

READINGS IN MODERN  
AND  
CONTEMPORARY HISTORY





The Century Historical Series

WILLIAM E. LINGELBACH

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READINGS IN MODERN  
AND  
CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

*by*

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## PREFACE

The practical problem of providing suitable collateral reading for large groups of students is recognized by every teacher who is at all conscious of his obligation. No teacher will oppose the view that students should be given reading material beyond the scope of the textbook, but unless provision is made by the library for a large number of duplicate copies, it is extremely difficult to administer such a program. History is a broad field and has an enormous literature which is frequently unknown to the student. He is often left with the impression that it is all in the text and has little opportunity to become familiar with diverse points of view or with good historical writing.

This collection of Readings is offered in the hope that it will provide a partial solution of the problem and that student interest in historical literature will be stimulated by it. The editor has been especially concerned with the student point of view, and, in order to test student opinion, used a trial edition of the Readings at Temple University. Over one thousand students were given the opportunity to criticize the selections, and the text was carefully revised in the light of this criticism. It was very clearly demonstrated that students preferred selections from secondary writers rather than primary source material, consequently the majority of the selections are of this character.

It is obviously impossible to include in a volume of this size material illustrative of all phases of Modern History, so the selections have been limited to certain fundamental movements. A unique feature of the book is the inclusion of pictures, cartoons, and caricatures which reflect the spirit of the times. This material is designed to illustrate certain basic trends and movements and is arranged with this purpose in mind.

I am under obligation to many individuals who have assisted me in the preparation of this book. The late Dana Carleton

Munro, former editor of the Century Historical Series, encouraged me to undertake this project and was most helpful in its initial stages. His successor to the editorship, Professor William E. Lingelbach, has proved a real friend in this undertaking and whatever merit the work may possess is due largely to his wise counsel and guidance.

Dr. J. Periam Danton and the staff of the Temple University Library, together with the editorial staff of D. Appleton-Century Company, have rendered invaluable service in gathering suitable illustrations, cartoons, and caricatures. My colleagues at Temple University have been helpful at all times and I wish to record my indebtedness to Professor Anna Lane Lingelbach, Professor Andreas Elviken, Professor James Barnes, Professor Raymond B. Munson, Mr. John S. Kramer, Mr. Thomas D. McCormick and Miss Theresa Nelson for many helpful suggestions. My wife, Barbara R. Cook, has helped with the proof and furnished that encouragement without which books would never be produced. I wish to record, also, my obligation to the many publishers who have permitted me to use copyrighted material.

ARTHUR N. COOK

*Glenside, Pennsylvania*

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### Rousseau

Rousseau's *Social Contract* did much to undermine the prestige of the Ancien Régime and provide the theoretical basis upon which Robespierre attempted to establish a new order in France through the instrumentality of the Terror.

### Voltaire

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### Montesquieu

Montesquieu was deeply interested in the problem of government and his *Spirit of the Laws* which drew many unfavorable comparisons between the English and French systems of government served to promote the growing feeling of discontent with the monarchy.

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## Hegel

Hegel, a German philosopher of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, is typical of an important group of intellectuals who did much to develop German national feeling.

## Garibaldi

Garibaldi, the great Italian patriot, not only conquered southern Italy but contributed much to the tradition of Italian greatness upon which nationalism feeds.

## Bismarck

Bismarck made skillful use of German national feeling to complete the greatest job of nation-building in the nineteenth century, the establishment of the German Empire.

## Mazzini

Mazzini was a great liberal as well as a great nationalist and contributed much to foster Italian national feeling, though he failed dismally as a practical leader.

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## Lincoln

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## Gladstone

Gladstone, four times Prime Minister of England, was the outstanding personality in the Liberal Party during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

## Gambetta

Leon Gambetta by his vigorous attacks on Napoleon III did much to weaken the Second Empire and as "the traveling salesman of the Republic" contributed greatly to the final establishment of republican government in France

## John Bright

John Bright is typical of the liberal bourgeoisie and was the staunch defender of the liberal philosophy of *laissez faire*.

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## I. THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TIMES



## 1. THE ADVENT OF THE MODERN AGE <sup>1</sup>

[There was no sudden break between medieval and modern times, and many of the characteristic features of medieval civilization are present in the world to-day. But by the middle of the fifteenth century there were a number of changes under way which were destined to persist, and which have played a large part in the development of modern culture.]



IT is an experience, not so common perhaps as it should be, but not unknown to some of us, to watch the increasing glow of the early morning spread over the landscape. Few of the objects disclosed are new, but all appear in an altered and constantly changing light. It is the dawn of a new day. The scene is set for a series of new occurrences. So it was with the coming on of modern times. No thoughtful student of history will now think of the middle ages, as he might have a generation ago, as a period of darkness. They had their own interest, their own culture, their own greatness. It is not in a contrast between darkness and light that the distinction between the middle ages and modern times is to be found, but in a difference of environment. The more the sources of our knowledge of the early modern centuries are studied the more do they disclose a new age. It is in a very real sense the dawn of a new era.

The tendency of scholarship has been to push the beginning of the modern period further and further back. As we obtain a clearer perspective, it becomes increasingly evident that by the middle of the thirteenth century the real middle ages were over.

<sup>1</sup> Edward P. Cheyney, *The Dawn of a New Era* (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1936), pp. 1-2. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Harper & Brothers.

A great era had passed away, its special characteristics outlived, its work accomplished. Those institutions which were destined to permanency had been placed on durable foundations. The Catholic church had been organized and its doctrines formulated, the basic systems of law had been elaborated, the universities had been founded, the older towns had been chartered, the chief lines of commerce had been marked out. On the other hand those institutions which were to disappear were obviously already in decay: feudalism was losing its universal sway; the Crusades were over; in the very year with which this volume begins Frederick II, the last of the medieval emperors claiming universal dominion, died and the long struggle between empire and papacy gradually ceased to interest their respective proponents. Little that was specifically medieval survived in any vigor the middle of the thirteenth century.

There was no sudden change. Birth and death of institutions as of populations nearly balanced one another. Most periods of history—and this is no exception—are marked by the simultaneous fading away of old institutions and the rise of new. From the middle of the thirteenth century onward, through the remainder of that century, in the active hundred years that followed and as the fifteenth century progressed, old institutions sank into insignificance, much that was new appeared. In these 200 years trade, industry and finance, under the influence of a nascent capitalism, superseded agriculture as the main economic basis of European society; town life grew in importance; the middle classes became more influential, the lower classes more restive; freedom took the place of serfdom among the rural masses; signs of the awakening of a national spirit became visible; boundaries of states were more settled. New dynasties took advantage of these conditions to build centralized monarchical states; the art of war was more highly developed; the church, weakened from within and without, lost its authority; new knowledge and new habits of thought were acquired. By some such date as 1450 a new age had arrived, and on the stage of a new Europe the drama of modern history was to be played. . . .

2. THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

[The expression "Commercial Revolution" is difficult to define but includes many of the changes that have resulted in the evolution of the present economic order. The extract which follows describes two aspects of this "revolution" but it should be remembered that such factors as the increase in the volume of trade, the widening scope of commerce, the growing supremacy of western ports, the increased supply of precious metals, and the development of new business techniques were an essential part of the movement.]



## IMPROVEMENTS IN NAVIGATION AND SHIPBUILDING

PERHAPS the most striking immediate effect of the expansion of Europe was its influence upon European and world commerce. The results in this field constitute what is, narrowly and technically speaking, the Commercial Revolution.

The era of expansion and commercial development depended upon several important innovations in the art of navigation. In the first place, we may note the series of inventions in the field of nautical instruments, from the earlier compass and astrolabe to the development of the mariner's log in the seventeenth century and the chronometer in the eighteenth. The mariner's compass, as we have seen, came to the knowledge of western Europe at the close of the twelfth century. Its origin is uncertain, though many believe it was derived from China or India by way of the Muslims. The astrolabe, a graduated brass circle for estimating the altitude of heavenly bodies, was known before 800, but was first employed in Western navigation by John II of Portugal about 1485. The quadrant, which replaced the astrolabe, was an instrument with a graduated arc of 90° and was used to measure

<sup>1</sup> Harry Elmer Baines, *The History of Western Civilization* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., New York, 1935), Vol. II, pp. 31-34. Copyright, 1935, by Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

approximately the altitude of heavenly bodies. It dates from the early sixteenth century. The sextant is a much more accurate instrument for computing the altitude of heavenly bodies and for estimating their angular distances as seen in the sky. It was invented independently by Captain John Hadley of the British navy and Thomas Godfrey of Philadelphia in 1731. It supplanted the astrolabe and quadrant. The chronometer, the first instrument for telling time accurately on board ship, was invented in 1735 by an Englishman, John Harrison. This, together with earlier instruments, made it possible to estimate longitude with exactness. The provision of the mariner's compass, the quadrant and the sextant, telescope, and other accessories enabled mariners to find their way at sea far more safely and precisely than had ever been the case in early maritime activity. Maps, charts, and tables were constantly improved, lighthouses built, harbors cleared of natural obstacles, and pilot service inaugurated. The rise of national governments marked the end of medieval strand laws, which had practically conferred upon localities the right to pillage stranded vessels.

Along with these improvements went the development of larger and more seaworthy ships. At first, the tendency was to concentrate upon building larger ships. The result was the development of the galleon, the caravel, the urca, and the carrack, vessels of from two to five decks, exceedingly well armed to beat off privateers and pirates. Ships of this sort were, however, relatively unwieldy. The Dutch and British specialized in craft somewhat smaller in size, but far swifter, more seaworthy, and more reliable than the galleon and the carrack. The Commercial Revolution rested upon these inventions and improvements connected with the art of navigation much as the later Industrial Revolution depended upon the inventions in textile machinery, steam power, and metallurgy.

#### NEW COMMODITIES FROM OVERSEAS AND THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPEAN TASTES AND CUSTOMS

The Commercial Revolution, with the accompanying growth of foreign trade and fresh cultural contacts, led to a radical

change in European taste. The psychological factor of demand lies at the bottom of all economic activity, and the character of European demand for consumer's goods was transformed during this period. Even the better middle-class houses were not considered comfortable without glass windows, wooden or tiled roofs, carpets and rugs, and upholstered furniture. Wall paper was introduced from China and lacquered ware from Japan. The hammock came from the West Indies, not from one of the older civilizations. Increase in the supply of cotton fiber and the cheapening of cotton and linen cloth made possible the introduction of more comfortable and more serviceable types of clothing. Underclothing and bedclothes, commonplace conveniences of modern life, began to come into general use in Europe for the first time.

Many of the new goods contributed less to comfort in itself than to satisfaction of the desire for ostentation and adornment. Furs, such as those of the beaver, sable, musk ox, and civet cat, were used for adornment of the person—particularly the feminine person. Furs were at this time especially a symbol of wealth and social rank. The use of silks for clothing, tapestry, and so on, was considerably increased by the introduction of silk culture from the East and its rapid development in northern Italy and southern France. Ostrich feathers were brought from Africa and utilized for trimming hats and dresses. Folding fans and parasols appeared in imitation of the Orient. At the outset, the parasol was almost wholly an object of ostentation, associated as it was in the Orient with royalty. In Europe it remained an ostensible sunshade until the close of the eighteenth century, when the more practical collapsible umbrella for protection against rain was developed. The perfumes used by both men and women, in part as a substitute for bathing, while not by any means novel in European society, were greatly increased and diversified by the new imports.

To add to the attractive appearance of dwellings, considerable attention was paid to the development of gardens, in which were planted various shrubs and flowers that had been brought from the Orient and America. Among these were the Virginia

creeper, the aster, the dahlia, the nasturtium, the sunflower, and various trees and plants such as the magnolia tree, the century plant, the pepper plant, the coral tree, and the locust tree.

The range of foods habitually consumed in Europe was greatly altered and enlarged. While spices continued to be imported in very large quantities, probably the most important food product introduced into Europe was the potato. This vegetable was first brought to Europe in the sixteenth century from the Americas. By the close of the seventeenth century it served as food for some people, especially the poor, as well as for live stock. It was not completely popularized as food, however, until the Napoleonic era and the decades following, when Europeans began to discover not only that the potato possesses high food value, but that it can be grown in abundance under relatively simple and cheap agricultural conditions.

Other food products new to Europe, though of somewhat less importance than the potato, were the lima bean, the yam, tapioca, and the tomato. Sugar was first extensively introduced at this time. Down to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the chief sweetening used for food and beverages had been honey. With the discovery of sugar cane, particularly in the West Indies and Central America, sugar came to be used in increasing quantities, especially after the opening of the nineteenth century. The demand for it was stimulated by the introduction of new beverages such as tea, coffee, and cocoa, which called for sweetening to meet the taste of most drinkers.

Important tropical fruits were now brought into Europe for the first time or in greater quantities than ever before. Among these were oranges, pineapples, bananas, and lemons. The more perishable fruits were introduced and grown in warm European areas. The coconut and the peanut were also first imported into Europe during the centuries after 1500. Indian corn (maize), while brought back to Spain by Columbus before the close of the fifteenth century, has never been as popular a crop in western Europe as in the United States. Yet it has been cultivated rather extensively as food for cattle and swine, and in parts of southern and southeastern Europe—in Rumania, for



example—it is a main article of peasant diet. Several new varieties of fowl were introduced as a result of oversea contact, particularly the turkey from Mexico, the guinea fowl from Africa, and the bantam from Java. Though the turkey came from America, its outlandish appearance earned it an oriental name, since mysterious or bizarre products were usually attributed to the East, for which Turkey was a symbol.

Probably the new beverages did even more than the foods and house furnishings to alter the pattern of social contacts in Europe. To alcoholic drinks long known in Europe were added new wines from the Madeira and Canary Islands, and rum made from the sugar and molasses of the West Indies. An especially popular beverage known as punch was made of rum, sugar, lemon juice, spices, and water. Far more significant, however, were the new nonalcoholic drinks. The Dutch in the East Indies learned tea-drinking from the Chinese and introduced it into Europe in the seventeenth century. Within a hundred years tea became an important commodity in world-trade. Attempts by the British East India Company to market it in the American colonies under conditions disapproved of by leading citizens will be remembered as one of the interesting episodes preliminary to our war for independence.

Europeans had discovered the virtues of coffee through contact with Arabia at the close of the Middle Ages. Mocha, the capital of the province of Yemen, on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea, was the first source of coffee for European consumption. Nearly all the coffee consumed in Europe until the close of the seventeenth century came from this area. In the following century the Dutch transplanted the industry to their East India islands, particularly Java. The Portuguese carried it to Brazil about the same time, and here it spread to other parts of tropical South America.

The third important nonalcoholic beverage was cocoa, which was made from the cacao bean imported from Mexico and Central America. Chocolate was manufactured by adding vanilla—also a new product—and sugar to cocoa.

The establishment of coffeehouses or “cafés” began a new

chapter in the social life of Europe. They were great fore-gathering places, particularly for men. They tended to break up the home as an air-tight compartment in society. Business enterprises often originated in coffeehouses, much of the political intrigue was laid there, and authors and artists often met there.

In this connection tobacco should be mentioned also, for it had a similar if not a greater effect upon social ways. When first brought from the West Indies it was used for its alleged medicinal properties. From the first there was a great deal of opposition—supported even by royalty—to its general adoption as a form of mild indulgence. King James I of England was one of the famous and vigorous critics of the new habit. Notwithstanding, there arose an enormous demand for tobacco in Europe, which led to its cultivation on a large scale in the West Indies and the South Atlantic colonies of North America, where it early became the most important single export of many areas.

In addition to a large number of fruits, vegetables, and beverages, at first regarded as medicinal, many drugs of undoubted therapeutic value were also brought into Europe during this period. Among these should be mentioned quinine, balsam, sarsaparilla, opium, and sweet flag. Of these much the most important was quinine, which was introduced from Peru in the seventeenth century and has proved a valuable specific for malaria and various fevers. In many areas and periods prior to this time malaria attained the proportions of a plague. These new drugs affected European medicine beneficially at the time by lessening the reliance upon crude methods of bloodletting for all diseases; they stimulated the beginnings of modern medical science, and extended the *materia medica*.

3. THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

[The economic revolution which occurred during the eighteenth century was twofold in character, agricultural and industrial. The growth of population rendered imperative changed methods of food production, which resulted in the conversion of village farms into factories for the production of bread and meat. This change involved two distinct innovations: the reforms in methods of cultivation introduced by such individuals as Jethro Tull, "Turnip" Townsend, and Arthur Young, and the introduction of a new system of land tenure featuring the enclosure movement. The selection which follows provides an explanation of the forces which made these changes necessary.]



A MOVEMENT such as the agricultural revolution, men like the leaders who brought it about, and the development of capitalistic agriculture have undoubted interest as well as value, but no such fascination or importance as is attached to the explanation or the causal factors. The most general expression of the cause of the agricultural revolution is that it was due to the desire (and opportunity) of cultivators to secure a larger surplus for sale without exhausting the fertility of the soil. It seems that there had been no actual impoverishment of agricultural lands on any large scale, though the poorer and lighter soils had already suffered. And as has before been pointed out, the most prominent locality in which early improvement took place was Norfolk, much of the soil of which is far from fertile. On the whole it seems that the issue was not so much to restore fertility as to maintain it; not to replenish lands worked out by earlier and cruder methods, but to keep them fit while heavier demands were being put upon them.

<sup>1</sup> N. S. B. Gras, *A History of Agriculture* (F. S. Crofts and Co., New York, 1925), pp. 220-222. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, F. S. Crofts and Co.

The heavier demands upon agriculture arose out of the increasing commercialization of production. This was due partly to the continued growth of towns and partly to the development of metropolitan economy, notable in England. The demand upon agriculture is strikingly illustrated by the great increase in grain exportation during the early part of the agricultural revolution. It is difficult, or impossible, to say to what extent this demand was due to the general expansion of the market and to what extent to the bounty paid by the government on English grain exported abroad. It is at least a plausible view that, while the bounty may have helped not a little, nevertheless, the main factor was the general growth of commerce, as is indicated by the following arguments. The progress in agriculture leading to the revolution began before the bounty was paid, and continued after it had ceased to be available. And on the analogy of developments in other countries, the expansion of general commerce tends to bring in the scientific rotation system.

Not only foreign but also domestic opportunities presented themselves. At home there was apparently an absolute increase of population of over two millions in the eighteenth century. There was likewise a rising standard of living that demanded fresh meat where formerly salted meat had been sufficient. This higher standard and new taste were doubtless due to the development of trade with its increasing opportunities and profits. And bound up with the new commercialism of growing towns and metropolitan economy, was the industrial revolution, which produced a larger surplus of manufactures than had been possible under the earlier industrial systems. This industrial revolution in turn put demands upon agriculture. It required raw materials in increasing amounts, notably wool and hides.

After the agricultural revolution had got under way, other factors emerged. Some small cultivators perceived that the industrial revolution was taking away their by-occupation of manufacture. During the summer months they had been cultivators, in the winter, handicraftsmen marketing their wares either in the wholesale or the retail trade. Having lost industry, they had only agriculture to rely upon. The smallness of their

holdings made such reliance precarious or impossible. The new agriculture was beyond their scant means. Accordingly they had either to become laborers on the larger estates of others, or to go off to the towns to work in the factories. If they went to the towns, they increased the market for agricultural products. If they became agricultural laborers, they helped produce the needed supply and gave up their scant acres for cultivation according to new and improved methods.

It is likely that the rise in the price of agricultural products, particularly during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, exerted some influence upon agriculture. Cultivators and landlords were stimulated to produce a larger surplus in order to enjoy the larger profits. This could be safely done only by cultivating the soil scientifically, that is, by effective rotation and by feeding the cattle in the stalls. At best, however, this was but a temporary factor, inducing the farmer to grow as much grain as possible, whilst the logical development of the new system would have suggested somewhat more attention to livestock than was given during the period of high wheat prices.

The government, too, may have had its influence. The effect of corn bounties has already been mentioned. The existence of protective corn laws for a whole generation may have been at least a minor factor. The favor shown to enclosers of land, at first by private act, and then by general statute, was doubtless of much greater moment, because without the large units of enclosed lands the new agriculture would not have come in, at least not so early and not so rapidly. The preachings of the Board of Agriculture and the fine example of George III, "Farmer George," should not be forgotten as contributing factors.

When we have set forth the causes of the agricultural revolution we have in part explained why the revolution began in England and not on the Continent. England had developed a metropolitan economy more completely than any other nation. This involved the careful organization of both foreign and domestic demand, the development of improved systems of transportation, and the industrial revolution. It meant available

capital for improvements with assured returns. Apparently England alone had an effective corn bounty. And Englishmen stood preeminent among Europeans as applied scientists and practical philosophers. Those who emphasize the materialistic interpretation of history will stress metropolitan economy; those who hold to the idealistic interpretation will make more of the traditional capacity of the English for applying knowledge to practical purposes.

#### 4. THE NATURE OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

[The selection which follows was written by Arnold Toynbee, who originated the phrase, "The Industrial Revolution." It provides an excellent summary of the many changes taking place at the close of the eighteenth century which marks the transition from the Domestic System to the Factory System.]



PASSING to manufactures, we find here the all-prominent fact to be the substitution of the factory for the domestic system, the consequence of the mechanical discoveries of the time. Four great inventions altered the character of the cotton manufacture; the spinning-jenny, patented by Hargreaves in 1770; the water-frame, invented by Arkwright the year before; Crompton's mule introduced in 1779 and the self-acting mule first invented by Kelly in 1792, but not brought into use till Roberts improved it in 1825. None of these by themselves would have revolutionised the industry. But in 1769—the year in which Napoleon and Wellington were born—James Watt took out his patent for the steam-engine. Sixteen years later it was applied to the cotton manufacture. In 1785 Boulton and Watt made an

<sup>1</sup> Arnold Toynbee, *The Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England* (First ed.; London: Rivingstone, 1887; more recently, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1916), pp. 69-73

engine for a cotton-mill at Papplewick in Notts, and in the same year Arkwright's patent expired. These two facts taken together mark the introduction of the factory system. But the most famous invention of all, and the most fatal to domestic industry, the power-loom, though also patented by Cartwright in 1785, did not come into use for several years, and till the power-loom was introduced the workman was hardly injured. At first, in fact, machinery raised the wages of spinners and weavers owing to the great prosperity it brought to the trade. In fifteen years the cotton trade trebled itself; from 1788 to 1803 has been called its 'golden age'; for, before the power-loom but after the introduction of the mule and other mechanical improvements by which for the first time yarn sufficiently fine for muslin and a variety of other fabrics was spun, the demand became such that 'old barns, carthouses, out-buildings of all descriptions were repaired, windows broke through the old blank walls, and all fitted up for loom-shops; new weavers' cottages with loom-shops arose in every direction, every family bringing home weekly from 40 to 120 shillings per week.' At a later date, the condition of the workman was very different. Meanwhile, the iron industry had been equally revolutionised by the invention of smelting by pit-coal brought into use between 1740-1750, and by the application in 1788 of the steam-engine to blast furnaces. In the eight years which followed this later date, the amount of iron manufactured nearly doubled itself.

A further growth of the factory system took place independent of machinery, and owed its origin to the expansion of trade, an expansion which was itself due to the great advance made at this time in the means of communication. The canal system was being rapidly developed throughout the country. In 1777 the Grand Trunk canal, 96 miles in length, connecting the Trent and Mersey, was finished; Hull and Liverpool were connected by one canal while another connected them both with Bristol; and in 1792, the Grand Junction canal, 90 miles in length, made a water-way from London through Oxford to the chief midland towns. Some years afterwards, the roads were greatly improved under Telford and Macadam; between 1818

and 1829 more than a thousand additional miles of turnpike road were constructed; and the next year, 1830, saw the opening of the first railroad. These improved means of communication caused an extraordinary increase in commerce, and to secure a sufficient supply of goods it became the interest of the merchants to collect weavers around them in great numbers, to get looms together in a workshop, and to give out the warp themselves to the workpeople. To these latter this system meant a change from independence to dependence; at the beginning of the century the report of a committee asserts that the essential difference between the domestic and the factory system is, that in the latter the work is done 'by persons who have no property in the goods they manufacture.' Another direct consequence of this expansion of trade was the regular recurrence of periods of over-production and of depression, a phenomenon quite unknown under the old system, and due to this new form of production on a large scale for a distant market.

These altered conditions in the production of wealth necessarily involved an equal revolution in its distribution. In agriculture the prominent fact is an enormous rise in rents. Up to 1795, though they had risen in some places, in others they had been stationary since the Revolution. But between 1790 and 1833, according to Porter, they at least doubled. In Scotland, the rental of land, which in 1795 had amounted to £2,000,000, had risen in 1815 to £5,278,685. A farm in Essex, which before 1793 had been rented at 10s. an acre, was let in 1812 at 50s., though six years after, this had fallen again to 35s. In Berks and Wilts, farms which in 1790 were let at 14s., were let in 1810 at 70s., and in 1820 at 50s. Much of this rise, doubtless, was due to money invested in improvements—the first Lord Leicester is said to have expended £400,000 on his property—but it was far more largely the effect of the enclosure system, of the consolidation of farms, and of the high price of corn during the French war. Whatever may have been its causes, however, it represented a great social revolution, a change in the balance of political power and in the relative position of classes. The farmers shared in the prosperity of the landlords; for many of






Hand Loom



Early Factory


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
From Sovfoto

Modern Power Plant

THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTION




Semaphore



Courtesy of Western Union Telegraph Company

Telegraph



Courtesy of Radio Corporation of America

Radio

## THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATION

them held their farms under beneficial leases, and made large profits by them. In consequence, their character completely changed; they ceased to work and live with their labourers, and became a distinct class. The high prices of the war time thoroughly demoralised them, for their wealth then increased so fast, that they were at a loss what to do with it. Cobbett has described the change in their habits, the new food and furniture, the luxury and drinking, which were the consequences of more money coming into their hands than they knew how to spend. Meanwhile, the effect of all these agrarian changes upon the condition of the labourer was an exactly opposite and most disastrous one. He felt all the burden of high prices, while his wages were steadily falling, and he had lost his common-rights. It is from this period, viz., the beginning of the present century, that the alienation between farmer and labourer may be dated.

Exactly analogous phenomena appeared in the manufacturing world. The new class of great capitalist employers made enormous fortunes, they took little or no part personally in the work of their factories, their hundreds of workmen were individually unknown to them; and as a consequence, the old relations between masters and men disappeared and a 'cash nexus' was substituted for the human tie. The workmen on their side resorted to combination, and Trades-Unions began a fight which looked as if it were between mortal enemies rather than joint producers. The misery which came upon large sections of the working people at this epoch was often, though not always, due to a fall in wages, for, as I said above, in some industries they rose. But they suffered likewise from the conditions of labour under the factory system, from the rise of prices, especially from the high price of bread before the repeal of the corn-laws, and from those sudden fluctuations of trade, which, ever since production has been on a large scale, have exposed them to recurrent periods of bitter distress. The effects of the Industrial Revolution prove that free competition may produce wealth without producing well-being. We all know the horrors that ensued in England before it was restrained by legislation and combination.

5. THE REVOLUTION IN TRANSPORTATION <sup>1</sup>

[A vital phase of the Industrial Revolution was the change in methods of communication. This "Communications Revolution" involved four distinct changes: the development of canals, the construction of hard surface roads, the development of railroads, and the invention and perfection of the steamship.]



## RAILROADS

NEITHER roads nor canals provided any adequate method of rapid transportation of individuals or goods. This was achieved by means of the railroad, which, in its general significance, simply meant the application of the Watt steam-engine to the principles of locomotion and transportation. The railroads developed naturally and gradually on the basis of a number of previous achievements, both in the way of construction of the road-bed and the providing of a satisfactory type of power. The earliest anticipation of the modern railroad was to be found in the so-called "tramways" which were introduced in Germany as early as the fifteenth century. The tramway was a device in which heavy square timbers were laid down in parallel rows with a distance between them equal to the gage of the ordinary cart or coach of the time. They were introduced at this early date in order to provide some method of escape from the miserable roads of the time, the timbers keeping the conveyance from sinking into the mud and becoming lodged there. The tramway was introduced into England in the eighteenth century, usually in connection with the transportation of heavy materials from factories and mines. Down to near the close of that century the English tramway continued to utilize timbers for the tracks, at best placing strips of iron

<sup>1</sup> Harry Elmer Barnes, *Living in the Twentieth Century* (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1928), pp. 94-97, 100-105. Reprinted by permission of the author.

on top to prevent excessive wear. Gradually, with the improved methods of making iron, iron tracks tended to supersede wooden ones and those made of a combination of wood and iron. In addition to the private tramways operated by miners, manufacturers and merchants, the practise developed of building public tramways, open to all upon the payment of a fee or toll. Carts and coaches on these public tramways were drawn by oxen, mules or horses.

The modern railroad was at first nothing more than the attempt to substitute the steam-engine for the horse, as the method of propulsive locomotion used. Almost synchronous with the appearance of the public tramway in England were efforts made by ingenious inventors to adapt the Watt engine to the requirements of an adequate type of locomotion. Among those who were successful in this effort were Richard Trevithick, William Hedley and George Stephenson. Stephenson completed his first reasonably successful locomotive as early as 1814, and in 1825 the first English railroad, the Stockton and Darlington, was opened. Trains were run at a speed of from ten to fifteen miles per hour. Stephenson assiduously devoted himself to the improvement of his engine, and by 1830 he had produced the famous "Rocket," which was able to make the unheard-of speed of some twenty-nine miles per hour. Before the close of the 'thirties the London and Birmingham Railroad had been opened over a distance of some one hundred and twenty-five miles and was maintaining trains scheduled at about twenty-five miles per hour. The early English railroads were originally operated in a very simple manner after the method of the turnpikes and tramways, being rented to any person who wished to pay the tolls. This procedure soon proved utterly preposterous and impossible of execution, and gave way to the single, centralized, controlling and regulating agency. In due time the railroads were owned and controlled by a commercial company which supplied and operated its own trains and constructed and maintained its own right-of-way.

In the matter of perfecting the technique of railroad transportation, many important contributions were made by Ameri-

can engineers, who had to face new and more serious problems, due to the steeper grades and longer distances of North America. The English railroads had at first been built on approximately straight lines without any curves, and the trucks on the cars and locomotives had been rigidly attached. It was impossible for such a locomotive or coach to take a sharp curve, for any such attempt would have led to the shearing off of the trucks from the coach. The Americans found it necessary to build railroads with sharp curves and they solved this problem by providing the so-called swivel axle on the trucks which allowed the taking of sharp curves and, further, made it possible to build much longer locomotives and coaches than would otherwise have been possible. Another contribution lay in the making of the car wheel in the form of a section of a cone to enable it to take the curves more safely. Again, the English railroads had been built on a solid road-bed with the rails fastened to a series of piles driven into the ground. This was an expensive method and also resulted in a far greater amount of wear and tear on the rolling-stock. American engineers invented the scheme of providing a flexible road-bed in the form of transverse ties laid on a ballast bed, which was provided by either gravel or crushed stone. This insured a relatively cheap type of road-bed and one which combined the necessary rigidity with sufficient flexibility to insure greater comfort to passengers and less wear upon the rolling-stock.

The latest development in railroad technique has been the appearance of electric locomotives. The electric locomotive is much cleaner, ever ready for service and also presents far less danger of starting fires along the right-of-way. The use of this type of power is bound to increase with the gradual exhaustion of the world's coal and oil supply. The electric car or trolley service has proved of great significance in urban and interurban transportation. It has reached the most complete development in the great metropolitan subways. . . .

## STEAMSHIPS

There is a well-supported tradition that Denis Papin, who was mentioned earlier as the creator of the atmosphere-engine, had in 1707 prepared the model of a steamboat which he had entrusted to a ship captain to be carried to the British Royal Society for exhibition and investigation. The captain was fearful, however, lest the steamboat might prove a success and ruin the business of the sailing vessels which he and his contemporaries were operating. He therefore destroyed the model before he reached England. About 1788 John Fitch, in America, and William Symmington, in England, had successfully applied the steam-engine to the problem of water locomotion. Fitch's work is particularly interesting in that one of his boats actually carried passengers for several months in 1790 and also in that he made use of a crude form of propeller instead of the paddle-wheel which was employed on all the other early steamboats, including Fulton's, up to the 1840's. The inventions of Fitch and Symmington were not, however, adopted on any significant scale.

The honor of having first achieved commercial success with the steamboat must be assigned to Robert Fulton, who was quite as much a promoter as an inventor. He had traveled widely in Europe and was thoroughly familiar with the work of both Fitch and Symmington. In 1807 he had the famous *Clermont* built and launched on the Hudson River and was rewarded by observing his vessel make a satisfactory voyage to Albany. He had the capital to hire first-rate builders to construct the hull, and to import a Watt and Boulton engine. The steamboat was thereafter rapidly developed to meet the need of water transportation in the inland waters of the United States and very soon for ocean transportation. In the process of successfully marketing the steamboat and securing its wide adoption, Fulton played a very important part. By 1819 the *Savannah*, a sailing vessel with an auxiliary engine, completed a trans-Atlantic trip, but the crossing was achieved quite as much by the use of sails as by the aid of steam. The first truly successful trans-Atlantic trips made by

steamboats were those of the *Sirius* and the *Great Western*, which crossed the Atlantic in eighteen and fifteen days respectively in the year 1838. The next year the Cunard line was established, this being the first marine organization for trans-Atlantic steam navigation.

From the time of Fulton onward the progress of steam navigation has been associated with certain technical improvements in the details of propulsion, in the type of motor used, in the material of which boats have been constructed and in the method of organizing and controlling in a commercial way the great fleet of steamboats which now serve the world's commerce. One very significant innovation was the invention of the screw propeller, which possessed very real advantages over the old paddle or stern-wheel propeller, except for navigation in shallow water. Fitch had hit upon a rudimentary form of propeller, and early in the nineteenth century Colonel Stevens of New Jersey had made improvements upon Fitch's device. The actual invention of a successful screw propeller, however, was due to the labors of John Ericsson, later noted as the inventor of the *Monitor*, and E. P. Smith, an English inventor. Ericsson's model, perfected in 1839, was the one generally adopted for application to steam vessels. Even at the present time, however, the paddle-wheel is retained on such large vessels as the Hudson River steamers because of the danger of damaging or entangling a screw propeller in shallow water. In addition to the devising of a propeller, another very significant improvement was found in the turbine-engine, which gave much greater power and took up less space. The Parsons turbine-engine had been invented in the 'eighties, but was first used on the *Kaiser Wilhelm II* in 1901. Much more recently we have witnessed, in some cases, the superseding of all forms of steam-engines, by the electric motor, or by a much more promising invention, the Diesel engine, an internal-combustion engine burning relatively cheap fuel and requiring no extensive space for boilers or fuel.

Very significant also is the improvement in the material out of which vessels have been constructed. The early ships were, of course, made of wood, though iron scows were built as early



as 1787 by an English iron-master, named Wilkinson. These iron scows were utilized for the transportation of coal and ore. At first it was commonly supposed that an iron boat would not float, though scientists familiar with Archimedes' law of floating bodies were convinced to the contrary. It was soon shown that iron construction actually economized weight in ships of the same size, capacity and strength. Wooden vessels were gradually superseded in the English merchant marine following 1840, about the same time that the screw propeller was adopted.

The critical period in the struggle between England and the United States for the ocean-carrying trade fell, unfortunately for the latter, in the decades of the Civil War and Reconstruction. There was some question as to the all-round superiority of iron over wood, but the steel ship, made generally practicable by the Bessemer and open-hearth processes, served to make both older types obsolete. Our preoccupation with the war and its aftermath gave Great Britain a lead which we have never been able to overcome. Some attempts have been made to introduce reinforced concrete into ship construction, but the success of this experiment has not been notable or encouraging to date. The improvement in the materials out of which boats were constructed was paralleled by certain other technical advances, most notably the standardization of parts in shipbuilding. This has made it possible to manufacture parts of standardized vessels in steel factories remote from shipyards, for collection and assemblage later. This process of standardization of parts in the building of steel steamships probably reached its highest development in the American efforts to build steel vessels during the World War, and in German submarine construction during the same period.

It was but natural that the progress in the technique of steam navigation should witness a remarkable increase in the size and speed of ocean-going vessels. For example, the tonnage of the *Great Northern* was only 1,340, whereas the *Bismarck*, the largest vessel constructed to date, and now known under the English name of the *Majestic*, rates a little over 58,000. Her older and slightly smaller sister ship, the *Vaterland*, now

the American *Leviathan*, has been refitted since the war in a manner to give her a tonnage of more than 59,000. The *Great Western* was 236 feet long, whereas the *Majestic* measures 912 feet; the *Leviathan* 907. The engine of the *Great Western* had a horse-power of 440 whereas the engines of the *Majestic* and *Leviathan* develop about 100,000 horse-power. The engines employed in most of the great steamers of to-day are either the improved turbine or a combination of turbine and reciprocating engine. The progress in the speed of trans-Atlantic voyages may also be measured by the comparison of the fact that the *Great Western* occupied fifteen days in making its trip, whereas the *Mauretania* has established a record of four days and ten hours.

The two great types of ocean traffic to-day are carried on by the liners, on the one hand, and the tramp steamers, on the other; in other words, the line traffic and the charter traffic. The average layman, in considering the subject of the steamboat, almost always concentrates his attention upon the great liners, which attract well-nigh all the popular attention because of the description of their remarkable size or speed or tragic disasters in the daily newspapers. As a matter of fact, however, far the greatest part of the commerce of the world is carried on by the relatively small and dingy tramp steamers, which bear what is known as the charter traffic. The liners are relatively large and speedy vessels which run along definite routes, according to a pre-announced schedule, and land uniformly at certain selected ports. They specialize primarily in passenger, express and mail transportation, all requiring a relatively high degree of speed and safety.

The tramp steamers are far more significant in world commerce, although less picturesque. The tramp steamer is prepared to carry all types of cargoes to any part of the world. It is not usually a large vessel, because it must be small enough so that it will not be required to wait too long in port to secure an adequate cargo. No effort is made to develop speed, because above a certain rate, additional speed becomes progressively more expensive. The average tonnage of the tramp steamer

usually runs from twenty-five hundred to five thousand, its speed is usually around ten to twelve knots per hour, and it uses only from twenty-five to forty tons of coal per day, whereas the *Mauretania* consumes something over a thousand tons per day. The tramp steamers effect their connection with shippers desiring their services chiefly through brokerage houses that specialize in the matter of bringing the shipper and the boat owners together. When a shipper desires to send a cargo to some remote port, he usually goes to a broker who puts him in touch with the captain of the tramp steamer which seems best adapted to carry his particular cargo to the desired destination. Usually the rate charged by the owner of the tramp steamer will depend upon the relative possibility of getting a return cargo from the port to which the original shipment is to be sent. In some cases there is a tendency for even the charter traffic to develop somewhat regular lines of transit in order to build up a more permanent and reliable clientèle, but it remains in general relatively flexible and adapted to transporting all types of cargoes to all parts of the earth. The improvement of steam navigation has resulted in a great decrease and standardization of rates. The shipping rates as a whole have been lowered by at least fifty per cent. in the last half-century. The lowering and standardization of shipping rates have reacted to increase the standardization and equalization of the prices of the commodities thus transported.



## II. THE OLD REGIME



## 6. THE BOURGEOISIE AND URBAN PROLETARIAT<sup>1</sup>

[The Bourgeoisie was the dynamic class in eighteenth-century French society. It was growing rapidly in wealth, influence, and ambition and was largely responsible for precipitating the Revolution. While the peasants were heavily burdened, it is doubtful if they would have initiated a revolution, and even had they done so they would in all probability have been crushed. On the other hand, the urban proletariat played an important part in the Revolution and provided the reservoir of discontent from which the mobs were drawn.]



ONLY a small percentage of the population lived in cities, and the cities, even the largest, were thinly populated. Paris with its half-million souls was the largest city in France and on the Continent. Lyons, long the seat of a prosperous silk trade and industry, was the second largest city in France with a population of 135,000. No other city in the realm had as many as 100,000 inhabitants. Yet France was the most densely populated country in Europe, and its population increased rapidly toward the end of the Old Régime, particularly in urban centers. Though the ancient obstacles to trade and industry still remained in force, France underwent a remarkable economic development in the eighteenth century. In 1789 France had nearly half the available specie in Europe, the population was increasing rapidly, and rents and the prices of commodities and land were rising steadily. Internal trade profited by the

<sup>1</sup> Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon* (F. S. Crofts and Company, New York, 1933), pp. 51-55. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, F. S. Crofts and Company.

improvements in the ways of communication and the means of transportation as well as by the application of the liberal commercial policy of the administration. The foreign trade of France was inferior only to that of England, its volume being quadrupled in the period between the death of Louis XIV and the outbreak of the Revolution. This extraordinary commercial expansion not only brought French merchants in closer contact with other European countries, but gave France a predominant share of the Levant trade and tended to modify the restrictive mercantilist policy which hampered colonial trade between France and her colonies in the West Indies.

At the same time, industrial development made notable progress, being stimulated by the great fluid capital that was amassed in commerce as well as by the application of the new doctrines of economic liberalism. All signs indicated that France was entering upon the first stages of that industrial Revolution which had already begun in England. There was a great extension of rural industry, particularly in the textile industry. In the poorer agricultural regions of western France the peasants devoted themselves only to the bleaching and finishing of the cloth, but in the more fertile provinces of northeastern France the peasants received the raw material from the entrepreneurs in the near-by towns and worked under their direction, carrying on production from the first to the last stages. The intervention of the entrepreneurs in the urban centers of the silk and cloth trade was still more pronounced. Great capital was invested in the cloth industry, large plants with costly equipments were built, vast supplies of raw materials were bought, and the labor was subdivided among many classes of specialized workmen. The cloth industry alone occupied more than one hundred factories which employed many formerly independent master workmen who now found themselves reduced to the ranks of wage earners. Machinery, however, had been introduced only in comparatively few industries: very slightly in the silk and paper mills; more pronouncedly in the metallurgical industry, and most commonly in the cotton mills and in the coal mines. Despite these scattered manifestations of increasing capitalistic



industry, the era of machinery and industrial concentration was only in its infancy, and the predominant system was that of petty industry employing only few workmen.

It is necessary to distinguish between the social classes among the city dwellers, for they did not profit alike from the astounding increase in the private wealth of the country. The urban population was divided into two large groups, the bourgeoisie and the workmen. The bourgeois lived on their incomes or else from the revenue of a trade or profession which required little manual labor. All other city dwellers belonged to the *gens du peuple*, that is, a group akin to an urban proletariat. Yet the bourgeoisie itself had gradations of rank. Most influential of all were the lordly, though non-noble, owners of offices in the financial and judicial administration, the rich bankers and financiers, and the small group of capitalists who had accumulated great fortunes in commerce and industry. Among the last named were those engaged in wholesale trade and maritime insurance and the directors of the new manufacturing establishments. Some retired from active business careers and lived on their incomes, and others bought offices that ennobled them, or patents of nobility and landed property in the country. They maintained sumptuous residences and vied with the richest nobles in the splendor of their social life.

This "urban patriciate," which monopolized most of the municipal offices, was only a small portion of the bourgeoisie. The great majority of the bourgeoisie, the "middle" and the petty bourgeois, led a simple life without luxury or ostentation. Some, like the masters of the guilds of the printers and book dealers, the apothecaries, the goldsmiths, the haberdashers, and the hosiers, and members of the legal profession (advocates and notaries), lived in easy circumstances. Others, like the physicians and surgeons, professors of the universities, and lesser merchants and subordinate legal officials (sheriffs, clerks, bailiffs), were less endowed with the world's goods. The social distinctions between the various groups were rigidly maintained, but nearly all had sufficient wealth for greater material comforts and leisure for intellectual pursuits. They bought the works of

the great writers of the century, mingled in the society of the salons, and joined clubs and Masonic lodges, where they discussed the new liberal and radical ideas and found an audience that listened to and debated the many grievances which they voiced.

In wealth, in ability, in formal education and culture, they felt themselves the equals of the nobility of birth, yet the doors to many offices were closed to them. The government's policy of selling offices enabled a great many bourgeois to become public functionaries, but tradition and royal edicts excluded them from highest positions in the administration, in the army, in the church and in the judiciary. Their pride and self-respect were wounded by the social discrimination and the deliberate snubs administered by the nobility. They demanded a voice in the government in order to check the wastefulness and the inefficiency of a monarchy which failed to respect its financial obligations to its creditors and burdened them with taxes. Though many of them steadily increased their wealth they chafed at the obsolete governmental and feudal restrictions upon free commercial and industrial development, at the unjustifiable barriers against their initiative and resourcefulness. From the ranks of these enterprising merchants, manufacturers, and financiers came the loudest protests against the obsolete system of trade and craft corporations, which the government, for fiscal reasons, attempted to strengthen. They pleaded the cause of commercial and industrial freedom, of *laissez faire*, against the innumerable obstacles that the guild systems, regulations, and monopolies raised in their path. From the ranks of the cultured and ambitious lawyers came the most enthusiastic and militant response to the new ideas of the century. In 1788-1789 their rôle in undermining the Old Régime was particularly prominent.

On the other hand, the very prosperity that brought wealth and comforts to the upper and middle bourgeoisie increased the hardships of the petty craftsmen and workmen. In most of the cities the small artisans who worked alone or with the assistance of one or two journeymen and apprentices were in an overwhelming majority. As Professor Sée remarks, "This is true

not only of all the trades having as their object the feeding, clothing, and housing of the population, but also of all the trades connected with the textile industry, all of which were later included among the great industries." The workingmen who belonged to the guilds or corporations found it increasingly difficult to rise to the status of master and were doomed to remain wage earners all their lives. They formed secret organizations of their own, but the force of their unions was misspent in petty rivalries rather than directed toward the common defense of the interests of the laboring class against the masters or the government. The first half of the century witnessed an increased stringency in the internal regulations of the corporations, the government coming to the aid of the masters in outlawing strikes and forbidding artisans to form corporate groups of their own. Those who worked in the factories were, in general, docile to the severe discipline that prevailed there. They could not leave their factory without written permission, nor could they obtain a new position without presenting a written dismissal from their previous master or employer.

For the workers the remarkable economic progress of the century was no blessing. It subjected them more closely than ever to the authority of the individual employer in particular and to that of the government in general. It raised prices much more rapidly than it did wages and tended steadily to impoverish them. Whenever a crisis occurred, many workmen were thrown out of employment and were reduced, like the agricultural proletariat, to vagrancy or mendicity. Still, there was no labor question during the Old Régime. The laboring class complained more and more vigorously, but it sought only relief from unemployment, soaring prices, government regulations, and the grim menace of starvation. It did not consider itself as a distinct group nor did it agitate for a new industrial organization. The claims of labor against the employer as voiced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were unknown in the Old Régime.

7. TURGOT'S ATTEMPT AT REFORM <sup>1</sup>

[Soon after the accession of Louis XVI, Turgot was appointed Controller-General. He had been very successful as Intendant of Limoges, and there was real promise that fundamental readjustments in the social order might be accomplished without violence. The following extract shows how vain this hope really was and pictures the despair which gripped the more thoughtful element in French society upon his dismissal.]



WHEN Turgot became Minister of Finance he found a large deficit and a peasantry ground down by taxation, but he did not find a poverty-stricken nation. The middle class was fairly prosperous, many of the nobles and clergy were rich, but there was little public spirit in France. The division of the country into provinces, each with its different regulations regarding taxation, its separate customhouses and separate tariff, prevented the growth of a spirit of patriotism. The heavy *octroi* charges made on all produce entering the towns from the country divided the interests of the peasants from those of the townsmen, while the incubus placed upon trade by restriction, privileges, and monopoly lay on the people as a deadening weight. "Your nation," Turgot once explained to Louis XVI, "is a society made up of different orders with little in common, and of a people, the individual members of which have few social bonds." Privilege—the privilege of the province, the town, the trade, and the class, was eating out the heart of the people, and to escape taxation was the universal effort. There was little wonder, for the payment of taxes brought no voice in the government of his country to the man who paid.

It was Turgot's aim to change these things. He thought out a great scheme by which the people should have a direct voice

<sup>1</sup> Sophia H. MacLehose, *The Last Days of the French Monarchy* (James MacLehose and Sons, Glasgow, 1901), pp. 171-190. (Condensed.)

in the management of local affairs, and at the same time should be represented in the administration of the affairs of the nation, and in this scheme he did not forget the importance of the class who had the greatest stake in the country—the proprietors of the soil. . . .

. . . But before attempting to carry out schemes so far-reaching, he had to meet two pressing needs—want of money and want of food. The Abbé Terray had left debt in all directions, and murmurs of national bankruptcy had been heard. Turgot at once made up his mind that there must be no bankruptcy. France must not be dishonoured by shirking her debt, and at the same time there must be no increase of taxation and no loans. To effect economy in the expenditure and in the collection of taxes was his first effort.

The maintenance of the king's household cost thirty-one million francs, or about one million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year. To economise here was difficult because of the private interests affected by each economy. The king had already set the example by reducing the number of tables in the royal household, that is, by having a larger number of the household dine together; he had also put down two of his hunting studs, that for the doe and that for the wild boar, and thus had deprived himself of the possibility of hunting every day in the week. Pensions from the royal treasury were reduced. The Minister of Finance was less ready than heretofore to advance funds to pay royal debts, and superfluous offices were, when possible, abolished.


Economy in the collecting of taxes was as important as in their expenditure. Turgot knew well that there was a grave difference between the amount paid by the nation and the amount which reached the treasury. The difference went to the men to whom the government let out the gathering of the taxes. The system was something like that which used to take place in England with tolls on roads. Certain men, called in France farmers-general, paid the French government so much for the right of collecting the taxes. These men took care to see that the money to be raised was enough to provide a profit for them-

selves. "I suppose," says a contemporary writer, "that the farmers-general each gain 50,000 crowns a year, and there are sixty of them . . . I am morally certain," he continues, "that the interest of particular people rather than the good of the State is concerned in the continuance of this system." . . .

But before Turgot could go far in finance reform he had to face a still sterner evil. On all sides trade was hampered by monopolies, but there was one which brought with it a risk of famine. This was the monopoly in corn. A company of men authorised by the State had the right of buying up and storing corn. The original idea was to provide against need in time of scarcity, but the company cared only for profit, and used to hoard up the grain until its price had risen to the highest possible, and then to sell in privileged markets. The people nicknamed the company the *Pacte de Famine*.

Turgot had only been a short time in office when this company applied for its ordinary renewal of license. Louis XV had had a money interest in the *Pacte de Famine*, and it brought a considerable revenue to the treasury, but this year the license was refused. A month later Turgot proposed an order by which trade in corn should be made free within the kingdom of France. Not only the *Pacte de Famine*, but all privileged markets were to be abolished. The king approved of the proposal, the measure was brought before his council on September 13th, 1774, and on the 20th was made public. This measure, coming as it did in the first early days of the royal popularity, was received with joy by the people, while the manner in which it was introduced created intense interest in the minds of those men who sympathised with Turgot, and, like him, were anxious for reform.

"For such is our good pleasure" had hitherto been the only reason given by a king for the promulgation of a law. But Turgot, true to his principle of educating the people to a willing obedience, prefaced the law by an explanation of the benefits of freer trade. "We have never yet," said Voltaire, "had edicts in which the sovereign had deigned to teach his people, to reason with them, to instruct them in their own interests, to persuade



THE THREE ESTATES PROCEEDING TO VERSAILLES

The first meeting of the States-General was set for May 5, 1789. The picture shows the clergy driving six owls symbolic of wisdom with the nobility sitting at ease and the peasantry, spade across shoulder, supporting the orb and the crown. (From Ernest F. Henderson, *Symbol and Satire in the French Revolution*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1912. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons.)



BREAKING DOWN FEUDALISM

The members of the National Assembly are shown destroying with their flails the symbols of the old order. the shield, armor, the sword, the crozier, and the mitre. (From Ernest F. Henderson, *Symbol and Satire in the French Revolution*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1912. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons.)



Rousseau



Voltaire

(From Havens, *Selections from Voltaire.*)



Montesquieu



Diderot

Courtesy of the Old Print Shop, New York City

FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS AND THINKERS



before commanding them." To do this, to recognise that intelligent comprehension is a desirable part of the obedience of the subject, was in itself reform, and reform which struck at the underlying idea of the old régime. It was because of this as well as in admiration of Turgot's clear statement of the advantages of a freer commerce that Voltaire wrote his friend d'Alembert, "I have just read Turgot's masterpiece, and it seems to me that it brings a new heaven and a new earth." . . .

Turgot's next reforms were on a larger scale and already he had made enemies . . .

The edicts were six in number, and were prefaced by an introduction which gave unmistakable warning of the policy Turgot meant to pursue. It was, as M. Say concisely puts it, "to abolish privilege, and to oblige the nobility and clergy to submit to taxation on the same conditions as did ordinary citizens." . . .

The edicts met with strong opposition, for the privileged were growing alarmed. Already during the first year and a half of the new reign three out of the new ministers who had been appointed were filled with the spirit of reform. . . .

When, therefore, Malesherbes prepared edicts to prevent the nobles from escaping their just debts, and St. Germain determined to prevent their buying advancement in the army, and Turgot asked them to contribute to a tax which should replace the forced labour—the *corvée*—from which they had been exempt, there was little wonder that the privileged cried out and were in great disquiet. "The king has published some edicts which will probably cause fresh trouble with Parlement," Marie-Antoinette wrote to her mother, and she was right.

As Turgot had foreseen, Parlement was foremost in the opposition. It took its old high ground of protecting the rights of France against royal despotism. The laws as they existed, it said, were part of the constitution of the nation, and the king had no power to change them. It defended the old régime against the sovereign himself, and refused to register the edicts. . . .

"There is only M. Turgot and myself who care for the people," Louis once said, and now he summoned the Parlement to Versailles and in a *Lettre de Justice* enforced registration.

The *Lit de Justice* was held on the 12th March, 1776. In remonstrating against the edicts the President of the Parlement had declared that Paris was alarmed—the nobles in distress and the bourgeois in consternation. But no sooner did the news of their registration reach the city than the people broke out into rejoicing. The name of the king and of liberty were shouted together, and both were loudly praised. For the first time working men were seen driving about the streets of Paris, thus asserting themselves socially, but they did it as cheaply as they could, for the carriages were very full! . . .

But if France profited, Turgot lost. The very passing of his edicts caused his downfall. He had made enemies in the strongholds of prejudice, and neither the approval of the liberal minded, the sympathy of his friend and colleague Malesherbes, nor the support of the king was enough to resist the power of the opposition. And alas! The king's support was beginning to fail. Turgot had compelled retrenchments: he had abolished unnecessary offices and the attendant salaries, and this manner of economy did not tend to make either king or queen more popular at court.

He had offended the clergy. They were angry because Turgot had tried to induce the king to omit that part of the coronation oath which forbade liberty of conscience, and in return succeeded in rousing the king's suspicion of his minister's orthodoxy. "Does M. Turgot go to mass?" the king asked Maurepas. "I do not know, Sire. M. Terray went every day," and Louis, a faithful churchman, grew uneasy.

Turgot had also offended the queen. He had hesitated over Trianon, he had opposed her desires to help her favourites, and especially had displeased her in a matter which excited much bitter feeling at the time. . . .

Consistent to the last, Turgot drew up a fresh scheme of reform for the king's household. He did not expect it to be accepted, and it was not. "What! another *mémoire*?" the king is reported to have said. "Is this all?" he added, when the *mémoire* was read through. "Yes, Sire." "So much the better," Louis replied, and on May 12th, 1776, Turgot was dismissed.

In dismissing Turgot, Louis may be said to have sealed his own fate. Serious difficulties lay before him. How to fill the exchequer and yet relieve the taxpayer, how to meet the new ideas and yet maintain the old administrations, were problems too great for the king. Heaven gave him Turgot and Malesherbes, and he let them go. . . .

The disappointment to the thoughtful was great. "I have only death to look forward to," said Voltaire, "now that Turgot is out of office." The office had not been held more than twenty-two months, but in these M. Turgot had done noble work. He had attacked privilege, he had freed the corn trade from restrictions within the kingdom of France, he had opened trade to all men, he had abolished forced labour, and, above all, had first given France the idea of a great national life in which each citizen must bear a part.

## 8. A TYPICAL CAHIER<sup>1</sup>

[In anticipation of the call for the Estates General, each estate was asked to submit a list of grievances together with suggestions for reform. The *cahiers* were compiled by the voters of each order at the time they voted for representatives to the Estates General and indicate in general the attitude of the French public on the eve of the Revolution.]



### CAHIER

OF the grievances, complaints and remonstrances of the members of the third estate of the bailliage of Versailles.

#### CONSTITUTION

Art. 1. The power of making laws resides in the king and the nation.

<sup>1</sup> *Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History*, translated by Merrick Whitcomb (Department of History of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1898), Vol. IV, No. 5 (Condensed.) Reprinted by courtesy of the University of Pennsylvania Press

Art. 2. The nation being too numerous for a personal exercise of this right, has confided its trust to representatives freely chosen from all classes of citizens. These representatives constitute the national assembly.

Art. 3. Frenchmen should regard as laws of the kingdom those alone which have been prepared by the national assembly and sanctioned by the king. . . .

Art. 5. The laws prepared by the States General and sanctioned by the king shall be binding upon all classes of citizens and upon all provinces of the kingdom. They shall be registered literally and accurately in all courts of law. They shall be open for consultation at all seats of municipal and communal government; and shall be read at sermon time in all parishes.

Art. 6. That the nation may not be deprived of that portion of legislation which is its due, and that the affairs of the kingdom may not suffer neglect and delay, the States General shall be convoked at least every two or three years. . . .

Art. 11. Personal liberty, proprietary rights and the security of citizens shall be established in a clear, precise and irrevocable manner. All *lettres de cachet* shall be abolished for ever, subject to certain modifications which the States General may see fit to impose.

Art. 12. And to remove forever the possibility of injury to the personal and proprietary rights of Frenchmen, the jury system shall be introduced in all criminal cases, and in civil cases for the determination of fact, in all the courts of the realm. . . .

Art. 15. A wider liberty of the press shall be accorded, with this provision alone: that all manuscripts sent to the printer shall be signed by the author, who shall be obliged to disclose his identity and bear the responsibility of his work; and to prevent judges and other persons in power from taking advantage of their authority, no writing shall be held a libel until it is so determined by twelve jurors, chosen according to the forms of a law which shall be enacted upon this subject. . . .

Art. 17. All distinctions in penalties shall be abolished; and crimes committed by citizens of the different orders shall

be punished irrespectively, according to the same forms of law and in the same manner. The States General shall seek to bring it about that the effects of transgression shall be confined to the individual, and shall not be reflected upon the relatives of the transgressor, themselves innocent of all participation.

Art. 18. Penalties shall in all cases be moderate and proportionate to the crime. All kinds of torture, the rack and the stake, shall be abolished. Sentence of death shall be pronounced only for atrocious crimes and in rare instances, determined by the law. . . .

Art. 21. No tax shall be legal unless accepted by the representatives of the people and sanctioned by the king.

Art. 22. Since all Frenchmen receive the same advantage from the government, and are equally interested in its maintenance they ought to be placed upon the same footing in the matter of taxation.

Art. 23. All taxes now in operation are contrary to these principles and for the most part vexatious, oppressive and humiliating to the people. They ought to be abolished as soon as possible, and replaced by others common to the three orders and to all classes of citizens, without exception. . . .

Art. 51. The three functions, legislative, executive and judicial, shall be separated and carefully distinguished.

The communes of the bailliage of Versailles have already expressed themselves in respect to the necessity of adopting the form of deliberation *per capita* in the coming States General. The reform of the constitution will be one of their principal duties. This magnificent monument of liberty and public felicity should be the work of the three orders in common session; if they are separated, certain pretensions, anxieties and jealousies are bound to arise; the two upper orders are likely to oppose obstacles, perhaps invincible, to the reform of abuses and the enactment of laws destined to suppress such abuses. It seems indispensable that in this first assembly votes should be taken *per capita* and not by order. After the renunciation by the two upper orders of their pecuniary privileges; after all distinctions before the law have been abolished; when the exclusion of the

third estate from certain offices and positions has been done away with,—then the reasons which to-day necessitate deliberation *per capita* will no longer exist.

The communes of Versailles therefore refrain from expressing a positive opinion upon the future composition of the national assemblies and upon the method of their deliberation. They defer, with all confidence, the decision of this important question to the wisdom of the States General. . . .

#### GENERAL DEMANDS

Art. 66. The deputies of the *prévôté* and *vicomté* of Paris shall be instructed to unite themselves with the deputies of other provinces, in order to join with them in securing, as soon as possible, the following abolitions:

- Of the *taille*;
- Of the *gabelle*;
- Of the *aides*;
- Of the *corvée*,
- Of the *ferme* of tobacco;
- Of the registry-duties;
- Of the free-hold tax;
- Of the taxes on leather;
- Of the government stamp upon iron;
- Of the stamps upon gold and silver;
- Of the interprovincial customs duties;
- Of the taxes upon fairs and markets;

Finally, of all taxes that are burdensome and oppressive, whether on account of their nature or of the expense of collection, or because they have been paid almost wholly by agriculturists and by the poorer classes. They shall be replaced with other taxes, less complicated and easier of collection, which shall fall alike upon all classes and orders of the state without exception.

Art. 67. We demand also the abolition of the royal preserves (*capitaineries*);

Of the game laws;  
 Of jurisdictions of *prérôtés*;  
 Of *banalités*;  
 Of tolls;  
 Of useless authorities and governments in cities and provinces. . . .

Art. 70. We demand, for the benefit of commerce, the abolition of all exclusive privileges:

The removal of customs barriers to the frontiers;  
 The most complete freedom in trade;  
 The revision and reform of all laws relative to commerce;  
 Encouragement for all kinds of manufacture: viz., premiums, bounties and advances:

Rewards to artisans and laborers for useful inventions

The communes desire that prizes and rewards shall always be preferred to exclusive privileges, which extinguish emulation and lessen competition. . . .

## 9. THE PROBLEM OF TAXATION<sup>1</sup>

[Inequality in taxation was a most important direct cause of the Revolution. Inability to collect taxes, together with governmental extravagance, led France to the brink of bankruptcy and eventually resulted in the call for the Estates General.]



WITHIN a given province or district, there was no proportional equality among persons in the matter of taxation. It was sometimes said that the noble paid with his blood, the villein with his money. But the order of the Nobility had come to include many persons who never thought of shedding their blood

<sup>1</sup> E. J. Lowell, *The Eve of the French Revolution* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1923), pp 213-229. (Condensed) Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

for their country; to include, in fact, the rich and prosperous generally. These were not (as they are sometimes represented to have been), quite free from taxation. Something like one-half of the taxes were indirect, and might be supposed to be paid by all classes in proportion to their consumption. Yet even for the indirect taxes, privileged persons managed to find ways partially to escape. Some of the direct taxes were deducted from salaries, or imposed on incomes, but it was said that the rich and powerful often succeeded in having their incomes lightly assessed. By way of increasing the inequality of taxation, the government had a habit, when in need of more money than usual, of adding a percentage to some old tax, instead of devising a new one, thus bearing most heavily with the new impost on those classes which were most severely taxed already.

First among French taxes, both in blundering unfairness and in evil fame, came the Land Tax or *Taille*, producing for the twenty-four districts a revenue of about forty-five million livres, or with its accessory taxes, of about seventy-five millions.

The *taille* was of feudal origin, and in the Middle Ages was paid to the lord by his tenants. In the fifteenth century, however, it had already been diverted to the royal treasury, and its product was employed in the maintenance of troops. It was therefore paid only by villeins, for the nobles served in person, and the clergy by substitute, if at all.

The exemption of the upper orders from liability to the *taille* clung to that tax after the reason for such freedom had ceased to exist. The tax itself early grew to be of two kinds, real and personal. The *taille réelle*, common in the southern provinces of France, was a true land-tax, assessed according to a survey and valuation on all lands not accounted noble, nor belonging to the church, nor to the public. The distinction between noble and peasant lands was an old one; and the peasant lands paid the tax even when owned by privileged persons.

Over the greater part of France, however, the *taille réelle* did not exist, and only the *taille personnelle* was in force. This bore on the profits of the land and on all forms of industry; but the churchmen and the nobles were exempt, at least in part.



Owing to its personal nature, the tax was payable at the residence of the person taxed. If a peasant lived in one parish and derived most of his income from land situated in another, he was taxable at the place of his residence, at a rate perhaps entirely different from that of the parish in which his farm was situated. It might happen that a large part of the lands of a parish were owned by non-residents, and that the ability of the parish to pay its taxes was thus reduced. But there were exceptions to the rule by which the tax followed the person, and the whole matter was so complicated as to be a fertile cause of dispute and of double taxation.

The method of assessment and levy was peculiar. The gross amount of the *taille* was determined twice a year by the royal council, and apportioned arbitrarily among the twenty-four districts (*généralités*) of France, and then sub-divided by various officials among the sub-districts (*élections*) and the parishes. The divisions thus made were very unequal; some provinces, sub-districts, and parishes being treated much more severely than others, apparently rather by accident or custom than for any equitable reason. An influential person could often obtain a diminution of the tax of his village. When the work of sub-division was completed, the *syndics* and other parish officers were notified of the tax laid on their parishes, which were thenceforth liable for the amount. But the *taille* had still to be apportioned among the inhabitants. For this purpose from three to seven collectors were elected in every rural community by popular vote. The collectors assessed their neighbors at their own discretion, and were personally responsible to the government for the whole amount assessed on the parish. In consideration of this, and of their labor, they were allowed to collect a percentage in addition to the *taille*, for their own pay. The whole process was the cause of endless bickerings and disputes, lawsuits and appeals, and the collectors were frequently ruined in spite of all their efforts. They were ignorant peasants, unused to accounts, sometimes unable to read. In some of the mountain parishes of the Pyrenees their accounts were kept on notched sticks to a period not very long before the Revolution.

The liability to the *taille* was joint. A gross sum was laid on the parish, and if one person escaped, or was unable to pay, his share had to be borne by the rest. On the other hand, if one man were overcharged, the burden of his neighbors was lightened. Thus it was everyone's interest to seem poor. And the taxes were so important a matter, taking so large a part of the yearly income, that they modified the whole conduct of life. People dared not appear at their ease, lest their shares should be increased. They hid their wealth and took their luxuries in secret. One day, Jean Jacques Rousseau, traveling on foot, as was his wont, entered a solitary farm-house, and asked for a meal. A pot of skimmed milk and some coarse barley bread were set before him, the peasant who lived in the house saying that this was all he had. After a while, however, the man took courage on observing the manners and the appetite of his guest. Telling Rousseau that he was sure he was a good, honest fellow, and no spy, he disappeared through a trap-door, and presently came back with good wheaten bread, a little dark with bran, a ham, and a bottle of wine. An omelet was soon sizzling in the dish. When the time came for Rousseau to pay and depart, the peasant's fears returned. He refused money, he was evidently distressed. Rousseau made out that the bread and the wine were hidden for fear of the tax-gatherer; that the man believed he would be ruined, if he were known to have anything. . . .

The poll tax (*capitation*) was one only in name. It was in fact a roughly reckoned income tax, and the inhabitants of France were for its purposes divided into twenty-two classes, according to their supposed ability to pay. In the country, the amount demanded for this tax was usually proportioned to that of the personal *taille*. People who paid no *taille* were assessed according to their public office, military rank, business, or profession. The rules were complicated, giving rise to endless disputes. In theory the very poor were exempt, but the exemption was not very generous, for maid-servants were charged at the rate of three livres and twelve sous a year, and there were yet

poorer people who paid less than half that amount. If the poor man failed to pay, a garrison was lodged upon him. A man in blue, with a gun, came and sat by his fire, slept in his bed, and laid hands on any money that might come into the house, thus collecting the tax and his own wages. The amount levied by the poll tax and accessories was from thirty-six to forty-two million livres a year. . . .

The first and most dreaded of the indirect taxes was the Salt Tax (*gabelle*). As salt is necessary for all, it has from early days been considered by some governments a good article for a tax, no one being able to escape payment by going entirely without it. To make the revenue more secure, every householder in certain parts of France was obliged to buy seven pounds of salt a year at the warehouses of the Farm, for every member of his family more than seven years old. In spite of this, a certain economy in the use of the article became the habit of the French nation, and the traveler of the nineteenth century may bless the government of the Bourbons when for once in his life he finds himself in a country where the cooks do not habitually oversalt the soup.

The unfortunate Frenchmen of the eighteenth century had to pay dear for this culinary lesson. But in this matter as in others they did not all pay alike. The whole product of the salt tax to the treasury was about sixty million livres, of which two-thirds, or forty millions, was taken from provinces containing a little more than one-third of the population of the kingdom. Necker, who much desired to equalize the impost, mentions six principal categories of provinces in regard to the salt tax; varying from those in which the sale was free, and the article worth from two to nine livres the hundred weight, to those where it was a monopoly of the Farm, and the salt cost the consumer about sixty-two livres. Salt being thus worth thirty times as much in one province as in another, it was possible for a successful smuggler to make a living by a very few trips. The opportunity was largely used; children were trained by their parents for the illicit traffic, but the penalties were very severe.

In the galleys were many salt-smugglers; people were shut up on mere suspicion, and in the crowded prisons of that day were carried off by jail-fevers. . . .

There was another burden which shared with the *taille* and the *gabelle* the especial hatred of the French peasantry. This was the villein service (*corvée*) which was exacted of the farmers and agricultural laborers. The service was of feudal origin, and, while still demanded in many cases by the lords, in accordance with ancient charters or customs, was now also required by the state for the building of roads and the transportation of soldiers' baggage. The demand was based on no general law, but was imposed arbitrarily by intendants and military commanders. The amount due by every parish was settled without appeal by the same authorities. The peasant and his draft-cattle were ordered away from home, perhaps just at the time of harvest. On the roads might be seen the overloaded carts, where the tired soldiers had piled themselves on top of their baggage, while their comrades goaded the slow teams with swords and bayonets, and jeered at the remonstrances of the unhappy owner. The oxen were often injured by unusual labor and harsh treatment, and one sick ox would throw a whole team out of work. The burden, imposed on the parish collectively, was distributed among the peasants by their syndics, political officers, often partial, who were sometimes accompanied in their work of selection by files of soldiers, equally rough and impatient with the refractory peasants and the wretched official. Turgot, who was keenly alive to the hardships of the *corvée*, abolished it during his short term of power, substituting a tax, but it was restored by his successor immediately on his fall, and was not discontinued until the end of the monarchy. . . .

How far did the rich escape taxation? The clergy of France as a body did so in a great measure. They paid none of the direct taxes levied on their fellow subjects. They made gifts and loans to the state, however, and borrowed money for the purpose. For this money they paid interest, which must be looked on as their real contribution to the expenses of the state. But in this again they were assisted by the treasury. The amount

which finally came out of the pockets of the clergy by direct taxation would appear to have been less than ten per cent. of their income from invested property.

The nobility bore a larger share. The only great tax from which the members of that order were exempted was the *taille*, forming less than one-half of the direct taxation, less than one-sixth of the whole. But in the other direct taxes, their wealth and influence sometimes enabled them to escape a fair assessment.

The indirect taxes also bore heavily on the poor. They were levied largely on necessities, such as salt and food, or on those simple luxuries, wine and tobacco, on which Frenchmen of all classes depend for their daily sense of well-being. The *gabelle*, with its obligatory seven pounds of salt, approached a poll-tax in its operation.

The worst features of French taxation were the arbitrary spirit which pervaded the financial administration, the regulations never submitted to public criticism, and the tyranny and fraud of subordinates, for which redress was seldom attainable. We groan sometimes, and with reason, at the publicity with which all life is carried on to-day. We turn wearily from the wilderness of printed words which surrounds the simplest matters. But only publicity and free discussion will prevent every unscrupulous assessor and every arbitrary clerk in the custom-house from being a petty tyrant. They will not by themselves procure good government, but they will prevent bad government from growing intolerable. In France, as we have seen, to print anything which might stir the public mind was a capital offense; and while the writer of an abstract treatise subversive of religion and government might hope to escape punishment, the citizen who earned the resentment of a petty official was likely to be prosecuted with virulence.



### III. THE REVOLUTION IN PROGRESS





## 10. THE STORMING OF THE BASTILLE <sup>1</sup>

[The attack on the Bastille was the first serious outbreak of mob violence. It was not premeditated but came as the culmination of the economic distress resulting from the poor harvest of 1788, the concentration of troops about Paris and Versailles, and the untimely dismissal of Necker.]



THE populace, on the other hand, was taking up arms: from the Garde-Meuble strange weapons, even "Saracen pikes," had been snatched. On the morning of the 14th the mob attacked the Invalides and seized twenty-seven guns, a mortar, and 32,000 muskets. The Gardes Françaises, who had been persuaded that their officers had intended to blow them up in their barracks, were thirsting for revenge. Every sort of story gained credence: the legends of July 14 were current before the Bastille had actually fallen. In its wild excitement the mob looked hither and thither for some exploit it might perform. And further, the people were determined to have arms, and the answer at the Arsenal, as one Pitra tells us, had been that all the gunpowder had been taken to the Bastille. "To the Bastille!" shouted some ruffian.

### TAKING OF THE BASTILLE

The Bastille! It was nothing but a bogey fortress! The muzzles of a few guns appeared between its battlements, but that was because salutes were fired from them, according to the old tradition, on festivals: since the distant days of the

<sup>1</sup> Louis Madelin, *The French Revolution* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1923), pp. 76-78. Reprinted by courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, publishers.

Fronde never a ball had issued from those muzzles. The people living in the Faubourg had seen those guns every morning, but such was the general frenzy that on this particular morning they fancied they looked dangerous. A deputation went to the Hôtel-de-Ville and requested that the threatening artillery might be removed. Then the "Electors," too, sent their delegates to the Governor of the Bastille, de Launey—a kindly man who smiled at the complaint, and demonstrated its absurdity, but had the guns withdrawn from the embrasures, and kept the "Electors," quite reassured, to breakfast with him.

This did not suit the agitators at all. A pretext was what they wanted. At their request, Thuriot, a barrister, paid another visit to the fortress: Launey received him with the same civility, and (the best answer to all this alarm) paraded all his little garrison before him—ninety-five pensioners and thirty Swiss Guards. Finally, as his last concession, the Governor had the empty embrasures blocked up with wooden boards. Quite satisfied, Thuriot, too, went his way. But the mob, which was already surging round the walls, did not depart with him. The longing to destroy was hot within it.

Launey left the entrance of the outer courtyard unguarded: and having gathered his little garrison within the outer enclosure, simply had the drawbridge that gave access to the "government court" raised. The assailants pretended to believe this to be a deliberate preparation for action; there must be some counter-demonstration: two men, one of them a Garde Française, rushed forward and severed the chains of the bridge with axes. Suddenly it dropped, and in an instant the courtyard was full of men. A witness of the scene who was in the crowd, and not inclined to criticize it too severely, asserts that most of those he saw there were "plunderers": after a moment the assailants caught sight of a few of the defenders, and fired on them.

The Governor was really bound to order his men to fire in reply. He was face to face with a mob, a large proportion of which were disciples of the famous Cartouche; it had made an irruption into the interior of a fortress committed to his care. He ordered his men to fire. And that very evening, in order to

glorify the contemptible business, the story was put about that the Governor had caused a message of peace to be carried to the crowd, that it had moved forward, relying on his word, and had been mowed down by his men's musketry fire. Not a single historian now accepts this tale.

Terrified at first, the mob took to its heels, but it soon returned to the charge. Yet the business made no progress: high-way robbers can sack a farm, but the taking of a fortress is soldiers' work.

#### MURDER OF DE LAUNEY

The soldiers were coming in, though—the mutineers of the Garde Française. The sight of them was enough to demoralize the garrison. It forced the broken-hearted de Launey to capitulate. One of the subordinate officers of the rebel Garde, Élie by name, testifies that the Bastille surrendered “on the faith of the word he himself gave, as a French officer, that no harm should be done to any person.” In spite of which (and in spite, indeed, of Élie's own efforts) within a few minutes de Launey was murdered. He was a brave man: when they fell on him he fought till he dropped riddled with wounds. They tore him to pieces. Desnot, a “cook's apprentice,” who “knew how to cut up meat,” struck off his head. He made a boast of it for ten years and got a medal for it. Major de Losne-Salbray was cut down too, then an adjutant, the lieutenant of the pensioners, and one of the pensioners as well. Two others were hanged.

#### THE LUST FOR BLOOD

Enough has been said of the scenes of cannibalism that ensued. Knowing, as we do, the nature of the elements of this so-called crowd of Parisians, we cannot feel surprised. But the Paris mob had been seized by this time with that horribly contagious disease—the lust for blood. While the few prisoners the assailants had released (four coiners, two madmen, and a sadic debauchee) were borne out in triumph, the defenders

were dragged into the street and hailed with savage yells. And Paris, sick with terror, beheld the howling mob as it poured back, while blood-stained heads with half-closed eyes, set upon pikes, nodded above its ranks. The mob acclaimed the bandits, gave them civic rights that were to last for years—and the right to rule from that moment.

## 11. THE END OF THE OLD RÉGIME <sup>1</sup>


[The fall of the Bastille had very little to do with the disturbances in the provinces. There had been trouble during the spring of 1789, and by July starving farm laborers began pillaging the fields. Conditions grew steadily worse, until by the end of July anarchy reigned throughout the countryside.]



THE peasant revolt started in the Île de France as early as July 20, and spread rapidly from place to place till it reached the farthest limits of the kingdom. As was natural, the excesses of the rioters were exaggerated by rumour. It was said that brigands were cutting down the growing crops, marching on the towns, and showing no respect for property. The panic thus spread abroad gave a strong impetus to the formation of the permanent committees and National Guards. The Great Fear and the peasant rising formed part of one simultaneous movement.

The brigands whose imminent irruption haunted men's imaginations could not as a rule be distinguished from the artisans who burnt the toll-gates and fixed the price of wheat in the market, or the peasants who forced their lords to give up their title-deeds. But that the crowds of poor wretches in the country and the working-class districts of the towns saw in the growing

<sup>1</sup> Albert Mathiez, *The French Revolution* (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1928), pp. 51-54, translation by Catherine Alison Phillips. Reprinted by permission of, and special arrangement with, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., authorized publishers.




CHANGES IN THE CONDITION OF THE PEASANT

This double cartoon is a graphic representation of the fundamental change wrought by the renunciations of August 4th, 1789. The first cartoon shows the peasant bent under the burden of the prevalent and noble with rabbits eating his cabbage and pigeons his grain. The second represents the peasant astride the noble who in turn leans on the clergy bearing the emblems of equality and liberty. Dead pigeons lie on the ground, a dead rabbit hangs from his sword, while the cabbage shows signs of renewed life. (From Ernest F. Henderson, *Symbol and Sature in the French Revolution*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1912. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons )



From Ewing Galloway, N. Y.

Tennis Court Oath  
Painting by David



Storming of the Bastille  
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REVOLUTION

anarchy a chance to revenge themselves upon the social order is too natural to be called in question. The rising was directed not only against the feudal system, but against monopolies of commodities, taxes, bad judges, all those who exploited the people and lived upon its work. In Upper Alsace the peasants attacked the Jewish merchants at the same time as the country-houses and convents. At the end of July the Jews of Alsace were obliged to take refuge in Basel by hundreds.

The property-owning middle classes were suddenly faced with the grim figure of the fourth estate. They could not allow the nobles to be expropriated without being anxious for themselves, for they owned a considerable part of the estates of the nobility, and in virtue of so doing levied seigniorial dues upon their peasants. Their permanent committees and National Guards at once set to work to restore order. Circulars were sent round to the parish priests requesting them to recommend calm. "Let us be chary," said the appeal of the Dijon committee, dated July 24, "of setting an example of licence to which we may all fall victims." But force was brought to bear without delay. In the Mâconnais and Beaujolais, where seventy-two country-houses had been burnt, repression was swift and vigorous. On July 29 a band of peasants was defeated near the Château of Cormatin and lost twenty killed and sixty prisoners. Another band was defeated near Cluny and lost a hundred killed and a hundred and seventy prisoners. The permanent committee of Mâcon turned itself into a court of justice and condemned twenty rioters to death. In this province of Dauphiné, where the union of the three orders had been preserved intact, the disturbances had definitely assumed the character of a class war. Peasants and workmen made common cause against the middle classes and their allies the nobles. The National Guard of Lyons lent its support to the National Guards of Dauphiné against the insurgents, with whom the workmen of Lyons were in sympathy.

The Assembly looked on in alarm at the terrible outburst which it had been unable to foresee. At first its only thought was to organize repression, and it was not the privileged orders, but the deputies of the third estate who were most ready to urge

severity. The Abbé Barbotin, one of those democratic priests who detested the bishops, wrote anxious and threatening letters from Versailles at the end of July to the Capuchin who succeeded him in his curé in Hainaut: "Impress upon them strongly that no society can subsist without obedience." According to him, it was the aristocrats who were stirring up the people: "None of this started until our enemies at court were scattered." It was obviously the *émigrés*, the friends of the Count of Artois and the Queen, who were revenging themselves for their discomfiture by letting loose these poor wretches against property! How many deputies of the third estate shared the opinion of this obscure priest? On August 3 Salomon, the secretary of the committee appointed to propose what measures were to be taken, could do nothing but violently denounce those responsible for the disorder and propose indiscriminate repression, without a word of pity for the sufferings of the wretched poor or the slightest promise for the future. If the Assembly had followed the advice of this hard-hearted landowner, it would have created a dangerous situation. The King would have had to take in hand a policy of ruthless general repression. This would have restored to him the means of checking the Revolution. And, on the other hand, it would have placed an impassable gulf between the middle classes and the peasantry. Under cover of the civil war, which would go on for a long time, the old régime would have been able to establish itself permanently.

The liberal nobles, both more politic and more generous than the middle classes, realized that a way had to be found out of this quandary. One of them, the Vicomte de Noailles, Lafayette's brother-in-law, proposed on the evening of August 4 that, in order to induce the peasants to lay down their arms, the following measures should be taken:

1. A proclamation should be issued stating that henceforward "taxes shall be paid by every individual in the kingdom in proportion to his income." This involved the suppression of all fiscal exemptions.

2. "All feudal dues shall be redeemable by the communities" (that is, by the communes) "for a money payment or com-



muted at a fair valuation." This involved the suppression of seigniorial dues in return for an indemnity.

3. "Seigniorial corvées, serfdom, and other forms of personal servitude shall be abolished without compensation."

Thus Noailles divided the feudal system into two parts. All personal burdens were to be abolished outright. All burdens on property were to be redeemable. Men would be set free, but the land retained its burdens.

The Duc d'Aiguillon, one of the greatest names and richest landowners in the kingdom, warmly seconded Noailles's propositions: "The people is at last trying to cast off a yoke which has weighed upon it for so many centuries past; and we must confess that, though this insurrection must be condemned, like all violent acts of aggression, an excuse can be found for it in the vexations of which the people has been the victim." This noble language aroused deep emotion, but at this pathetic moment a deputy of the third estate, an economist who had been the collaborator and friend of Turgot, Dupont of Nemours, once more called for severe measures. The nobles were accessible to pity; this bourgeois censured the inaction of the authorities, and spoke of sending orders to the local tribunals to act with severity.

But the impetus had been given. An obscure Breton deputy, Leguen de Kerangal, who had lived in country fashion in the little town where he was a linen-draper, rose and related the sorrows of the country people with an eloquence touching in its simplicity: "Let us be just, gentlemen; let them bring to us here those title-deeds which are an outrage, not only to our sense of shame, but to our very humanity. Let them bring us those title-deeds which humiliate the human race by demanding that men should be harnessed to the plough like beasts of burden. Let them bring us the title-deeds which oblige men to spend the night beating ponds to prevent the frogs from disturbing the sleep of their pleasure-loving lords. Which of us, gentlemen, in this enlightened century, would not make an expiatory pyre of these infamous parchments and set fire to it in order to sacrifice them upon the altar of the fatherland? You will not restore

calm to a distracted France, gentlemen, until you have promised the people that you will commute for a money payment, redeemable at will, all feudal dues whatsoever, the slightest traces of which give the people just cause for complaint and will be abolished by the laws you are about to promulgate." It was certainly a bold act to justify the burning of the records before an assembly of landowners, but the conclusion was moderate, since on the whole the Breton orator accepted the redemption of those dues of which he proclaimed the injustice.

This redemption was reassuring to the deputies. The sacrifice demanded of them was more apparent than real. They would continue to collect their rents, or their equivalent. They would lose nothing, or hardly anything, by the operation, and would gain by the recovery of their popularity with the mass of the peasants. Then, having grasped the clever manoeuvre of the minority of the nobles, they gave themselves up to enthusiasm. The deputies of the provinces and towns, the priests, and the nobles came in turn to sacrifice their ancient privileges "on the altar of the nation." The clergy renounced their tithes, the nobles their rights over hunting and fishing, warrens and dovecots, and their courts of justice; the middle classes renounced their special exemptions. This imposing renunciation of the past lasted all night. Before dawn a new France had come into being under the urgent pressure of the poorest classes.

12 THE DEATH MARCH OF THE FRENCH  
MONARCHY <sup>1</sup>

[The march on Versailles was the last of the series of revolts which occurred during the year 1789. Fundamentally, the prevailing economic distress was responsible for the outbreak. The fear that the King intended to repudiate the work of the National Assembly provided the spark that set off the demonstration. Considerable difficulty was experienced in controlling the mob and the life of the Queen was threatened, but the promise to accompany the people to Paris quieted the rioters. Carlyle is a typical historian of the "Literary School" and is noted for his brilliant powers of description as well as for his many inaccuracies.]



YES, *The King to Paris*: what else? Ministers may consult, and National Deputies wag their heads: but there is now no other possibility. You have forced him to go willingly "At one o'clock!" Lafayette gives audible assurance to that purpose; and universal Insurrection, with immeasurable shout, and a discharge of all the fire-arms, clear and rusty, great and small, that it has, returns him acceptance. What a sound; heard for leagues: a doom-peal!—That sound too rolls away; into the Silence of Ages. And the Château of Versailles stands ever since vacant, hushed-still; its spacious Courts grassgrown, responsive to the hoe of the weeder. Times and generations roll on, in their confused Gulf-current; and buildings like builders have their destiny.

Till one o'clock, then, there will be three parties: National Assembly, National Rascality, National Royalty, all busy enough. Rascality rejoices; women trim themselves with tricolor. Nay motherly Paris has sent her Avengers sufficient 'cartloads of loaves;' which are shouted over, which are gratefully consumed.

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Carlyle, *The French Revolution* (Harper & Brothers, New York), Vol. I, pp. 277-281. (Condensed.)

The Avengers, in return, are searching for grain-stores; loading them in fifty wagons; that so a National King, probable har-binger of all blessings, may be the evident bringer of plenty, for one.

And thus has Sansculottism made prisoner its King; *revoking* his parole. The Monarchy has fallen; and not so much as honorably; no, ignominiously; with struggle, indeed, oft-repeated; but then with unwise struggle; wasting its strength in fits and paroxysms; at every new paroxysm, foiled more pitifully than before. Thus Broglie's whiff of grapeshot, which might have been something, has dwindled to the pot-valour of an Opera Repast, and *O Richard, O mon Roi*. Which again we shall see dwindle to a Favras' Conspiracy, a thing to be settled by the hanging of one Chevalier.

Poor Monarchy! But what save foulest defeat can await that man, who wills, and yet wills not? Apparently the King either has a right, assertible as such to the death, before God and man; or else he has no right. Apparently, the one or the other; could he but know which! May Heaven pity him! Were Louis wise he would this day abdicate.—Is it not strange so few Kings abdicate; and none yet heard of has been known to commit suicide? Fritz the First, of Prussia, alone tried it; and they cut the rope. . . .

Now, however, the short hour has struck. His Majesty is in his carriage, with his Queen, sister Elizabeth, and two royal children. Not for another hour can the infinite Procession get marshalled, and under way. The weather is dim drizzling; the mind confused; the noise great.

Processional marches not a few our world has seen; Roman triumphs and ovations, Cabiric cymbal-beatings, Royal progresses, Irish funerals: but this of the French Monarchy marching to its bed remained to be seen. Miles long, and of breadth losing itself in vagueness, for all the neighbouring country crowds to see. Slow; stagnating along, like shoreless Lake, yet with a noise like Niagara, like Babel and Bedlam. A splashing and a tramping; a hurraing, uproaring, musket-volleying;—the truest segment of Chaos seen in these latter Ages! Till slowly

it disembody itself, in the thickening dust, into expectant Paris, through a double row of faces all the way from Passy to the Hôtel-de-Ville.

Consider this: Vanguard of National troops; with trains of artillery; of pikemen and pikewomen, mounted on cannons, on carts, hackney-coaches, or on foot; tripudiating, in tricolor ribbons from head to heel; loaves stuck on the points of bayonets, green boughs stuck in gunbarrels. Next, as main-march fifty cartloads of corn, which have been lent, for peace, from the stores of Versailles. Behind which follow stragglers of the Garde-du-Corps; all humiliated, in Grenadier bonnets. Close on these comes the Royal Carriage; come Royal Carriages: for there are a Hundred National Deputies too, among whom sits Mirabeau,—his remarks not given. Then finally, pellmell, as rearguard, Flandre, Swiss, Hundred Swiss, other Bodyguards, Brigands, whosoever cannot get before. Between and among all which masses, flows without limit Saint-Antoine, and the Menadic Cohort. Menadic especially about the Royal Carriage; tripudiating there, covered with tricolor; singing 'allusive songs; pointing with one hand to the Royal Carriage, which the allusions hit, and pointing to the Provision-wagons, with the other hand and these words: "Courage, Friends! We shall not want bread now; we are bringing you the Baker, the Bakeress, and Baker's Boy."

The wet day draggles the tricolor, but the joy is unextinguishable. Is not all well now? "*Ah Madame, notre bonne Reine,*" said some of these Strong-women some days hence, "Ah Madame, our good Queen, don't be a traitor any more and we will all love you!" Poor Weber went splashing along, close by the Royal carriage, with the tear in his eye: 'their Majesties did me the honour,' or I thought they did it, 'to testify, from time to time, by shrugging of the shoulders, by looks directed to Heaven, the emotions they felt.' Thus, like frail cockle, floats the royal Life-boat, helmless, on black deluges of Rascality.

Mercier, in his loose way, estimates the Procession and assistants at two hundred thousand. He says it was one boundless inarticulate Haha;—*transcendent* World-Laughter; comparable

to the Saturnalia of the Ancients. Why not? Here too, as we said, is Human Nature once more human; shudder at it whoso is of shuddering humour: yet behold it is human. It has 'swallowed all formulas,' it tripudiates even so. For which reason they that collect Vases and Antiques with figures of Dancing Bacchantes 'in wild and all-but impossible positions,' may look with some interest on it.

Thus, however, has the slow-moving Chaos or modern Saturnalia of the Ancients, reached the Barrier; and must halt, to be harangued by Mayor Bailly. Thereafter it has to lumber along, between the double row of faces, in the transcendent heaven-lashing Haha, two hours longer, towards the Hôtel-de-Ville. Then again to be harangued there, by several persons; by Moreau de Saint-Méry among others; Moreau of the Three-thousand orders, now National Deputy for St. Domingo. To all which poor Louis, 'who seemed to experience a slight emotion' on entering this Townhall, can answer only that he "comes with pleasure, with confidence among his people." Mayor Bailly, in reporting it, forgets 'confidence;' and the poor Queen says eagerly: "Add with confidence."—"Messieurs," rejoins Mayor Bailly, "You are happier than if I had not forgotten."

Finally, the King is shown on an upper balcony, by torch-light, with a huge tricolor in his hat: 'and all the people,' says Weber, 'grasped one another's hands;'—thinking *now* surely the New Era was born. Hardly till eleven at night can Royalty get to its vacant, long deserted Palace of the Tuileries: to lodge there, somewhat in strolling-player fashion. It is Tuesday, the sixth of October, 1789.

Poor Louis has Two other Paris Processions to make: one ludicrous-ignominious like this; the other not ludicrous nor ignominious, but serious, nay, sublime.

13. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN  
AND CITIZEN<sup>1</sup>

[During the weeks of comparative quiet which followed the July insurrections the National Assembly found opportunity to proceed with the work of constitution making. Public opinion demanded a declaration of rights and it was agreed that it should come before the body of the constitution. Historians are still in doubt as to whether the Declaration derived its inspiration from English charters, the Bills of Rights in American state constitutions, or from the works of the French philosophers.]



## DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN

THE representatives of the French people, organized in National Assembly, considering that ignorance, forgetfulness or contempt of the rights of man are the sole causes of the public miseries and of the corruption of governments, have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, inalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being ever present to all the members of the social body, may unceasingly remind them of their rights and duties; in order that the acts of the legislative power and those of the executive power may be each moment compared with the aim of every political institution and thereby may be more respected; and in order that the demands of the citizens, grounded henceforth upon simple and incontestable principles, may always take the direction of maintaining the constitution and welfare of all.

In consequence, the National Assembly recognizes and de-

<sup>1</sup> Duvergier, *Lois, etc.*, Vol III, pp. 39-55. English translation from F. M. Anderson, *Constitutions and other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of France* (H. W. Wilson Company, Minneapolis, 1908, 2d ed.), pp. 58-60. Reprinted by courtesy of H. W. Wilson Company and Professor F. M. Anderson.

clares, in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the following rights of man and citizen.

1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions can be based only upon public utility.

2. The aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.

3. The source of all sovereignty is essentially in the nation; no body, no individual can exercise authority that does not proceed from it in plain terms.

4. Liberty consists in the power to do anything that does not injure others; accordingly, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those that secure to the other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These limits can be determined only by law.

5. The law has the right to forbid only such actions as are injurious to society. Nothing can be forbidden that is not interdicted by the law, and no one can be constrained to do that which it does not order.

6. Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to take part personally, or by their representatives, in its formation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens being equal in its eyes, are equally eligible to all public dignities, places, and employments, according to their capacities, and without other distinction than that of their virtues and their talents.

7. No man can be accused, arrested, or detained except in the cases determined by the law and according to the forms it has prescribed. Those who procure, expedite, execute, or cause to be executed arbitrary orders ought to be punished: but every citizen summoned or seized in virtue of the law ought to render instant obedience; he makes himself guilty by resistance.

8. The law ought to establish only penalties that are strictly and obviously necessary, and no one can be punished except in virtue of a law established and promulgated prior to the offense and legally applied.

9. Every man being presumed innocent until he has been



pronounced guilty, if it is thought indispensable to arrest him, all severity that may not be necessary to secure his person ought to be strictly suppressed by law.

10. No one ought to be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious, provided their manifestation does not derange the public order established by law.

11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man; every citizen then can freely speak, write, and print, subject to responsibility for the abuse of this freedom in the cases determined by law.

12. The guarantee of the rights of man and citizen requires a public force; this force then is instituted for the advantage of all and not for the personal benefit of those to whom it is entrusted.

13. For the maintenance of the public force and for the expenses of administration a general tax is indispensable; it ought to be equally apportioned among all the citizens according to their means.

14. All the citizens have the right to ascertain, by themselves or by their representatives, the necessity of the public tax, to consent to it freely, to follow the employment of it, and to determine the quota, the assessment, the collection, and the duration of it.

15. Society has the right to call for an account of his administration from every public agent.

16. Any society in which the guarantee of the rights is not secured, or the separation of powers not determined, has no constitution at all.

17. Property being a sacred and inviolable right, no one can be deprived of it unless a legally established public necessity evidently demands it, under the condition of a just and prior indemnity.

14. THE MACHINERY OF THE TERROR<sup>1</sup>

[Confronted by the danger of defeat at the hands of the foreign invaders, and menaced by the specter of civil war, the Convention was forced to devise an emergency government to see France through the crisis. This government worked: the invaders were driven from French soil, counter-revolutionary elements were crushed, and a centralized administrative system established which has, with some important modifications, endured until the present.]



AFTER the fall of the Girondins, the Mountain rushed through a constitution of its own, with universal suffrage, an omnipotent unicameral legislature, and a Bill of Rights rather more collectivist than orthodox eighteenth-century Bills of Rights in Europe and America, submitted this constitution to the people, who accepted it 1,801,908 to 11,610, and then, on October 10, 1793, finally suspended its application until the end of the war. The government of France was to be openly and proudly revolutionary. No doubt this so-called Constitution of 1793 could have been made to accord with the aims of the Mountain; it was a vigorously authoritarian document. But its application would have meant a new election, and the Mountain, even though they possessed in the Jacobin clubs an apparently invincible machine for controlling votes, feared that anything resembling a free election would lead to the return of a moderate, and perhaps royalist, legislature. The revolutionary government, however, had a constitution of its own, a definite legal structure, resting on the famous decree of December 4, 1793, and subsequent amendments. This structure, far from arbitrary or shapeless, must now be analyzed.

At its head were the two great committees of Public Safety

<sup>1</sup> Crane Brinton, *A Decade of Revolution* (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1934), pp. 120-127. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Harper & Brothers. (Condensed.)

and General Security. Chosen by the Convention from its own members, in theory responsible to it, holding their appointment for but one month, the committees from their final constitution in the autumn of 1793 became almost independent executive powers. Each month their membership was automatically renewed, and though they took care to report to the Convention from time to time, their authority was not seriously challenged in open debate until the collapse of the whole system with the fall of Robespierre.

Of the two, the Committee of Public Safety was the more important. Its twelve members were all good Montagnards, radical revolutionaries, educated middle-class men of respectable antecedents—six lawyers, two army officers (both engineers), two men of letters, a civil servant, and a Protestant minister. No one man—and certainly not Robespierre—ever assumed a predominant position among them. The Committee of Public Safety was a sort of dictatorship in commission. So long as its members were held together by that intangible but recognizable relation perhaps too little dignified as teamwork, the Committee was successful. When acute dissensions broke out between the members—broadly speaking, between the ecstatically devout and the less exacting, more worldly men of affairs—the rule of the Great Committee was over. Entrusted by decree of the Convention with complete administrative powers, the Committee soon began to exercise a general supervision over policy. It was at least as unanimous as a modern cabinet in important matters of general concern. In some respects, however, it was a more informal body than a modern cabinet. Each member followed his own interests, took over certain fields, and within them was pretty much his own master. The signature of a single member was sufficient to validate a decree of the Committee, and many of its acts have but one or two signatures, though really important measures were no doubt thoroughly discussed. Barère, a smooth, conciliatory speaker, a man thoroughly at home in parliamentary corridors, commonly reported for the Committee, and served as its chief agent of liaison with the Convention. . . .

The Committee of General Security formed the central administration of the revolutionary police. Most great revolutions—including most emphatically the present Russian Revolution—have created such groups, if only to cater to the popular demand for melodrama, without which revolutions might be mere political changes. The Committee of General Security supervised the police throughout France, issued warrants of arrest unchecked by *habeas corpus* or other limitations, had charge of prisons, administered “revolutionary justice” through *comités de surveillance* in the provinces. Its twelve members lacked some of the personal distinction of the members of the Committee of Public Safety. Neither the violent Amar nor the quietly envious Vadier was a personage of the first rank. Yet the Committee of General Security always held itself to be an organ coordinate with, not subordinate to, the Committee of Public Safety, and within its own elastic police functions certainly acted very independently. At first the two committees cooperated, even meeting together occasionally as one body. But as the Terror became more and more a form of religious intoxication and less and less a government of national defense, dissension broke out between the two committees. The Committee of Public Safety set up its own “bureau de police” to keep watch over the civil servants, later to enforce the decrees of Ventôse. The theoretical unity of the government, never quite perfect in practice, was visibly impaired by the spring of 1794.

Under the two great committees, the ministries and the ordinary committees of the convention were reduced to the position of clerks. So obviously useless was the Executive Council of Ministers—and so hateful still to true republicans was the title of minister—that Carnot on April 1 obtained the suppression of the ministries, and their replacement by twelve “commissions” composed wholly of civil servants and completely without power over policy. Nor was the great Convention itself in a much more powerful position. The decree of December 4 had, indeed, announced that “the national Convention is the unique center of governmental impulsion,” but in practice the bulk of the Convention simply submitted to the dictatorship of the Mountain. Par-

liamentary debates during the Terror were perfunctory. The only striking sessions were those in which reports of the great committees were read by Robespierre, Barère, Amar, Billaud, Saint-Just, or another, and piously accepted. Many of the more active and ambitious Conventionnels were absent for long periods on executive missions and the milder members of the Plain frequently absented themselves to avoid the painful sight of their colleagues acting without benefit of philosophy. Attendance was therefore small, not infrequently falling below one hundred. The Convention was still France, of course, still a symbol, and with no Convention to listen to them the numerous popular delegations, manifesters, and lobbyist groups might actually have annoyed the government.

The indispensable links between this central government and the local administrations were of two sorts: special agents on a definite mission, and a permanent resident *agent national*. The special agents were chiefly the *représentants en mission*. Members, chosen by the Committee of Public Safety and approved by the Convention, were sent out to organize the new revolutionary government in the provinces in accordance with the law of December 4, to supervise the conscription of men and horses, to keep the armies in the field efficient and their generals loyal, in short, to do a specific job. . . .

The *agents nationaux* were permanent appointive agents of the national government in each local circumscription, municipality or district, charged with the "execution of the laws." In reality, their function was as old as the *missi dominici* of Charlemagne, and is continued today in the prefects of the Third Republic. They were simply the instruments of efficient government from Paris. The monarchical experiment had set up eighty odd departments as little republics, and thousands of communes endowed with more than Anglo-Saxon self-government. Against all this the *agents nationaux* are a reaction towards the French tradition. Actually the revolutionary government lasted for too short a time, and was assembled too rapidly, for this particular form of bureaucracy to reach its full bloom. Notably the use of agents totally strangers in their districts was impossible, and

most of the agents were orthodox and even violent local Jacobins who had called attention to themselves in their clubs. A surprisingly large number of them were destined to be respectable Napoleonic bureaucrats. Fire-eaters rarely consume themselves.

The final stage in the purely administrative organization of the revolutionary government is reached with the local units themselves. The law of December 4 left the departments, always a bit less warmly revolutionary than the smaller units, with no real powers, and concentrated authority in the more radical districts and municipalities. To each of these local units was attached an *agent national*, and the entire personnel of each was thoroughly "purified" by the representatives on mission. These purifications, often pretty drastic, were carried through with the advice of local politicians, and resulted in the elimination of all recalcitrant elements. A suitable republican ceremony usually accompanied these arbitrary dismissals and replacements, lending to the whole transaction the grace of the General Will. The local Jacobin club—itsself thoroughly purified of priests, aristocrats, federalists, profiteers, lukewarm patriots and other undesirables—would be convoked, commonly in a *ci-devant* church, listen to a few orations, and finally to a list of local officials worthy of retention, another of the unworthy, a third of the new men suggested to supplant those cashiered. With appropriate shouts and boos the sovereign people—rarely more than a small fraction of the adult male population—would signify its acquiescence.

The Jacobin clubs, now usually called *sociétés populaires*, thus formed the rather narrow base of the pyramid of revolutionary government. Under the Terror they no longer seem like the tireless and remorseless pressure group that destroyed the monarchy. The victorious clubs could hardly attempt to undermine the government they had created, whose leaders indeed were still leaders in the clubs. The *sociétés populaires* served as centers for the new revolutionary cult; they formed a reservoir from which the government could draw civil servants; they managed to get done a certain amount of cooperative work in aid of the beleaguered fatherland—collecting saltpeter, assembling

medical supplies, caring for wounded veterans, distributing food, and similar tasks familiar to those who have lived through the last democratic war. But they were tame enough in their relations with constituted authority, and their total active membership was perhaps even smaller than in the days when they were in opposition.

The disputatious course of the ordinary law could hardly suit so convinced an administration as that of the Terror. The judicial organization of the revolutionary government was developed on the same footing as its executive organization. Ordinary cases—even during the Terror there were ordinary cases at law—went through the courts as established by the Constituent Assembly. Any political offense, however, any act, word, or even thought directed against the omnipotent Mountain, came under the jurisdiction of “revolutionary justice.” The Supreme Court of the system was the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris. Established as early as March, 1793, to deal with the enemies of the Revolution more expeditiously than ordinary courts could, this Tribunal took on its final form in October of that year. It had sixteen judges and sixty jurors, both paid by the state, and was by the Law of 22 Prairial divided into four sections to handle the press of constantly increasing business. At first its proceedings were recognizably those of a court of law, with the accused having the right to obtain counsel, to give evidence, to cross-examine. As time went on and men had fewer doubts as to the adequacy of the inner light, the proceedings became mere public pillorying of the already condemned. Death was the only sentence. Occasionally a touch of sentiment—gray hairs, a sobbing daughter—would win over the jury, but such touches were rare. Of the 2,559 condemnations pronounced before the Ninth Thermidor, Wallon insists that “you cannot find ten, you cannot find two pronounced for crimes punishable with death in the penal Code.”

15. DECREE FOR THE LEVY EN MASSE <sup>1</sup>.

[This document not only is indicative of the spirit with which France met the challenge of the powers, but marks the birth of the principle of the nation in arms.]



1. FROM this moment until that in which the enemy shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the armies.

The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.

2. The national buildings shall be converted into barracks, the public places into workshops for arms, the soil of the cellars shall be washed in order to extract therefrom saltpetre.

3. The arms of the regulation calibre shall be reserved exclusively for those who shall march against the enemy; the service of the interior shall be performed with hunting pieces and side arms.

4. The saddle horses are put in requisition to complete the cavalry corps; the draught-horses, other than those employed in agriculture, shall convey the artillery and the provisions.

5. The Committee of Public Safety is charged to take all the necessary measures to set up without delay an extraordinary manufacture of arms of every sort which corresponds with the ardor and energy of the French people. It is, accordingly, authorized to form all the establishments, factories, workshops and

<sup>1</sup> Duvergier, Lois, etc., Vol. VI, pp 107-108. English translation from Frank M. Anderson, *Constitutions and other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of France* (H. W. Wilson Company, Minneapolis, 1904), pp. 184-185. Reprinted by courtesy of H. W. Wilson Company and Professor F. M. Anderson.



mills which shall be deemed necessary for the carrying on of these works, as well as to put in requisition, within the entire extent of the Republic, the artists and workingmen who can contribute to their success. For this purpose there shall be put at the disposal of the Minister of War a sum of thirty millions, to be taken out of the four hundred ninety-eight million two hundred thousand livres in *assignats* which are in reserve in the fund of the three keys. The central establishment of this extraordinary manufacture shall be fixed at Paris.

6. The representatives of the people sent out for the execution of the present law shall have the same authority in their respective districts, acting in concert with the Committee of Public Safety; they are invested with the unlimited powers assigned to the representatives of the people to the armies.

7. Nobody can get himself replaced in the service for which he shall have been requisitioned. The public functionaries shall remain at their posts.

8. The levy shall be general. The unmarried citizens and widowers without children, from eighteen to twenty-five years, shall march first; they shall assemble without delay at the head-town of their districts, where they shall practice every day at the manual of arms while awaiting the hour of departure.

## 16. SOME REFORMS OF THE CONVENTION<sup>1</sup>

[Two of the positive achievements of the Convention were the introduction of the metric and decimal systems. The attempt to establish a new calendar was not successful but does afford an interesting illustration of revolutionary psychology.]



NEVERTHELESS, the application of intelligence to human institutions was still proceeding, and in the fresh light of the time, when the paralyzing hand of custom, tradition, of con-

<sup>1</sup> Wilfred B Kerr, *The Reign of Terror* (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1927), pp. 245-247. Reprinted by courtesy of the University of Toronto Press and permission of the author.

servatism and inertia was shaken off, ideas for the improvement of human society bubbled forth in a flood. Among these was a change in the system of weights and measures; the old complicated units were swept away and the admirably simple decimal system introduced in their place, with the weights based on the gram and the measurements on the metre, which, as the geographers prided themselves, was one forty-millionth of the earth's circumference. With this there is only one fault to find, a defect of the decimal system itself, that the number ten is not divisible into thirds and quarters, an imperfection which would have been corrected by the adoption of twelve instead of ten as the unit of the scale of notation (the duodecimal system); but this idea did not occur to the revolutionaries. Another important problem to be attacked was that of the calendar. Clearly, republicans could not count the years when France was oppressed by kings as a time when living was real; the foundation of the Republic, the great beginning of human liberty, ought to be marked in the calendar as it deserved, the commencement of a new era. The year just ended had been Year I of the New World; by a coincidence it began on a date which had witnessed both the autumnal equinox and the proclamation of the Republic—September 22nd, 1792. Already men were in the Year II of Liberty. As for the divisions of the year, the number of revolutions of the moon around the earth presented a serious obstacle to the adoption of the decimal system in this sphere also, and accordingly it was necessary to retain the twelve months. But the awkward Roman names, with their standing reminder of absurd pagan gods and tyrannical emperors ought clearly to be abolished. The Convention's commission in charge of the calendar, headed by Romme and Fabre d'Eglantine, proposed new names, more artistic and more appropriate. There would be three months in autumn—Vendémiaire, Brumaire, Frimaire—the season of vintage, of mist and of frost; three months in winter—Nivose, Pluviose, Ventose—the period of snow, of rain and of wind; three in Spring—Germinal, Floreal and Prairial—the months of the growing of seeds, of flowers and of meadows; and three in summer—Messidor, Thermidor and Fructidor—

the time of harvest, of heat and of fruit. Each of these months was composed of thirty days; there remained five days in each year, to be set apart for national festivals under the title of *sansculottides*, one of which was to be consecrated to Intelligence, one to Labour, one to Glorious Actions, one to Rewards, one to Opinions. The last day was to be a *Saturnalia*, on which anyone was free to write and say whatever he would about any public man, a festival of liberty of thought. The additional day in Leap Year would be The *Sansculottide*, devoted to the honour of the class which formed the basis of the Republic. Thus the year would be complete. The charming and poetical names invented by Fabre and his colleagues are open to only one objection—that their meanings render them unsuitable to countries in the Southern hemisphere or in any latitude widely different from that of France; and a calendar, owing to the necessities of human intercourse, ought to be as nearly universally acceptable as is possible. A new division was adopted for the month; there would be three weeks of ten days each, and the tenth day only would be the day of rest. The names of the days also required to be altered. The first day of the new week would be *primidi*; the next, *duodi*; then in succession, *tridi*, *quartidi*, *quintidi*, *sextidi*, *septidi*, *octidi*, *nonidi*, and finally *décadi*. It was intended also to divide the day into ten hours, the hour into ten parts, and these parts into ten subdivisions; but this portion of the proposal was adjourned for a year, and never came into force. The revolutionaries did not notice that the divisions of the day are themselves the result of careful and methodical calculation; that the number of hours in the day, 24, divisible by 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 12, and the number of minutes in the hour, 60, with its factors 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 20, and 30 are in reality more convenient and more scientific than any conceivable application of the decimal system. The new calendar was adopted on October 24th, 1793; the next day was *quartidi*, the fourth of Brumaire of the Year II of the Republic.



#### IV. THE NAPOLEONIC DICTATORSHIP



## 17. BRUMAIRE <sup>1</sup>

[While Napoleon was in Egypt the Directory had steadily declined in popularity and influence. Serious issues divided the Directors and the legislature, the constitution had been flouted, an aggressive and blundering foreign policy had led to the formation of a new coalition against France, and the armies met with defeat in both Germany and Italy. Napoleon arrived at the opportune moment to fish in these troubled waters.]



THE journey from Fréjus to Paris was a triumphal procession for the returning hero. Master of propaganda as he was, Bonaparte had taken care that the glorious details of the Egyptian campaign should be well known in France, and had managed to arrive at about the same time as the first tidings of his overwhelming victory at Aboukir over the Turks. He reached Paris on October 16. Sieyès was already conspiring to overthrow the Directory and was casting about for a general to aid him, for no conspiracy could be complete now without the tramp of boots and the clank of swords. Jourdan, Augereau, and Bernadotte were radicals and were themselves engaged in planning a Jacobin reaction. Moreau refused to meddle in politics and suggested Bonaparte. Sieyès would have preferred some one whom he could more easily have directed, but he had no choice. Bonaparte listened willingly to his project, but for the time being affected neutrality. He had had enough experience with the Directory's meddling and ineptitude to realize that no effectual government could be possible as long as the Constitu-

<sup>1</sup> Louis R. Gottschalk, *The Era of the French Revolution* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1929), pp. 300-304. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

tion of the Year III remained in force, but he preferred not to commit himself until he felt himself on firmer ground. His neutrality was well rewarded when the Council of Five Hundred elected his brother Lucien as its president. Perhaps Bonaparte would have preferred using the constitutional means of gaining control of the Directory, but as he was far younger than the age required of Directors (forty), he had to surrender that notion, if, indeed, he ever seriously entertained it. In November, Bonaparte had assured himself of the support of most of the generals and Sieyès had won over a large part of the Council of Ancients. With Lucien presiding over the Council of Five Hundred, everything seemed ripe for a *coup d'état*.

Taking advantage of the constant fear of a Jacobin uprising, on November 9 the Council of Ancients, in accordance with the powers vested in it by the Constitution, convoked the Legislature to meet the next day at Saint-Cloud, across the Seine River, and ordered General Bonaparte to take command of the troops in Paris in order to carry out its decree and protect it against attack. The next step was the resignation of Sieyès and Ducos as Directors. Barras was wheedled by threats and bribes to hand in his, likewise, and the Directory ceased to function, since the signatures of at least three Directors were necessary for the legality of any act. Moulin and Gohier were detained by Moreau at the Palace of the Luxembourg. In compliance with the decree of the preceding day, the two Councils met at Saint-Cloud on November 10 (19th Brumaire). The Council of Five Hundred did not prove as docile as had been hoped and set up a cry of "Down with Dictators!" and carried a motion to renew the oath to the Constitution of the Year III. Bonaparte thought it high time to act. He visited the Ancients first. How about the Constitution, he was asked, and answered:

The Constitution? You yourselves have rendered it of no account. You violated it on the 18th Fructidor, you violated it on the 22d Floréal and on the 30th Prairial. It is appealed to by all parties, and all parties have sinned against it. It cannot afford safety to us, for no one respects it any more. Let us find the means of assuring to every one the liberty to which he is entitled and which could not be guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the Directory.



Bonaparte's cards now were on the table, and they had made an unfavorable impression. His mere presence in arms was a flagrant violation of the law. He had worse luck with the Five Hundred, where it had just been agreed to take a new oath of allegiance to the constitution that he had just attacked. The deputies gathered around him and jostled him. According to some accounts, there were even threats to kill him. For a moment he lost either his nerve or his consciousness, and fell into the arms of his grenadiers, who led him away, followed by cries of "Outlaw him!" His brother Lucien tried to save the situation by refusing to put a motion of outlawry and addressing his colleagues on his brother's behalf. But he was unable to make himself heard above the din and was glad when some soldiers, sent by his brother, arrived to escort him from the chamber. So far, the attempted conspiracy had been a failure. It looked as if the Councils would succeed in preserving the Constitution of the Year III and punishing the conspirators.

Everything now depended upon the use of force. Lucien seemed to grasp the situation better than Napoleon, who was in somewhat of a daze, or Sieyès, whose coach was near by ready for flight. He appealed to the troops. The Council of Five Hundred, he declared, was held in terror by representatives armed with daggers and inspired by the English Government. This had its effect. The soldiers hurrahed for Bonaparte, but still they did not move. Seizing a dagger and pointing it at his brother's breast, Lucien swore to kill him if ever he violated the liberties of the French. That proved more than the troops could resist. They followed General Murat into the hall, and the members of the Council of Five Hundred fled through the windows as the soldiers entered. Apparently a bit of *opéra-bouffe* had changed the course of history, though it would be rash to assert that, even if Bonaparte had failed on this occasion, the Directory would have maintained itself, and the dictatorship would not have come.

The Council of Ancients now proved more docile. It adjourned both chambers and appointed a provisional government of three consuls until a new constitution might be completed. In

every way the forms of legality were observed as far as possible. A remnant of the Council of Five Hundred was assembled that evening in order to confirm these measures. Sieyès, Ducos, and Napoleon Bonaparte were named provisional consuls. A commission of twenty-five from each of the chambers was designated to cooperate with them in drawing up a new constitution. At first, the three provisional consuls had equal authority. But it was not long before Bonaparte arrogated to himself the supreme position. Ducos withdrew from active politics almost altogether, while Sieyès devoted himself to his favorite pastime of constitution-mongering. At the first meeting of the three Consuls, Sieyès is said to have asked, "Who shall preside?" and Ducos answered, "Don't you see that the General is in the chair?"

An ostensibly republican form of government was retained for several years more. By the Constitution of the Year VIII, which (we shall see) was completed before the year 1799 came to a close, Bonaparte was named First Consul with two innocuous assistants in the form of Second and Third Consuls. In 1802 he was to be made Consul for life, and in 1804 he was to become the Emperor Napoleon. Until that time the fiction of the Republic was officially maintained. Indeed, even after the Empire was created, it was for some time designated upon the coins as the *République française, Napoléon empereur*. But actually France had ceased to be republican, and, since the 19th Brumaire, was under the guidance of one man. "Gentlemen," Sieyès had said on the evening of the 20th Brumaire, "we have a master; he knows how to do everything, he is able to do everything, he is willing to do everything." Sieyès' weakness for epigrams this time permitted him to be not only clever but profound. Bonaparte, who, in his own words, was the son and testamentary executor of the Revolution, had received his bequest. How much of it he was to squander, how much he was to save, how much he was to add, the next fifteen years were to tell.

18. THE NAPOLEONIC CODE <sup>1</sup>

[The period of the Consulate was one of intense activity and the accomplishments of Napoleon were of permanent significance. The *Code Napoléon* was the outstanding achievement of this era but it should be remembered also that he was successful in carrying through important changes in local government, that he established the Concordat, created the Legion of Honor, and carried into practice the educational designs of Condorcet.]



THE same quality of almost pyramidal solidity characterizes another great enterprise of the Napoleonic period, the codification of French law.

The difficulties of this undertaking consisted mainly in the enormous mass of decrees emanating from the National Assemblies, relative to political, civil, and criminal affairs. Many of those decrees, the offspring of a momentary enthusiasm, had found a place in the codes of laws which were then compiled; and yet sagacious observers knew that several of them warred against the instincts of the Gallic race. This conviction was summed up in the trenchant statement of the compilers of the new code, in which they appealed from the ideas of Rousseau to the customs of the past: "New theories are but the maxims of certain individuals: the old maxims represent the sense of centuries." There was much force in this dictum. The overthrow of Feudalism and the old monarchy had not permanently altered the French nature. They were still the same joyous, artistic, clan-loving people whom the Latin historians described: and pride in the nation or the family was as closely linked with respect for a doughty champion of national and family interests as in the days of Caesar. Of this Roman or quasi-Gallic reaction Napoleon was to be the regulator; and no sphere of his activi-

<sup>1</sup> John Holland Rose, *The Life of Napoleon I* (G. Bell and Sons, Ltd, London, 1901), Vol I, pp. 265-271. Reprinted by permission of G Bell and Sons, Ltd., London

ties bespeaks his unerring political sagacity more than his sifting of the old and the new in the great code which was afterwards to bear his name.

Old French law had been an inextricable labyrinth of laws and customs, mainly Roman and Frankish in origin, hopelessly tangled by feudal customs, provincial privileges, ecclesiastical rights, and the later undergrowth of royal decrees; and no part of the legislation of the revolutionists met with so little resistance as their root and branch destruction of this exasperating jungle. Their difficulties only began when they endeavoured to apply the principles of the Rights of Man to political, civil, and criminal affairs. The chief of these principles relating to criminal law were that law can only forbid actions that are harmful to society, and must only impose penalties that are strictly necessary. To these epoch-making pronouncements the Assembly added, in 1790, that crimes should be visited only on the guilty individual, not on the family; and that penalties must be proportioned to the offences. The last two of these principles had of late been flagrantly violated; but the general pacification of France now permitted a calm consideration of the whole question of criminal law, and of its application to normal conditions.

Civil law was to be greatly influenced by the Rights of Man; but those famous declarations were to a large extent contravened in the ensuing civil strifes, and their application to real life was rendered infinitely more difficult by that predominance of the critical over the constructive faculties which marred the efforts of the revolutionary Babel-builders. Indeed, such was the ardour of those enthusiasts that they could scarcely see any difficulties. Thus, the Convention in 1793 allowed its legislative committee just one month for the preparation of a code of civil law. At the close of six weeks Cambacérès, the reporter of the committee, was actually able to announce that it was ready. It was found to be too complex. Another commission was ordered to reconstruct it: this time the Convention discovered that the revised edition was too concise. Two other drafts were drawn up at the orders of the Directory, but neither gave satisfaction.

And thus it was reserved for the First Consul to achieve what the revolutionists had only begun, building on the foundations and with the very materials which their ten years' toil had prepared.

He had many other advantages. The Second Consul, Cambacérès, was at his side, with stores of legal experience and habits of complaisance that were of the highest value. Then, too, the principles of personal liberty and social equality were yielding ground before the more autocratic maxims of Roman law. The view of life now dominant was that of the warrior, not of the philosopher. Bonaparte named Tronchet, Bigot de Préameneu, and the eloquent and learned Portalis for the redaction of the code. By ceaseless toil they completed their first draft in four months. Then, after receiving the criticisms of the Court of Cassation and the Tribunals of Appeal, it came before the Council of State for the decision of its special committee on legislation. There it was subjected to the scrutiny of several experts, but, above all, to Bonaparte himself. He presided at more than half of the 102 sittings devoted to this criticism; and sittings of eight or nine hours were scarcely long enough to satisfy his eager curiosity, his relentless activity, and his determined practicality.

From the notes of Thibaudeau, one of the members of this revising committee, we catch a glimpse of the part there played by the First Consul. We see him listening intently to the discussions of the jurists, taking up and sorting the threads of thought when a tangle seemed imminent, and presenting the result in some striking pattern. We watch his methodizing spirit at work on the cumbrous legal phraseology, hammering it out into clear, ductile French. We feel the unerring sagacity, which acted as a political and social touchstone, testing, approving, or rejecting multifarious details drawn from old French law or from the customs of the Revolution; and finally we wonder at the architectural skill which worked the 2,281 articles of the Code into an almost unassailable pile. To the skill and patience of the three chief redactors that result is, of course,

very largely due: yet, in its mingling of strength, simplicity, and symmetry, we may discern the projection of Napoleon's genius over what had hitherto been a legal chaos.

Some blocks of the pyramid were almost entirely his own. He widened the area of French citizenship; above all, he strengthened the structure of the family by enhancing the father's authority. Herein his Corsican instincts and the requirements of statecraft led him to undo much of the legislation of the revolutionists. Their ideal was individual liberty: his aim was to establish public order by autocratic methods. They had sought to make of the family a little republic, founded on the principles of liberty and equality; but in the new Code the paternal authority reappeared no less strict, albeit less severe in some details, than that of the *ancien régime*. The family was thenceforth modelled on the idea dominant in the State that authority and responsible action pertained to a single individual. The father controlled the conduct of his children: his consent was necessary for the marriage of sons up to their twenty-fifth year, for that of daughters up to their twenty-first year; and other regulations were framed in the same spirit. Thus there was rebuilt in France the institution of the family on an almost Roman basis; and these customs, contrasting sharply with the domestic anarchy of the Anglo-Saxon race, have had a mighty influence in fashioning the character of the French, as of the other Latin peoples, to a ductility that yields a ready obedience to local officials, drill-sergeants, and the central Government.

In other respects Bonaparte's influence on the code was equally potent. He raised the age at which marriage could be legally contracted to that of eighteen for men, and fifteen for women, and he prescribed a formula of obedience to be repeated by the bride to her husband; while the latter was bound to protect and support the wife.

And yet, on the question of divorce, Bonaparte's action was sufficiently ambiguous to reawaken Josephine's fears; and the detractors of the great man have some ground for declaring that his action herein was dictated by personal considerations. Others again may point to the declarations of the

French National Assemblies that the law regarded marriage merely as a civil contract, and that divorce was to be a logical sequel of individual liberty, "which an indissoluble tie would annul" It is indisputable that extremely lax customs had been the result of the law of 1792, divorce being allowed on a mere declaration of incompatibility of temper Against these scandals Bonaparte firmly set his face. But he disagreed with the framers of the new Code when they proposed altogether to prohibit divorce, though such a proposition might well have seemed consonant with his zeal for Roman Catholicism After long debates it was decided to reduce the causes which could render divorce possible from nine to four—adultery, cruelty, condemnation to a degrading penalty, and mutual consent—provided that this last demand should be persistently urged after not less than two years of marriage, and in no case was it to be valid after twenty years of marriage.

We may also notice here that Bonaparte sought to surround the act of adoption with much solemnity, declaring it to be one of the grandest acts imaginable. Yet, lest marriage should thereby be discouraged, celibates were expressly debarred from the privileges of adopting heirs. The precaution shows how keenly this able ruler peered into the future. Doubtless, he surmised that in the future the population of France could cease to expand at the normal rate, owing to the working of the law compelling the equal division of property among all the children of a family. To this law he was certainly opposed. Equality in regard to the bequest of property was one of the sacred maxims of revolutionary jurists, who had limited the right of free disposal by bequest to one-tenth of each estate: nine-tenths being of necessity divided equally among the direct heirs. Yet so strong was the reaction in favour of the Roman principle of paternal authority, that Bonaparte and a majority of the drafters of the new Code scrupled not to assail that maxim, and to claim for the father larger discretionary powers over the disposal of his property. They demanded that the disposable share should vary according to the wealth of the testator—a remarkable proposal, which proves him to be anything but the

unflinching champion of revolutionary legal ideas which popular French histories have generally depicted him.

This proposal would have re-established liberty of bequest in its most pernicious form, granting almost limitless discretionary power to the wealthy, while restricting or denying it to the poor. Fortunately for his reputation in France, the suggestion was rejected; and the law, as finally adopted, fixed the disposable share as one-fourth of the property: it was never to be more than one-fourth, and it might be less if there were more than three children, diminishing as the size of the family increased. This sliding scale, varying inversely with the size of the family, is open to an obvious objection: it granted liberty of bequest only in cases where the family was small, but practically lapsed when the family attained to patriarchal dimensions. The natural result has been that the birth-rate has suffered a serious and prolonged check in France. It seems certain that the First Consul foresaw this result. His experience of peasant life must have warned him that the law, even as now amended, would stunt the population of France. . . . The great captain did all in his power to prevent the French settling down in a self-contained national life; he strove to stir them up to world-wide undertakings, and for the success of his future imperial schemes a redundant population was an absolute necessity.

The Civil Code became law in 1804: after undergoing some slight modifications and additions, it was, in 1807, renamed the Code Napoléon. Its provisions had already, in 1806, been adopted in Italy. In 1810 Holland, and the newly-annexed coast-line of the North Sea as far as Hamburg, and even Lubeck on the Baltic, received it as the basis of their laws, as did the Grand Duchy of Berg in 1811. Indirectly it has also exerted an immense influence on the legislation of Central and Southern Germany, Prussia, Switzerland, and Spain: while many of the Central and South American States have also borrowed its salient features.






#### HANDWRITING ON THE WALL

This drawing by the famous caricaturist, Gillray, reflects the extremely bitter attitude of English opinion toward Napoleon. It is a satire on Belshazzar's feast and depicts the First Consul, Josephine, and members of the court feasting on St James Palace, the Tower of London, and King George's head. (A. B. Maurice and F. T. Cooper, *The History of the Nineteenth Century in Caricature*, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1904.)



#### NAPOLEON IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH

This caricature by Gillray shows Napoleon fighting for his life against his numerous enemies who are easily identified. (A. B. Maurice and F. T. Cooper, *The History of the Nineteenth Century in Caricature*, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1904 )



Napoleon



Keystone View Company

Stalin



Photograph by Brown Brothers

Hitler



Photograph by Brown Brothers

Mussolini

MODERN DICTATORS

19. THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM<sup>1</sup>

[The failure of the Continental System to ruin English commerce, coupled with the resentment aroused by Napoleon's attempt to enforce it, were largely responsible for the collapse of his empire.]



THE Continental System is the term that Napoleon himself applied to that set of measures by means of which he confidently expected to ruin English economic prosperity as a preliminary to the destruction of England's political influence. The Continental System introduced only one novel factor into the century-old commercial war between England and France. This was the association of the entire Continent with France proper in the execution of the various acts of policy which France had hitherto employed single-handed against England. At the moment that Napoleon formally established the continental blockade, he was in sufficient control of Europe to resist England by forming a military alliance with Prussia and a maritime alliance with Holland and Spain. His aim, however, was not exclusively the ruin of the English, as the famous English historian Seeley maintained; rather it was a European confederation of states under his personal domination. By establishing a continental blockade against English products and vehemently condemning English maritime practices, Napoleon could pose as the defender of continental interests against an unprincipled England and still inflict as crushing a blow upon the English economic system as he could have done by following any other tactics. If England agreed to modify her maritime code and restore the colonies of France and her allies, Napoleon's grand design in Europe and in the East would progress rapidly. If England refused to come to terms, Napoleon would confront the English

<sup>1</sup> Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon* (F. S. Crofts & Co., New York, 1933), pp. 420-424. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, F. S. Crofts & Co.

—as for a brief moment he was able to do—with an armed Continent. Though his ultimate goal of a European confederation was clearly premature and the ruthless violence of his methods doomed his venture to failure, it is only by correlating the continental blockade with his general policy of imperial conquest that we can understand why he was inevitably led to renew his war against Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

The idea of compulsory regulation of commercial policy and maritime intercourse was not new, and the theory underlying it was considerably older than the Revolution. Up to the time of the commercial treaty of 1786, the normal state of relations between France and England was that of commercial war and mutual embargo. Following the mercantile theory that a country was strong in so far as its exports exceeded its imports, and that the mother country should have the monopoly of trade with its own colonies, the two states professed a policy of general prohibition of each other's goods. In practice, smuggling on a very extensive scale and the use of the license system made the actual intercourse between the two countries far different from what it was supposed to be in theory. This divergence between reality and professed policy became all the more pronounced in the latter half of the eighteenth century, when the forces of the industrial revolution and the doctrines of economic liberalism (*laissez faire*) helped to weaken the old mercantile ideal. The commercial treaty of 1786 openly recognized the great change in the commercial relations of the two countries and allowed the entry of British manufactured goods into France. So unpopular, however, was this treaty with the French textile manufacturers, who were crippled by English competition, that they endeavored to end it at the first opportunity. This opportunity came in 1793, with the outbreak of war between France and England; and from 1793 till the close of the Napoleonic era the commercial relations between the two states consistently followed the older traditions of blockade and restrictive commercial policy.

From 1793 to 1799 the revolutionary assemblies passed severe if not draconic decrees for the exclusion from French

markets of various classes of British manufactured products, such as cotton and woolen fabrics, iron and steel products, and refined sugar. They also pursued a strongly protectionist policy against all foreign goods, levying heavy customs taxes on such products when conveyed on foreign ships. This policy of French self-blockade was in practice modified by regulations and seriously weakened by extensive smuggling operations.

The English government during the same interval professed a policy of blockade, but it made no effort to starve out France or to stop French imports. It was always the desire of the English to regulate French trade for their own benefit and never to encourage the French self-blockade of British products. The English policy actually was an effective method of strengthening the commercial prosperity of Great Britain. It helped to hinder the trade of the French colonies of the West Indies with France and her European allies to the advantage of the British colonies, and it enabled England to convey the products of the enemy colonies to her own ports. It served also to increase in extraordinary fashion the total foreign trade of the United States, whose merchants and shipowners gained enormous profits in transporting the produce of French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies to Europe. Though this carrying trade of the American vessels had been declared legal by an eminent British authority, the position of the American and European neutral was fraught with some danger. The legal status of the neutral shipper was protected, but this legal protection scarcely checked the damaging activities of British ships of war and privateers. In fact, Great Britain used its uncontested naval superiority to indulge in extra-legal and injurious practices which often eventuated in the confiscation of the neutral's cargo. Nevertheless, despite the interference of British warships and French privateers and prize-court condemnation the years up to 1807 were prosperous for American merchants, farmers, and shippers. "The whole situation was remarkably similar to the first years of the World War, 1914—1917, when the United States, as the great neutral, profited from supplying foodstuffs and other products to the warring nations."

With Napoleon's seizure of power in 1799 the commercial war between France and England grew more severe and gradually involved the whole Continent. Like many of his contemporaries in France, Napoleon was convinced of the hollowness of the English economic system. As he firmly believed that a country's trade was of slight value in comparison with its industry and agriculture, he was certain that England's apparent prosperity was fictitious. He could therefore bring about the economic strangulation of England by closing her continental markets. "Deprived of these immense markets," he wrote, "harassed by revolts and internal disturbances which will be the consequence, England will have great embarrassment with her colonial and Asiatic goods. These goods, being unsalable, will fall to low prices, and the English will find themselves vanquished by excess. . . ." Furthermore, he thought he saw the signs of economic decay in England in the extraordinary increase of the funded debt, in the suspension, on the part of the Bank of England, of the redemption of its notes, and in the gradual inflation of the currency. Hence, by closing the Continent to the English and forcing them to buy their foodstuffs from France, paying for them in metallic currency, he would deplete the gold reserves of the Bank of England. The English credit system would then collapse, English subsidies to the Continent would cease, and France would emerge victorious.

Such was the Napoleonic conception of the commercial war. To make good his aim of closing the Continent to the English, he extended the practices of the revolutionary assemblies to the North Coast, to Italy and Switzerland. Although he had offered, in 1800, to revise the revolutionary decrees against British merchandise, pressure from French manufacturers induced him to maintain the restrictions. Consequently nothing was stipulated in the treaty of Amiens. In April, 1803, the Corps législatif voted a new tariff law which made no concessions to English commerce, thus making inevitable the renewal of the war in the following month. After the outbreak of the implacable war, Napoleon tightened the restrictions upon colonial wares from British sources, also against neutrals that lent themselves to

smuggling activities. On the British side, the most important measures taken were the extension of the paper blockade to the coast between the mouth of the Elbe and the port of Brest and the reversal of the policy concerning the broken voyage of American vessels (1806).

After his victory at Austerlitz (December 2, 1805), Napoleon was free to promote systematically his great plan of conquering the sea by the land; that is, of using his military domination on the Continent to close European markets to the English and, at the same time, to win those markets for French manufacturers. The new tariff of April 10, 1806, which he later characterized as "a real coup d'état," was a clear indication of his policy. All colonial products were subjected to heavy customs duties. Raw cotton became dutiable, subject however to a drawback if the goods manufactured were subsequently exported. Cotton manufactures, with certain exceptions for such as could not be produced in France, were excluded *in toto*. He foresaw the difficulties that the measure would bring to French manufacturers, but was sanguine that after a year or two of hardship French manufacturers would be grateful to him for removing foreign competition.





## V. THE CONSERVATIVE ERA



## 20. EUROPEAN SOCIETY IN 1815 <sup>1</sup>

[European Society had been profoundly stirred by the French Revolution. The old régime had been overthrown, the peasants had in many cases become owners of the land, and the prestige of the bourgeoisie had been greatly enhanced. The social structure as a whole, however, was not essentially new in 1815.]



IN considering the social structure as a whole it becomes clear that neither the early stages of industrialism in England and France, nor the upheaval of the French Revolution had, even in western Europe, created an essentially new society. The traditional class lines had become blurred, but were not effaced. A transformation of the life of the English peasants was being effected through the enclosure movement. On the continent the French Revolution had in some states modified the legal status of the peasants and their method of landholding. At the same time, improved systems of cultivation were coming into use. Nevertheless, the great mass of the peasantry continued to follow in a routine of life in which their ancestors of the thirteenth century could easily have found a place. Indeed, Virgil's Roman peasant would have found much that was familiar: "Often doth the driver of the slow-moving ass load his back with oil-jars or with cheap apples, and, returning from the town bring back a grindstone or a mass of swarthy pitch." After 1830 five years of the railroad produced more visible changes in agricultural life than had several decades of emancipation.

Eastern Europe was almost entirely an agricultural world,

<sup>1</sup> Frederick B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution* (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1934), pp 46-48. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Harper & Brothers.

centuries behind western Europe in economic and intellectual development. A handful of the aristocracy in Hungary, Poland, and Russia affected French or English ideas which they rarely understood. The economic activity of the towns had hardly changed for centuries; exports were mainly raw products; the mines were largely unworked; manufactures were rarely on a large scale; and transportation was hindered by the wretched state of the roads and by the almost total lack of canals. There was no large or widely distributed middle class interested in banking, manufacturing, schools, and newspapers. The clergy and the nobility ruled the masses with an iron hand. This striking contrast between the east and the west of Europe—a line drawn from the mouth of the Elbe to the Adriatic roughly marked the division—must always be borne in mind in any consideration of the general social, political, and cultural situation.

In western Europe the bourgeoisie was extending its economic power by improved methods of manufacture and by better means of communication. But the influence of the middle class was everywhere limited, as before 1789, by the presence of the aristocracy, the clergy, and the peasantry. The tendency of the business world to dominate all classes and to impose its philosophy of life on every social group was only beginning to appear. In some centers in England, France, and the Low Countries the suffering among the working classes was beginning to attract the attention of a few reformers, but the proletarian problem was still of only minor significance in the social situation of the time. In every state the population was increasing, chiefly because of the lowering of the death rate due to the progress of medicine, and in the towns to improved sewage and hospital service.

What had changed since the eighteenth century, however, was not so much the economic and social organization of society as its intellectual outlook. The changes wrought by the French Revolution had everywhere started discussion of further changes. Men were more inclined than ever before either to defend or to question the validity of old ways of thinking and living. The philosophers of the eighteenth century had spread

the idea that change was desirable and the revolutionary era had given striking evidence that it was possible. This inspired some classes to hope for further advances and aroused others to oppose change bitterly. Moreover, the constant movements of the armies during twenty-five years of campaigning had brought the nations into closer contact with one another. This intermingling was particularly important in spreading ideas of western Europe among the intellectual classes of central and eastern Europe. Taking Europe as a whole, it is this profound difference in the intellectual climate rather than any striking economic or political change that makes the life of the period from Waterloo to the Reform Bill of 1832 so different from life as it had been before the French Revolution

## 21. THE BURSCHENSCHAFT<sup>1</sup>

[In no part of Europe did the heavy hand of reaction descend with more vigor than in Germany. Opposition to the conservative policies of Metternich and his associates centered largely in the Universities and found expression in the organization of the Burschenschaft. The following passage from the writings of the German historian, Treitschke, describes the famous Wartburg Festival which, coupled with the subsequent murder of Kotzebue, enabled Metternich to persuade the German Princes to promulgate the Carlsbad Decrees.]



LONG in advance, and with vigorous trumpeting, the press had heralded the great day. A free assembly of Germans from all parts, meeting solely on behalf of the fatherland, was to this generation a phenomenon so astounding as to seem almost more important than the world-shaking experiences of recent years.

<sup>1</sup> Von Treitschke, *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (McBride, Nast and Co., New York, 1917), Vol. III, pp. 54-57. Translation by Eden and Cedar Paul. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Robert M. McBride and Company.

During October 17th fifteen hundred Burschen arrived at Eisenach, about half of this number being from Jena, thirty from Berlin, and the rest from Giessen, Marburg, Erlangen, Heidelberg, and the other universities of the minor states; following the custom of the gymnasts, the vigorous men of Kiel had come the whole distance on foot. Four of the Jena professors, Fries, Oken, Schweitzer, and Kieser, were also present. As the men of each new group entered, they were greeted at the gate with loud hurrahs, and were then conducted to the Rautenkranz, there before the severe members of the committee to swear to observe the peace strictly for three days. Early on the following morning, a fine autumn day, "the sacred train" made its way through the forest to the reformer's stronghold. The procession was led by Scheidler, carrying the sword of the Burschen, and followed by four vassals; next came Count Keller, surrounded by four standard guards, with the new colours of the Burschen which the girls of Jena had shortly before embroidered for their austere young friends; the Burschen followed two by two, among them a number of heroic German figures, many of them bearded (which to the timid already sufficed to arouse suspicion of treasonable designs). Delight shone from every eye, for all were inspired by the happy self-forgetfulness of youth which is still able to immerse itself in the pleasures of the moment. It seemed to them as if today for the first time they had been able truly to appreciate the glories of their fatherland.

In the banqueting-hall of the Wartburg, which the grand duke had hospitably thrown open, *God is to us a tower of strength* was first of all sung amid the rolling of kettle-drums and the blast of trumpets. Then Riemann, of Lutzow's yagers, delivered an inaugural address describing in emotional and exaggerated phraseology the deeds of Luther and of Blucher, and going on to exhort the Burschen by the spirits of the mighty dead "to strive for the acquirement of every human and patriotic virtue." The speech was not free from the current catch-words about the frustrated hopes of the German nation and about the one prince who had kept his word. As a whole, it was a youthful and obscure but thoroughly harmless outpouring of

sentimentality, just as vague and unmeaning as the new password *Volunto!* of which the Burschen were so fond. Nor did the subsequent speeches of the professors and of the other students exceed this measure, for even Oken spoke with unusual self-restraint, warning the young people against premature political activities.

After the midday meal, the Burschen returned to the town and went to church, the service being also attended by the Eisenach Landsturm; and after church the champions of the Berlin and Jena gymnastic grounds displayed their arts to the astonished Landsturmiers. At nightfall there was a renewed procession to the Wartenberg, opposite the Warsberg, this time by torchlight, and here were lighted a number of bonfires of victory, greeted with patriotic speeches and songs. Hitherto the festival had been characterised by a pleasing harmony, but now it became manifest that there already existed within the Burschenschaft a small party of extremists, composed of those fanatical primitive Teutons of Jahn's school who passed by the name of "Old Germans." The Turnvater had felt that this valuable opportunity for a senseless demonstration must on no account be lost. He had suggested that the festival in commemoration of Luther should be crowned by an imitation of the boldest of the reformer's actions, and that just as Luther had once burned the papal bull of excommunication, so now the writings of the enemies of the good cause should be cast into the flames. Since the majority of the festival committee, wiser than Jahn, had rejected the proposal, Jahn had given his Berlin companions a list of the books to be burned, and his faithful followers, led by Massmann, now determined to carry out the master's plan on their own initiative, a proceeding which the committee, desiring to keep the peace, was unwilling positively to prohibit. On the Wartenberg, hardly had the last serious song been finished by the Burschen surrounding the fires, and the true festival been brought to a close, when Massmann suddenly came to the front, and in a bombastic speech exhorted the brethren to contemplate how, in accordance with Luther's example, sentence was to be executed in the fires of purgatory upon the evil writings of the

fatherland. Now had arrived the sacred hour "in which all the world of Germany can see what we desire; can know what is to be expected from us in the future."

Thereupon his associates brought forward several parcels of old printed matter, each inscribed with the titles of the condemned books. Tossed in by a pitchfork, the works of the traitors to their fatherland then fell into the infernal flames amid loud hooting. The parcels contained a wonderfully mixed society of about two dozen books in all, some good and some bad, everything which had most recently aroused the anger of the *Isis* and similar journals. There were burned the works of Wadzeck and Schere, and, to make a clean sweep, those "of all the other scribbling, screaming, and speechless foes of the praise-worthy gymnastic craft"; copies of the *Alemanmia*, too, found their way to the flames, with issues "of all the other newspapers which disgrace and dishonour the fatherland"; then, of course, came three writings by the detested Schmalz (while the chorus intoned an opprobrious pun upon the author's name), and the *General Code of the Gendarmerie* by Schmalz's comrade, Kamptz. Beside the *Code Napoléon*, Kotzebue's *German History*, and Ascher's *Germanomania* (followed by a shout of "Woe unto the Jews"), there was burned Haller's *Restoration*, the choice of this victim being explained on the ground "the fellow does not want the German fatherland to have a constitution"—although not one of the Burschen had ever read this ponderous book. But even Benzenberg and Wangenheim, liberals both, had to suffer at the hands of these angry young men because their works had proved incomprehensible to the Jena journalists. Finally, an Uhlan warrior's pair of stays, a pigtail, and a corporal's cane, were burned as "fuglemen of military pedantry, the scandal of the serious and sacred warrior caste"; and with three groans for "the rascally Schmalzian crew" the judges of this modern Fehmich court dispersed.



22. THE CARLSBAD DECREES<sup>1</sup>

[Alarmed by the activities of the Burschenschaft, and terrified by the murder of Kotzebue, Alexander I and Frederick William III yielded to the desires of Metternich and supported his efforts to combat liberalism in Germany. As a result of several conferences held at Carlsbad, a series of decrees was formulated and forced through the Diet, despite the opposition of certain of the lesser states. These decrees suppressed liberty for a full generation and determined the political system of Germany until 1848.]



1. A special representative of the ruler of each state shall be appointed for each university, with appropriate instructions and extended powers, and shall reside in the place where the university is situated. This office may devolve upon the existing curator or upon any other individual whom the government may deem qualified.

The function of this agent shall be to see to the strictest enforcement of existing laws and disciplinary regulations; to observe carefully the spirit which is shown by the instructors in the university in their public lectures and regular courses, and, without directly interfering in scientific matters or in the methods of teaching, to give a salutary direction to the instruction, having in view the future attitude of the students. Lastly, he shall devote unceasing attention to everything that may promote morality, good order, and outward propriety among the students. . . .

2. The confederated governments mutually pledge themselves to remove from the universities or other public educational institutions all teachers who, by obvious deviation from their duty, or by exceeding the limits of their functions, or by the abuse of their legitimate influence over the youthful minds,

<sup>1</sup> From Robinson and Beard, *Readings in Modern European History*, Vol. II, pp. 20-22. By permission of the publishers, Ginn and Company.

or by propagating harmful doctrines hostile to public order or subversive of existing governmental institutions, shall have unmistakably proved their unfitness for the important office intrusted to them. . . .

No teacher who shall have been removed in this manner shall be again appointed to a position in any public institution of learning in another state of the union.

3. Those laws which have for a long period been directed against secret and unauthorized societies in the universities shall be strictly enforced. These laws apply especially to that association established some years since under the name Universal Students' Union (*Allgemeine Burschenschaft*), since the very conception of the society implies the utterly unallowable plan of permanent fellowship and constant communication between the various universities. The duty of especial watchfulness in this matter should be impressed upon the special agents of the government.

The governments mutually agree that such persons as shall hereafter be shown to have remained in secret or unauthorized associations, or shall have entered such associations, shall not be admitted to any public office.

4. No student who shall be expelled from a university in virtue of a decision of the university senate ratified or prompted by the agent of the government, or who shall have left the institution in order to escape expulsion, shall be received in any other university. . . .

1. So long as this decree shall remain in force no publication which appears in the form of daily issues, or as a serial not exceeding twenty sheets of printed matter, shall go to press in any state of the union without the previous knowledge and approval of the state officials.

Writings which do not belong to one of the above-mentioned classes shall be treated according to the laws now in force, or which may be enacted, in the individual states of the union. . . .

4. Each state of the union is responsible, not only to the state against which the offense is directly committed, but to the

whole Confederation, for every publication appearing within the limits of its jurisdiction in which the honor or security of other states is infringed or their constitution or administration attacked. . . .

6. The Diet shall have the right, moreover, to suppress on its own authority, without being petitioned, such writings included in Article 1, in whatever German state they may appear, as, in the opinion of a commission appointed by it, are inimical to the honor of the union, the safety of individual states, or the maintenance of peace and quiet in Germany. There shall be no appeal from such decisions, and the governments involved are bound to see that they are put into execution. . . .

7. When a newspaper or periodical is suppressed by a decision of the Diet, the editor thereof may not within a period of five years edit a similar publication in any state of the union.

### 23. SERFDOM IN OLD RUSSIA <sup>1</sup>

[The elimination of serfdom by Alexander II was the most significant event in the history of Russia during the nineteenth century. While the Edict of Emancipation failed to solve the land problem, it did make the Russian serf a free man and corrected many of the abuses described by Prince Peter Kropotkin, the famous Russian anarchist.]



SERFDOM was then in the last years of its existence. It is recent history,—it seems to be only of yesterday; and yet, even in Russia, few realize what serfdom was in reality. There is a dim conception that the conditions which it created were very bad; but those conditions, as they affected human beings bodily and mentally, are not generally understood. It is amazing, indeed, to see how quickly an institution and its social conse-

<sup>1</sup> P. Kropotkin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1899), pp. 49-57. Reprinted by courtesy of Houghton Mifflin Company.

quences are forgotten when the institution has ceased to exist, and with what rapidity men and things change. I will try to recall the conditions of serfdom by telling, not what I heard, but what I saw.

Uliána, the housekeeper, stands in the passage leading to father's room, and crosses herself; she dares neither to advance nor to retreat. At last, after having recited a prayer, she enters the room, and reports, in a hardly audible voice, that the store of tea is nearly at an end, that there are only twenty pounds of sugar left, and that the other provisions will soon be exhausted.

"Thieves, robbers!" shouts my father. "And you, you are in league with them!" His voice thunders throughout the house. Our stepmother leaves Uliána to face the storm. But father cries, "Frol, call the princess! Where is she?" And when she enters, he receives her with the same reproaches.

"You also are in league with this progeny of Ham; you are standing up for them;" and so on, for half an hour or more.

Then he commences to verify the accounts. At the same time, he thinks about the hay. Frol is sent to weigh what is left of that, and our stepmother is sent to be present during the weighing, while father calculates how much of it ought to be in the barn. A considerable quantity of hay appears to be missing, and Uliána cannot account for several pounds of such and such provisions. Father's voice becomes more and more menacing; Uliána is trembling; but it is the coachman who now enters the room, and is stormed at by his master. Father springs at him, strikes him, but he keeps repeating, "Your highness must have made a mistake."

Father repeats his calculations, and this time it appears that there is more hay in the barn than there ought to be. The shouting continues; he now reproaches the coachman with not having given the horses their daily rations in full; but the coachman calls on all the saints to witness that he gave the animals their due, and Frol invokes the Virgin to confirm the coachman's appeal.

But father will not be appeased. He calls in Makár, the piano-tuner and sub-butler, and reminds him of all his recent

sins. He was drunk last week, and must have been drunk yesterday, for he broke half a dozen plates. In fact, the breaking of these plates was the real cause of all the disturbance: our stepmother had reported the fact to father in the morning, and that was why Uliána was received with more scolding than was usually the case, why the verification of the hay was undertaken, and why father now continues to shout that "this progeny of Ham" deserve all the punishments on earth.

Of a sudden there is a lull in the storm. My father takes his seat at the table and writes a note. "Take Makár with this note to the police station, and let a hundred lashes with the birch rod be given to him."

Terror and absolute muteness reign in the house.

The clock strikes four, and we all go down to dinner; but no one has any appetite, and the soup remains in the plates untouched. We are ten at table, and behind each of us a violinist or a trombone-player stands, with a clean plate in his left hand; but Makár is not among them.

"Where is Makár?" our stepmother asks. "Call him in."

Makár does not appear, and the order is repeated. He enters at last, pale, with a distorted face, ashamed, his eyes cast down. Father looks into his plate, while our stepmother, seeing that no one has touched the soup, tries to encourage us.

"Don't you find, children," she says, "that the soup is delicious?"

Tears suffocate me, and immediately after dinner is over I run out, catch Makár in a dark passage, and try to kiss his hand; but he tears it away, and says, either as a reproach or as a question, "Let me alone; you, too, when you are grown up, will you not be just the same?"

"No, no, never!"

Yet father was not among the worst of landowners. On the contrary, the servants and the peasants considered him one of the best. What we saw in our house was going on everywhere, often in much more cruel forms. The flogging of the serfs was a regular part of the duties of the police and of the fire brigade.

A landowner once made the remark to another, "Why is it

that the number of souls on your estate increases so slowly? You probably do not look after their marriages."

A few days later the general returned to his estate. He had a list of all the inhabitants of his village brought him, and picked out from it the names of the boys who had attained the age of eighteen, and the girls just past sixteen—these are the legal ages for marriage in Russia. Then he wrote, "John to marry Anna, Paul to marry Paráshka," and so on with five couples. "The five weddings," he added, "must take place in ten days, the next Sunday but one."

A general cry of despair rose from the village. Women, young and old, wept in every house. Anna had hoped to marry Gregory; Paul's parents had already had a talk with the Fedótoffs about their girl, who would soon be of age. Moreover, it was the season for ploughing, not for weddings; and what wedding can be prepared in ten days? Dozens of peasants came to see the landowner; peasant women stood in groups at the back entrance of the estate, with pieces of fine linen for the landowner's spouse, to secure her intervention. All in vain. The master had said that the weddings should take place at such a date, and so it must be.

At the appointed time, the nuptial processions, in this case more like burial processions, went to the church. The women cried with loud voices, as they are wont to cry during burials. One of the house valets was sent to the church, to report to the master as soon as the wedding ceremonies were over; but soon he came running back, cap in hand, pale and distressed.

"Paráshka," he said, "makes a stand; she refuses to be married to Paul. Father" (that is, the priest) "asked her, 'Do you agree?' but she replied in a loud voice, 'No, I don't.'"

The landowner grew furious. "Go and tell that long-maned drunkard" (meaning the priest; the Russian clergy wear their hair long) "that if Paráshka is not married at once, I will report him as a drunkard to the archbishop. How dares he, clerical dirt, disobey me? Tell him he shall be sent to rot in a monastery, and I shall exile Paráshka's family to the steppes."

The valet transmitted the message. Paráshka's relatives and

the priest surrounded the girl; her mother, weeping, fell on her knees before her, entreating her not to ruin the whole family. The girl continued to say "I won't," but in a weaker and weaker voice, then in a whisper, until at last she stood silent. The nuptial crown was put on her head; she made no resistance, and the valet ran full speed to the mansion to announce, "They are married."

Half an hour later, the small bells of the nuptial processions resounded at the gate of the mansion. The five couples alighted from the cars, crossed the yard, and entered the hall. The landlord received them, offering them glasses of wine, while the parents, standing behind the crying daughters, ordered them to bow to the earth before their lord.

Marriages by order were so common that amongst our servants, each time a young couple foresaw that they might be ordered to marry, although they had no mutual inclination for each other, they took the precaution of standing together as godfather and godmother at the christening of a child in one of the peasant families. This rendered marriage impossible, according to Russian Church law. The stratagem was usually successful, but once it ended in a tragedy. Andréi, the tailor, fell in love with a girl belonging to one of our neighbors. He hoped that my father would permit him to go free, as a tailor, in exchange for a certain yearly payment, and that by working hard at his trade he could manage to lay aside some money and to buy freedom for the girl. Otherwise, in marrying one of my father's serfs she would have become the serf of her husband's master. However, as Andréi and one of the maids of our household foresaw that they might be ordered to marry, they agreed to unite as god-parents in the christening of a child. What they feared had happened: one day they were called to the master, and the dreaded order was given.

"We are always obedient to your will," they replied, "but a few weeks ago we acted as godfather and godmother at a christening." Andréi also explained his wishes and intentions. The result was that he was sent to the recruiting board to become a soldier.

Under Nicholas I. there was no obligatory military service for all, such as now exists. Nobles and merchants were exempt, and when a new levy of recruits was ordered, the landowners had to supply a certain number of men from their serfs. As a rule, the peasants, within their village communities, kept a roll amongst themselves; but the house servants were entirely at the mercy of their lord, and if he was dissatisfied with one of them, he sent him to the recruiting board and took a recruit acquaintance, which had a considerable money value, as it could be sold to any one whose turn it was to become a soldier.

Military service in those times was terrible. A man was required to serve twenty-five years under the colors, and the life of a soldier was hard in the extreme. To become a soldier meant to be torn away forever from one's native village and surroundings, and to be at the mercy of officers like Timoféeff, whom I have already mentioned. Blows from the officers, flogging with birch rods and with sticks, for the slightest fault, were normal affairs. The cruelty that was displayed surpasses all imagination. Even in the corps of cadets, where only noblemen's sons were educated, a thousand blows with birch rods were sometimes administered, in the presence of all the corps, for a cigarette—the doctor standing by the tortured boy, and ordering the punishment to end only when he ascertained that the pulse was about to stop beating. The bleeding victim was carried away unconscious to the hospital. The commander of the military schools, the Grand Duke Mikhael, would quickly have removed the director of a corps who had not had one or two such cases every year. "No discipline," he would have said.

With common soldiers it was far worse. When one of them appeared before a court-martial, the sentence was that a thousand men should be placed in two ranks facing each other, every soldier armed with a stick of the thickness of the little finger (these sticks were known under their German name of *Spitzruthen*), and that the condemned man should be dragged three, four, five, and seven times between these two rows, each soldier administering a blow. Sergeants followed to see that full force was used. After one or two thousand blows had been given, the



victim, spitting blood, was taken to the hospital and attended to, in order that the punishment might be finished as soon as he had more or less recovered from the effects of the first part of it. If he died under the torture, the execution of the sentence was completed upon the corpse. Nicholas I. and his brother Mikhael were pitiless; no remittance of the punishment was ever possible. "I will send you through the ranks; you shall be skinned under the sticks," were threats which made part of the current language.

A gloomy terror used to spread through our house when it became known that one of the servants was to be sent to the recruiting board. The man was chained and placed under guard in the office, to prevent suicide. A peasant-cart was brought to the office door, and the doomed man was taken out between two watchmen. All the servants surrounded him. He made a deep bow, asking every one to pardon him his willing or unwilling offenses. If his father and mother lived in our village, they came to see him off. He bowed to the ground before them, and his mother and his other female relatives began loudly to sing out their lamentations,—a sort of half-song and half-recitative: "To whom do you abandon us? Who will take care of you in the strange lands? Who will protect you from cruel men?"—exactly in the same way in which they sang their lamentations at a burial, and with the same words.

Thus Andréi had now to face for twenty-five years the terrible fate of a soldier: all his schemes of happiness had come to a violent end.

The fate of one of the maids, Pauline, or Pólya, as she used to be called, was even more tragical. She had been apprenticed to make fine embroidery, and was an artist at the work. At Nikólskoye her embroidery frame stood in sister Héléne's room, and she often took part in the conversations that went on between our sister and a sister of our stepmother who stayed with Héléne. Altogether, by her behavior and talk Pólya was more like an educated young person than a housemaid.

A misfortune befell her: she realized that she would soon be a mother. She told all to our stepmother, who burst into re-

proaches: "I will not have that creature in my house any longer! I will not permit such a shame in my house! oh, the shameless creature!" and so on. The tears of H         made no difference P       had her hair cut short, and was exiled to the dairy; but as she was just embroidering an extraordinary skirt, she had to finish it at the dairy, in a dirty cottage, at a microscopical window. She finished it, and made many more fine embroideries, all in the hope of obtaining her pardon. But pardon did not come.

The father of her child, a servant of one of our neighbors, implored permission to marry her; but as he had no money to offer, his request was refused. P      's "too gentlewoman-like manners" were taken as an offense, and a most bitter fate was kept in reserve for her. There was in our household a man employed as a postilion, on account of his small size; he went under the name of "bandy-legged F      ." In his boyhood a horse had kicked him terribly, and he did not grow. His legs were crooked, his feet were turned inward, his nose was broken and turned to one side, his jaw was deformed. To this monster it was decided to marry P      ,—and she was married by force. The couple were sent to become peasants at my father's estate in Ryaz    .

Human feelings were not recognized, not even suspected, in serfs, and when Turg         published his little story, "Mum    ," and Grigor         began to issue his thrilling novels, in which he made his readers weep over the misfortunes of the serfs, it was to a great number of persons a startling revelation. "They love just as we do; is it possible?" exclaimed the sentimental ladies who could not read a French novel without shedding tears over the troubles of the noble heroes and heroines.

24. THE FALL OF METTERNICH<sup>1</sup>

[A growing desire for national self-expression and a democratic type of government, plus the social discontent liberated by the Industrial Revolution, had rendered the Metternich System odious to many peoples living in the regions dominated by Austria. The news of the fall of the July Monarchy provided the spark which set off the great mid-century revolution. The following is a contemporary account of the events in Austria which ended in the fall of Prince Metternich.]



WE commence our narrative of the important events which happened this year in the dominions of Austria with a few remarks upon the position of Hungary, for the revolutions at Vienna had an intimate connection with the troubles which agitated that portion of the empire.

From 1812 to 1825 the Diet of Hungary had remained in a state of abeyance, and was not once convoked during that interval. At the former period it met when Austria was crushed under the heel of Napoleon, and the Palatine addressed to it the memorable words, that "Hungary must once more save the empire, as it had done in 1741, when appealed to by Maria Theresa." In 1825, the members again assembled, and from this period we may date the commencement of the aggressive attempts of the Magyar race to establish an offensive supremacy over the whole of Croatia and Sclavonia. But it was not until 1830 that the Diet determined to substitute the use of the Magyar language for the Latin throughout the whole of the Sclavonic population of Hungary. This awakened a strong feeling of reaction in the latter, and the joint Diet of Croatia and Sclavonia, which has its sittings at Agram, the capital of Croatia, and claims to be independent of the General Hungarian Diet at Pesth, raised the cry of "*Nolumus Magyarisari*," and

<sup>1</sup> *Annual Register*, 1848, pp. 402-404

when at a later period the Diet at Pesth decreed that the Magyar language should be adopted in all official transactions, and taught in the public schools, and that both the Diets should carry on their discussions in that tongue, the Croatian Diet at Agram, which had hitherto deliberated in Latin, resolved thenceforth to use the Illyrian language exclusively.

Early in March, the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies assembled at Presburg, voted an address to the Emperor, in which they, without disguise, condemned the system of Prince Metternich's policy, and advised their monarch "to surround his throne with constitutional institutions, in accordance with the ideas of the age." In this address the Chamber of Magnates also concurred. When the news of this arrived at Vienna, Prince Metternich at once proposed in the Supreme Council of State that the Hungarian Parliament should be dissolved; the announcement of which excited lively dissatisfaction in the capital.

On the 13th of March, the Diet for Lower Austria was opened, and an address was resolved upon, which contained the following passage:—

Most Gracious Sire:—The people of Austria will elevate to the stars the Crown which, free and self-conscious, great and glorious, declares confidence to be the real fortress of the State, and harmonizes this confidence with the ideas of the age.


To this was added a petition, which asked for an immediate reform in the constitution of the Chamber, and the liberty for it forthwith to consider measures for increasing the representation; reparation of the finances; and a general restoration of confidence in the empire, together with the liberty of the press.

But the people had collected in crowds around the hall, and a 'body of persons, consisting chiefly of students, forced their way inside. They were followed by more of the mob, and the Chamber was filled by a strange assemblage. A deputation of the States proceeded to present the address to the Emperor, and during their absence the populace became impatient, and were very riotous; but, when the news arrived that the requests contained in the petition had been refused, a general destruction




#### THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA IN GREAT CONSTERNATION

This scene shows the kings and ministers dividing the map of Europe. Napoleon enters from the right, saying "Tell them I come to settle that part which relates to France." (William Murrell, *A History of American Graphic Art*, Whitney Museum of American Art, 1933.)




#### THE GREAT SEA SERPENT OF 1848

This cartoon reflects the consternation of the crowned heads of Europe by the sudden appearance of Liberty represented as a great sea-serpent. (A. B. Maurice and F. T. Cooper, *The History of the Nineteenth Century in Caricature*, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1904 )




Darwin



From Ewing Galloway, N. Y.

Marx



Tolstoi



From Ewing Galloway, N. Y.

Lenin

DYNAMIC THINKERS

of the contents of the Chamber immediately commenced. The students headed the work of violence, and after doing all the mischief in their power, the excited mob rushed towards the palace, and began to attack some houses in the immediate neighborhood. The troops now came up, and fired in platoon upon the crowd, who however, would not give way, and a fierce conflict took place. At last the Burgher Guard appeared, and this produced a pause in the struggle; but the whole body forced their way to the palace, where they were met by the intelligence that Prince Metternich had resigned, and that their demands would be granted. This put a stop to the tumult, and during the night the peace of the city was preserved by the Burgher Guard, assisted by the students, to whom arms were supplied from the Arsenal by orders of the Government. Next morning the troops of the line, to the number of about 18,000, were withdrawn beyond the walls, and the preservation of order was confided to the Burgher Guard. The formation of a National Guard was also decreed. On the 15th, the following important proclamation was issued by the Emperor.

By virtue of our declaration abolishing the censorship, liberty of the press is allowed in the form under which it exists in those countries which have hitherto enjoyed it. A National Guard, established on the basis of property and intelligence, already performs the most beneficial service.

The necessary steps have been taken for convoking, with the least possible loss of time, the Deputies from all our provincial States, and from the Central Congregations of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, (the representation of the class of burghers being strengthened, and due regard being paid to the existing provincial constitutions,) in order that they may deliberate on the constitution which we have resolved to grant to our people.

We therefore confidently expect that excited tempers will become composed, that study will resume its wonted course, and that industry and peaceful intercourse will spring into new life.

Prince Metternich fled from Vienna, and ultimately took up his abode in England—the great land of refuge this year for distressed foreigners. A Provisional Council was in the meantime appointed, consisting of the following members—Barons Steifel and Doppel, and MM. Meyer and Roberto. In the midst

of all this confusion and excitement, the people gave a proof that the inherent loyalty of the German character was by no means extinct, for when the Emperor, surrounded by several members of the Imperial Family, appeared on the balcony of the Court Library, on the Josephs Platz, where the National Guard was drawn up in ranks, they were received with enthusiastic shouts. Suddenly the National Anthem was begun, and the effect upon the assembled multitude was electric. Tears flowed down the cheeks of young and old, and it seemed as if the Crown had never been more endeared to the people.



## VI. REFORM MOVEMENTS



## 25. ROBERT OWEN: A UTOPIAN SOCIALIST<sup>1</sup>

[Robert Owen was the most famous of the group known as the Utopian Socialists. His experiments at New Lanark mark an important chapter in the industrial and social history of England.]



ROBERT OWEN was the first to find the Socialistic application of the doctrines of "utility." He was the father of the factory laws and of the co-operative movement.

Never was there such a combination as in Robert Owen of business ability with moral simplicity and earnestness, and visionary insight, occasionally running to the absurd. Brought up in a Welsh village in the days of Wesley, his destiny lay in wider realms of thought and space, but his mind and character never lost the mark of an upbringing among poor people and among people aspiring earnestly towards an ideal outlook on everyday things. After a village schooling he went off into the great world and worked his way unaided up the ladder of the new industrialism, to become, before he was thirty, part owner and sole manager of the cotton mills of New Lanark in Scotland. In early life he was a magnificent example of "self-help."

While Napoleon was winning and losing Europe, Owen was quietly working out his social experiment. The Scottish factory, when he took it over, was as bad as other factories of the time. In fifteen years he made it a model of humane and intelligent provision for mind and body, with moderate hours, good pay, healthy conditions both in the factory and the village, and good education, including the first infant school in the island. The outcome was a high morale among the hands. It was, he imag-

<sup>1</sup> G. M. Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century* (Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1922), pp. 183-186.

ined, his great discovery that "the character of man is formed *for* him, and not *by* him," or, as we should now say, that "environment makes character." To prove it, he had by environment made the characters of the New Lanark employees; and at the same time he had made the fortune of the New Lanark Mills!

Owen's double success proved that if the social aspects of the Industrial Revolution had been attended to, its worst evils could have been avoided without a lowering of production, and that even in that age the big factory might have been used as a new and powerful engine of social amelioration. The world of that day admitted the facts; thousands of visitors drove all the way from the Thames to the Clyde, and the monarchs of Europe sent embassies to see the miracle of a happy factory-town. Men could not deny, yet would not believe, the living proof that Owen had set before their eyes.

In the year of Waterloo, Owen, having failed to persuade his brother manufacturers of the things that pertained to their peace, went up to London to persuade the Government itself. He was not by temperament and theory a democrat. He had been the patriarch of New Lanark, gently forming his men's characters "for them." He now wanted the Tory Cabinet to be equally paternal in its protection of all the factory hands in the island. With the simplicity of Parsifal, he came up to town expecting to make a convert of Castlereagh and a pupil of Parliament. His failure did not sour him, but it turned him back to the working-men themselves, whom he now regarded as the only possible agents of his vision of a new society.

His failure, though fundamental, had not been complete. Cabinet Ministers treated him with politeness, but gave no help. His plans were, however, taken up in Parliament by Sir Robert Peel, father of the great Sir Robert, a Lancashire mill-owner, originally of no good reputation as such, who had the family honesty to own that he had changed his mind on the need for factory legislation.

During Napoleon's Hundred Days, Owen and Peel drew up the first real Factory Bill. It applied not merely to cotton, but

to all factories; it forbade the employment of any child under ten years old, or after that for more than ten and a half hours a day; paid inspectors were to enforce its provisions. But the other manufacturers hastened up to London to protest against the insanity of these two eccentric members of their order. They established before a Committee the point that Owen was an infidel, and argued the more doubtful thesis that the children were well and happy in the mills. After four years' delay, a useless shadow of Peel's Bill was passed, for cotton only, with no important provision except the prohibition of child labour under nine. As there were to be no inspectors, the Act was ignored whenever employers and parents joined to break it.

The first campaign was lost, but Owen had started on the right lines the hundred years' war for State control. Thanks to him and to his successor, Lord Shaftesbury, not only children but parents have since found protection in an area of legislation ever widening down to our own day.

Owen himself, meanwhile, despairing of the governors, turned to the governed. He abandoned politics for labour association. Parliament had failed him; he did not propose to get it reformed, but to set the labourers to work out their own salvation. He became in a certain sense a democrat, but not, like Place and Cobbett, a Radical. He put himself at the head of the economic as distinct from the political action of the working-class. He devoted himself in the latter half of his life to starting the co-operative and extending the Trade Union movement. But that part of his life belongs to a later chapter of British history.

26. THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO<sup>1</sup>

[With the possible exception of Darwin's *Origin of Species* the *Communist Manifesto* published by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on the eve of the Revolution of 1848, is the most influential publication of the nineteenth century. Supplemented by Marx's monumental work, *Das Kapital*, the *Manifesto* is the most important source for socialist philosophy.]



THE history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition. . . .

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps . . . bourgeoisie and proletariat. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. . . . The bourgeoisie . . . has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, then callous "cash payment." . . . It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-laborers. . . .

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them all the relations of society. . . . The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. . . . Industries . . . no longer work up indigenous raw material. . . . We have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. . . . The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. . . . It has made barbarian

<sup>1</sup> Erik Achorn, *European Civilization and Politics Since 1815* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1934), pp. 342-343. I am indebted to the publishers for permission to use this excellent abstract.

and semibarbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West. . . . Modern bourgeois society . . . is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world which he has called up by his spells . . . It is enough to mention the commercial crises . . . because there is . . . too much of the means of subsistence. . . . How does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

. . . Not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons . . . the proletarians. . . . The lower strata of the middle class—the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants—all these sink gradually into the proletariat. . . . Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population. . . . What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable . . . .

The immediate aim of the Communists is . . . : formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat. . . . Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society: all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others. . . . The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property . . . this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form. . . . What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual

production changes in character in proportion as material production is changed? . . .

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, *i.e.* of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible. Of course in the beginning this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable. . . .

In the most advanced countries the following will be pretty generally applicable: 1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes. 2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax. 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance. 5. . . . A national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State. 7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State. . . . 8. Equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture. 9. . . . A more equable distribution of population over the country. 10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc., etc.

When . . . all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. . . . The proletariat . . . will . . . have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

. . . Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!



27. WOLVERHAMPTON <sup>1</sup>

[Wolverhampton, which may be taken as a typical factory town of the early 1840's, possessed a population of 36,382. Its principal industries are described in the Report of the Children's Employment Commission as "iron-mongery in nearly all its branches." The following extracts from the report of the Commissioners should make clear to the reader the conditions under which the workingman lived.]



## DWELLINGS OF THE WORKING CLASSES

THESE are, with few exceptions, very indifferent and bare of all comfort, while with the great majority they are squalid and dirty, and situated in narrow courts, unpaved yards, and blind alleys.

In the smaller and dirtier streets of the town, where the working classes reside, there are narrow passages, at intervals of every eight or ten houses, and sometimes at every third or fourth house. These passages are in a very few instances of the width of nine feet, and about nine feet high—some of them are only two feet and a half wide (by measurement) and less than six feet high. They are often flat at the top, though perhaps as often arched, and their length varies from about twelve to twenty-four feet. These narrow passages are also the general gutter, which is by no means always confined to one side, but often streaming all over the passage.

Having made your way through the passage, you find yourself in a space varying in size with the number of houses, hutches, or hovels it contains. They are nearly all proportionately crowded. Out of this space there are other narrow passages sometimes, leading to other hovels.

These are the dwelling and workshops of the poorest of the

<sup>1</sup> Great Britain, Children's Employment Commission, Appendix to the *Second Report of the Commissioners*, Part II (London, 1842). (Condensed.)

working classes. Where there are the largest number of these they have the appearance, after going through the narrow dark passage or burrow, of a sort of rabbit-warren; one or two of them may almost aspire to the resemblance of a colony of beavers, but wanting the green banks and the fresh air. . . .

None of these houses and hovels in courts and alleys have any underground drainage, and very few have any privies. Some of the better sort of courts have one privy in common.

There is often a common dunghill at one end, or in one corner, where everything is cast; but more generally there is nothing but the gutter and the passage into the street. When there is a pump in these places, their condition is not so bad; but when there is no pump, it is exceedingly dirty; often filthy and degraded. The slush in front of the doors is usually of the most disgusting kind. . . .

In front of some of the small houses in these and other places there are stagnant pools, the colour of dead porter, with a glistening metallic film over them; and sometimes they resemble a sort of disgusting mixture of gruel and soap-suds. After a day's rain many of them have a little pond in front, the size of a quilt, the colour of liquorice-tea. The ground is always soft and sinking in front of the doors. The effluvia are very offensive, even in the winter and cold weather. . . .

#### HEALTH OF THE WORKING CLASSES

Acute diseases are not common. Fever is not prevalent among them, nor any other medical or chronic diseases, except asthma.

There is scarcely an old collier or an old locksmith who has not had asthma.

They seem to be protected from fevers by the position of the town, which stands on very high ground, and is drained all round by the unavoidable descent of the water. Its unsheltered state from the east and north-east winds may in a great measure account for the prevalence of asthma.

There are innumerable pumps in the town. Most of the courts and yards of any size have a pump, and some two, or even three. In one yard, not a very large one, though straggling, where there were several small workshops belonging to Mr. Bennet, a tinplate worker and japanner, I counted as many as five pumps.

The number of tall chimneys from forges and furnaces is also thought by some to be antagonistic to the generation of fevers. . . .

#### HOURS OF WORK

The hours vary with different trades, and frequently with different employers in the same trade.

The hours also vary with different children and young persons in the same manufactory, according to the will of the adult workman whom they assist.

Children and adults, of whatever trade, and whether the work be light or heavy, all work the same time.

The japanners work from seven in the morning till seven at night in the summer, and from eight in the morning till eight at night in the winter.

The tinplate-workers, iron-braziers, and iron-founders work from five, six, or seven in the morning till seven at night.

The brass-founders usually work from seven or eight in the morning till seven at night.

The screw-manufacturers the same.

The rope and twine makers often begin work in the summer at five o'clock in the morning, in winter as soon as it is light, and always work till dark. Their work is rather dependent on the weather. . . .

The children at all the manufactories and workshops occasionally work overtime, from one to three hours, that is to say, an hour earlier in the morning, and till nine or ten at night. This seldom occurs oftener than twice in the week, and is usually occasioned by the waste of Monday and Tuesday by the adults. . . .

## MEALS

The hours allowed for meals by the great majority of employers are liberal.

The japanners allow an hour for breakfast, in the summer, an hour for dinner, and half an hour for tea. At the two former meals the people all leave the manufactory, and go home; but not for tea.

The hour for breakfast is not allowed in winter, because, as the people come to work an hour later, it is supposed they get their breakfast first. . . .

The nail and tip manufacturers only allow half an hour for breakfast, and an hour for dinner in the winter, pretending sometimes to allow half an hour for tea, but the children never get it.

In the summer, at these latter, and at many other manufactories, there is only one real pause from work during the whole day, *viz.*, the hour for dinner. In fact, the children are *stinted* to do a certain quantity of work, which is so much that they could seldom avail themselves of more time for rest, even were it pretended to be allowed. . . .

Machinery is always stopped during the breakfast and dinner meals, but not at tea time.

Children and young persons are often employed in the works during mealtimes, some being kept there, others having returned in a quarter of an hour, with part of their victuals in their hands, to continue their work. Being stinted to do a certain amount, they could not otherwise accomplish it. . . .

## NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT

The children and young persons employed by the japanners and tin-plate workers are engaged in painting, japanning, varnishing, polishing; in light tin-work, carrying light weights, etc. Their work is seldom laborious, and they are not exposed to heated rooms.

Women are always stationed in the stove-rooms, as they are

found to bear the heat best. They are almost always beyond the age of 18, seldom as young as 16.

The work of the children employed in the tin toy manufactories is also very light in general, except with a few who work at the presses, which however are not very laborious, and the paint is used in quantities too small to be injurious, though it makes some of the more delicate children feel sick at first. . . .

With the iron-braziers, and the hammer and heavy steel toy manufacturers, the boys work very hard. The nature of their employment is laborious from the heavy weights they frequently have to lift, as in carrying metal, or using heavy hammers.

Children from 9 and 10 years of age blow the bellows, and boys of 13 and 15 strike with a hammer; the latter often have to do both.

Their work would not, however, be injurious, if the periods of rest were something longer, and the weights more carefully proportioned to the age and degree of strength. . . .

In the manufactories of tips, and washers, the children and young persons, boys and girls, all stand, if the machines are worked by the hand; but usually sit to punch the tips and washers, if the machine be worked by steam. Nearly all those who sit, as they have to do in one unvarying attitude the whole day, get a slight curve in the spine, with a projection of the blade-bones. . . . With some, this curve gradually becomes a positive distortion of the spine, just above the hips, together with a hump-back.

Boys of 13 and 14 work at the edge-tool grinding, and the mixture of steel and stone given off in the process is very pernicious. Though the boys do not appear to be injured by it, the foundation of injury is certainly laid, as the men who work at it never live to be old. It is hard heavy work, and their hours are too long.

A still more pernicious process is to be found in the casting-shop of the brass and bell-founders. The boys who are employed in the casting are often sick, and frequently vomit a kind of white substance. They generally look delicate, if not sickly, and have a yellow tinge in the face. Sometimes their

complexion is a tawny yellow, sometimes a very pale sulphur colour. The men look old before their time, and never live to be really old. . . .

#### STATE OF THE PLACE OF WORK

This is of course variable in cleanliness and dirtiness according to the nature of the employment, and the care of the employer; and in wholesomeness or the contrary, according to the presence or absence of noxious vapours, either in the processes of the employment or the locality of the workshop.

Few of the large manufactories are in unhealthy situations.

They are all pretty well ventilated by means of doors and windows or apertures in windows, and by special provision also in some other cases, where they have air-chimneys, holes in the wall, and along the roof, etc. . . .

The worst of the localities of workshops will generally be found to be those of the small locksmiths, key-makers, and screw-makers, who work in little shops and hovels in courts up narrow passages, with gutters in them, running or stagnant, within a foot of their doorways, and perhaps with a general dunghill not many feet from their windows. . . .

At Hemingsley's nail and tip manufactory, where at least 60 children and young persons are employed, besides adults, where there are quantities of iron employed in the work, and a great number of heavy iron machines working in every room on each floor,—the building was in so shattered a condition that every particle of it was in a constant state of creaking and groaning vibration. The flooring was so broken that in many places I could look down into the room below through gaping and rotten planks. The upper floor had been shored up with props from time to time.

I mentioned its unsafe condition, but my apprehensions were smiled at as groundless, and treated lightly. A few days afterwards a part of the upper floor fell. . . .

## ACCIDENTS

On Friday evening, March 19th, a part of the upper floor of Hemingsley's manufactory fell, and killed one little boy on the spot by the descent of a heap of iron tips upon him, and another boy had both his thighs broken and one arm. Three other boys were also injured; one in his knee, one in his arm, and another in his back. The ordinary run of accidents at this latter manufactory occur to children and young persons, of whom there are as many as from 60 to 70 employed under 18 years of age; their ages are from *nine* upwards. The rooms are all crowded with dangerous machinery, so close that you can scarcely pass; indeed some operations have to be stopped in order that you may pass at all, so that there shall be room for the body to effect its passage, a safe distance being out of the question.

Not any of this machinery is boxed off, or guarded in any way.

It is a frightful place, turn which way you will. There is a constant hammering roar of wheels, so that you could not possibly hear any warning voice. You have but once to stumble on your passage from one place to another, or to be thinking of something else, and you are certain to be punished with the loss of a limb, or of your life, if the limb does not come away kindly.

Little boys and girls are seen here at work at the tip-punching machines (all acting by steam power) with their fingers in constant danger of being punched off once in every second, while at the same time they have their heads between two whirling wheels a few inches distant from each ear.

"They seldom lose the hand," said one of the proprietors to me, in explanation; "it only takes off a finger at the first or second joint. Sheer carelessness—looking about them—entirely through carelessness!"

28. FACTORY AND MINING LEGISLATION <sup>1</sup>

[Agitation in favor of factory reform was initiated by humanitarians drawn largely from the English aristocracy. The most prominent of this group was Lord Shaftesbury, and it was due largely to his efforts that the first effective Factory Act was passed in 1833. In 1842 the principles defined in the Factory Act were extended to cover conditions of labor in the mines.]



ONE of the greatest difficulties with which the early mill owners had to contend was the insufficient supply of labor for their factories. Since these had to be run by water power, they were placed along the rapid streams in the remote parts of Yorkshire, Lancashire, Derbyshire, and Nottinghamshire, which were sparsely populated, and where such inhabitants as there were had a strong objection to working in factories. However abundant population might be in some other parts of England, in the northwest, where the new manufacturing was growing up, and especially in the hilly rural districts, there were but few persons available to perform the work which must be done by human hands in connection with the mill machinery.

There was, however, in existence a source of supply of laborers which could furnish almost unlimited numbers and at the lowest possible cost. The parish poorhouses or workhouses of the large cities were overcrowded with children. The authorities always had difficulty in finding occupation for them when they came to an age when they could earn their own living, and any plan of putting them to work would be received with welcome. This source of supply was early discovered and utilized by the manufacturers, and it soon became customary for them to take as apprentices large numbers of the poorhouse children. They signed contracts with the overseers of the poor by which

<sup>1</sup> E. P. Cheyney, *Industrial and Social History of England* (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1923), pp. 232-237, 242-244. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.





### TELESCOPIC PHILANTHROPY

As a result of a great moral awakening in England the institution of slavery was abolished throughout England's possessions in 1833, but there was great indifference to bad social conditions at home. (Charles L. Graves, *Mr. Punch's History of Modern England*, Vol. II, Frederick A Stokes Company, New York.)




### OLIVER ASKS FOR LESS

This cartoon published in *Punch* July 24, 1912, reflects the growing opposition to Lloyd George's program of social legislation. (*Lloyd George* by *Mr. Punch*, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York, 1922.)




The Three Field System

(From Traill, *Social England*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons.)



An Old Type Farm



Mechanized Agriculture



From Sovfoto

A Collective Farm

PHASES OF THE LAND QUESTION

they agreed to give board, clothing, and instruction for a certain number of years to the children who were thus bound to them. In return they put them to work in the factories. Children from seven years of age upward were engaged by hundreds from London and the other large cities, and set to work in the cotton spinning factories of the north. Since there were no other facilities for boarding them, "apprentice houses" were built for them in the vicinity of the factories, where they were placed under the care of superintendents or matrons. The conditions of life among these pauper children were, as might be expected, very hard. They were remotely situated, apart from the observation of the community, left to the burdens of unrelieved labor and the harshness of small masters or foremen. Their hours of labor were excessive. When the demands of trade were active they were often arranged in two shifts, each shift working twelve hours, one in the day and another in the night, so that it was a common saying in the north that "their beds never got cold," one set climbing into bed as the other got out. When there was no night work the day work was the longer. They were driven at their work and often abused. Their food was of the coarsest description, and they were frequently required to eat it while at their work, snatching a bite as they could while the machinery was still in motion. Much of the time which should have been devoted to rest was spent in cleaning the machinery, and there seems to have been absolutely no effort made to give them any education or opportunity for recreation.

The sad life of these little waifs, overworked, underfed, neglected, abused, in the factories and barracks in the remote glens of Yorkshire and Lancashire, came eventually to the notice of the outside world. Correspondence describing their condition began to appear in the newspapers, a Manchester Board of Health made a presentment in 1796 calling attention to the unsanitary conditions in the cotton factories where they worked, contagious fevers were reported to be especially frequent in the apprentice houses, and in 1802 Sir Robert Peel, himself an employer of nearly a thousand such children, brought the matter

to the attention of Parliament. An immediate and universal desire was expressed to abolish the abuses of the system, and as a result the "Health and Morals Act to Regulate the Labor of Bound Children in Cotton Factories" was passed in the same year. It prohibited the binding out for factory labor of children younger than nine years, restricted the hours of labor to twelve actual working hours a day, and forbade night labor. It required the walls of the factories to be properly whitewashed and the buildings to be sufficiently ventilated, insisted that the apprentices should be furnished with at least one new suit of clothes a year, and provided that they should attend religious services and be instructed in the fundamental English branches. This was the first of the "Factory Acts," for, although its application was so restricted, applying only to cotton factories, and for the most part only to bound children, the subsequent steps in the formation of the present great code of factory legislation were simply a development of the same principle, that factory labor involved conditions which it was desirable for government to regulate.

At the time of the passage of this law the introduction of steam power was already causing a transfer of the bulk of factory industry from the rural districts to which the need for water power had confined it to the towns where every other requisite for carrying on manufacturing was more easily obtainable. Here the children of families resident in the town could be obtained, and the practice of using apprentice children was largely given up. Many of the same evils, however, continued to exist here. The practice of beginning to work while extremely young, long hours, night work, unhealthy surroundings, proved to be as common among these children to whom the law did not apply as they had been among the apprentice children. These evils attracted the attention of several persons of philanthropic feeling. Robert Owen, especially, a successful manufacturer, who had introduced many reforms in his own mills, collected a large body of evidence as to the excessive labor and early age of employees in the factories even where no apprentice labor was engaged. He tried to awaken an interest in the matter by the publication of a pamphlet on the injurious consequences

of the factory system, and to influence various members of Parliament to favor the passage of a law intended to improve the condition of laboring children and young people. In 1815 Sir Robert Peel again brought the matter up in Parliament. A committee was appointed to investigate the question, and a legislative agitation was thus begun which was destined to last for many years and to produce a series of laws which have gradually taken most of the conditions of employment in large establishments under the control of the government. In debates in Parliament, in testimony before government commissions of investigation, in petitions, pamphlets, and newspapers, the conditions of factory labor were described and discussed.

The bill originally introduced in 1815, after having been subjected to a series of discussions, amendments and postponements, was passed in June, 1819, being the second "Factory Act." It applied only to cotton mills, and was in the main merely an extension of the act of 1802 to the protection of children who were not pauper apprentices. It forbade the employment of any child under nine years of age, and prohibited the employment of those between nine and sixteen more than twelve hours a day, or at night. In addition to the twelve hours of actual labor, at least a half-hour must be allowed for breakfast and an hour for dinner. Other minor acts amending or extending this were passed from time to time, till in 1833 after the first parliamentary Reform Act was passed and after two successive commissions had made investigations and reports on the subject, the most important of the early laws was passed.

The law of 1833 applied practically to all textile mills, not merely to those for the spinning of cotton. The prohibition of employment of all below nine years was continued, children between nine and thirteen were to work only eight hours per day, and young persons between thirteen and eighteen only twelve hours, and none of these at night. Two whole and eight half holidays were required to be given within the year, and each child must have a surgeon's certificate of fitness for labor. There were also requirements for the education of the children and the cleanliness of the factories. But the most important

clause of this statute was the provision of a corps of four factory inspectors who were sworn to their duties, salaried, and provided with extensive powers of making rules for the execution of the act, of enforcing it, and prosecuting for its violation. The earlier laws had not been efficiently carried out. Under this act numerous prosecutions and convictions took place, and factory regulation began to become a reality. The inspectors calculated during their first year of service that there were about 56,000 children between nine and thirteen, and about 108,000 young persons between thirteen and eighteen, in the factories under their supervision.

The period lying between 1840 and 1848 was one of specially great activity in social and economic agitation. Chartism, the abolition of the corn laws, the formation of trade unions, mining acts, and further extensions of the factory acts were all alike under discussion, and they all created the most intense antagonism between parties and classes. In 1844 the law commonly known as the "Children's Half-time Act" was passed. It contained a large number of general provisions for the fencing of dangerous machinery, for its stoppage while being cleaned, for the report of accidents to inspectors and district surgeons, for the public prosecution for damages of the factory owner when he should seem to be responsible for an accident, and for the enforcement of the act. Its most distinctive clause, however, was that which restricted the labor of children to a half-day, or the whole of alternate days, and required their attendance at school for the other half of their time. All women were placed by this act in the same category as young persons between thirteen and eighteen, so far as the restriction of hours of labor to twelve per day and the prohibition of night work extended.

The next statute to be passed contained the provision which had long been the most bitterly contested of any during the whole factory law agitation. This was the "Ten-hour Act" of 1847. From an early period in the century there had been a strong agitation in favor of restricting by law the hours of young persons, and from somewhat later, of women, to ten hours per day, and this proposition had been repeatedly introduced and defeated in Parliament. It was now carried. By this

time the more usual length of the working day for grown men and women had been reduced to twelve hours, and in some trades to eleven. It was now made by law half-time for children, and ten hours for young persons and women, or as rearranged by another law passed three years afterward, ten and a half hours for five days of the week and a half-day on Saturday. The number of persons to whom the Ten-hour Act applied was estimated at something over 360,000. That is, including the children, at least three-fourths of all persons employed in textile industries had their hours and some other conditions of labor directly regulated by law. Moreover, the work of men employed in the same factories was so dependent on that of the women and the children, that many of these restrictions applied practically to them also. . . .

By the successive acts of 1819, 1833, 1844, and 1847, a normal length of working day and regulated conditions generally had been established by government for the textile factories employing women and children. The next development was an extension of the regulation of hours and conditions of labor from factories proper to other allied fields.

A witness in one of the factory investigations had testified that "the hardest labor in the worst room in the worst conducted factory is less hard, less cruel, and less demoralizing than the labor in the best coal mine." Notwithstanding the possible exaggeration of so strong a statement, it was evident that far away from ordinary observation, unconsidered by the government, unorganized and at the mercy of their employers, subject, as was constantly reported, to the most destructive of accidents, the condition of the coal miners demanded public investigation. A commission was appointed in 1840. They made a thorough investigation of the obscure conditions of labor underground, and reported a condition of affairs which was heart-sickening. Children began their life in the coal mines at five, six, or seven years of age. Girls and women worked like boys and men; they were less than half clothed, and worked alongside of men who were stark naked. There were from twelve to fourteen working hours in the twenty-four, and these were often at night. Little girls of six or eight years of age made ten to twelve trips a day

up steep ladders to the surface, carrying half a hundred weight of coal in wooden buckets on their backs at each journey. Young women appeared before the commissioners when summoned from their work, dressed merely in a pair of trousers, dripping wet from the water of the mine, and already weary with the labor of a day scarcely more than begun. A common form of labor consisted of drawing on hands and knees over the inequalities of a passageway not more than two feet or twenty-eight inches high a car or tub filled with three or four hundred weight of coal, attached by a chain and hooked to a leather band around the waist. The mere recital of the testimony taken precluded all discussion as to the desirability of reform, and a law was immediately passed, in 1842, almost without dissent, which prohibited for the future all work underground by females and by boys under ten years of age. Inspectors were appointed, and by subsequent acts a whole code of regulation of mines as regards age of beginning work, hours of work, lighting, ventilation, safety, and licensing of engineers had been created.

## 29. THE WAGE CONTRACT<sup>1</sup>

[The rise of the trade union movement in England was one of the important consequences of the Industrial Revolution. The English worker was not inclined to challenge the capitalistic system, nor did socialism make much progress in England during the nineteenth century. But the necessity of developing an organization capable of improving the economic position of labor through collective bargaining became apparent early in the century. The selection which follows is a good explanation as to why this was necessary.]



LET us consider how the wage-contract is actually entered into. Leave out of account, to begin with, any period of bad trade, when mills are shutting down or running only short time,

<sup>1</sup> Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Problems of Modern Industry* (Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1902), pp. ix-xiii of the Introduction.



and armies of unemployed are looking for work. Assume that things are in equilibrium,—that there is only one place vacant, and only one “hand” applying for it. Watch carefully the play of motives acting on the two minds, that of the “man with the dinner pail” seeking employment, and that of the employer or foreman with a place to fill. Suppose the workman to demur to the wage offered by the employer. There is, we assume, absolutely no other spare hand in sight. To leave the vacancy unfilled may cause some inconvenience in the mill. To complete the orders in hand, some of the other men may have to work more overtime. The delivery of the goods may even have to be delayed, the year’s output may be diminished, and the year’s profits may be fractionally less than they would have been. But in the meantime the capitalist or his agent is not actually affected in his daily life. He and his family go on eating and drinking as they did before. At most, the matter is a trifling one to them. Thus, the capitalist can afford to wait until the workman returns in a humbler frame of mind. And this is just what the workman must do. What is only a trifling matter to the capitalist is to the workman his whole livelihood. Moreover, he cannot wait. Even if he stands out one day, he has thereby lost that day. His very subsistence depends on his quickly coming to an agreement. If he is obstinate, consumption of his little hoard or the sale of his furniture may delay the catastrophe. Sooner or later slow starvation forces him to come to terms. And since success in the “higgling of the market” is largely dependent on the relative eagerness of the parties to come to terms—conspicuously so if this eagerness cannot be concealed from the antagonist,—capitalist and workmen always meet, in the absence of law or effective trade unionism, on unequal terms. Further, the capitalist knows the cards, and the workman does not. Even in the rare cases in which the absence of a single workman is of any real consequence to the employer, this is usually unknown to any one but himself. He, too, knows the state of the market, and can judge whether it might not even suit him better to slacken production for the moment. The isolated individual workman bargains in the dark. Add to this the fact that the workman is

not trained in the art of bargaining, which is the daily business of the employer, or the constant task of an expert specially trained for the particular work of hiring men. Thus, in the bargaining between a capitalist corporation and the individual labourers whom it hires, the labourers stand to lose at every point.

So far we have been assuming that the labour market is in equilibrium, and that only one hand applies for one vacant place. But at what periods and in what trades is so perfect an equilibrium to be found? When wealthy companies are concentrating their works and shutting down unnecessary mills; when new processes or new machines are displacing labour; when industrial crises, changes of fashion, or the mere shifts and gusts of international commerce cause our production to wane, now in this branch, now in that,—what freedom has the hired man? When the unemployed are crowding round the factory gates, it is plain to each one among them that, unless he can induce the foreman to choose him rather than another, his chance of subsistence for weeks to come may be irretrievably lost. Bargaining, in any genuine sense, there can be none. The foreman has but to pick his man, and name the price,—even if he does so much as name the price. Once inside the gates, the lucky workman knows that if he grumbles at any of the surroundings, however intolerable; if he demurs to any speeding up, lengthening of the hours, or arbitrary deductions; or if he hesitates to obey any orders, however unreasonable, he condemns himself once more to the semi-starvation and misery of unemployment. The alternative to the foreman or ganger is merely to pick another labourer out of the eager crowd at the gate. The difference to the joint-stock company is *nil*.

But much more remains to be said. To the capitalist corporation the wage-contract is simply a question of so much money to be paid. To the workman it is a matter of placing, for ten or twelve hours out of every twenty-four, his whole life at the disposal of his hirer. What hours he shall work, when and where he shall get his food, the sanitary conditions of his employment, the safety of the machinery, the temperature and

atmosphere to which he is subjected, the fatigue or strains that he endures, the risks of disease or accident that he incurs,—all these are involved in the workman's contract, and not in his employer's. These are matters of as vital importance to the wage-earner as are his wages. Yet about these matters he cannot, in practice, bargain at all. Imagine a weaver, before accepting employment in a cotton-mill, examining the proportion of steam in the atmosphere of the shed, testing the strength of the shuttle-guards, and criticising the soundness of the shafting belts; a mechanic prying into the security of the hoists and cranes or the safety of the lathes and steam-hammers among which he must move, a work-girl in a sweating den computing the cubic space which will be her share of the work-room, discussing the ventilation, warmth, and lighting of the place in which she will spend nearly all her working life, or examining disapprovingly the sanitary accommodation provided; think of the man who wants a job in a white lead works testing the poisonous influence of the particular process employed, and reckoning in terms of weekly wages the exact degree of injury to his health which he is consenting to undergo. On all these matters, at any rate, we must at once give up the notion of freedom of contract. In the absence of any restraint of law, the conditions of sanitation, decency, and security from accident in the various enterprises of the United States Steel Corporation or the Standard Oil Company are really at the mercy of the rulers of these great undertakings. They decide these conditions of life for the millions of workmen whom they employ—and thus, to this extent, for the nation,—as arbitrarily (and, it is to be hoped, as humanely) as they do for their horses. "In the general course of human nature," remarked the shrewd founders of the American Constitution, "power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."

30. THE EDICT OF EMANCIPATION<sup>1</sup>

[The most important reform accomplished in Russia during the nineteenth century was the abolition of serfdom by an imperial edict issued March 3, 1861. While emancipation ended feudalism in Russia and made the serf a free man, it failed to provide a final solution of the land problem. The Russian peasant after Emancipation still demanded "more land" and groaned under the burden imposed by the compensation awarded the landlords.]



**B**Y the grace of God, we, Alexander II, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, &c., to all our faithful subjects make known:—

Called by Divine Providence and by the sacred right of inheritance to the throne of our ancestors, we took a vow in our innermost heart so to respond to the mission which is intrusted to us as to surround with our affection and our Imperial solicitude all our faithful subjects of every rank and of every condition, from the warrior who nobly bears arms for the defence of the country to the humble artisan devoted to the works of industry; from the official in the career of the high offices of the State to the labourer whose plough furrows the soil.

In considering the various classes and conditions of which the State is composed we came to the conviction that the legislation of the empire having wisely provided for the organization of the upper and middle classes and having defined with precision their obligations, their rights, and their privileges, has not attained the same degree of efficiency as regards the peasants attached to the soil, thus designated because either from ancient laws or from custom they have been hereditarily subjected to the authority of the proprietors, on whom it was incumbent at the same time to provide for their welfare. The rights of the

<sup>1</sup> *Annual Register*, 1861, pp. 207-212. (Condensed.)

proprietors have been hitherto very extended and very imperfectly defined by the law, which has been supplied by tradition, custom, and the good pleasure of the proprietors. In the most favourable cases this state of things has established patriarchal relations founded upon a solicitude sincerely equitable and benevolent on the part of the proprietors, and on an affectionate submission on the part of the peasants; but in proportion as the simplicity of morals diminished, as the diversity of the mutual relations became complicated, as the paternal character of the relations between the proprietors and the peasants became weakened, and, moreover, as the seigneurial authority fell sometimes into hands exclusively occupied with their personal interests, those bonds of mutual good-will slackened, and a wide opening was made for an arbitrary sway, which weighed upon the peasants, was unfavourable to their welfare, and made them indifferent to all progress under the conditions of their existence.

These facts had already attracted the notice of our predecessors of glorious memory, and they had taken measures for improving the conditions of the peasants; but among those measures some were not stringent enough, insomuch that they remained subordinate to the spontaneous initiative of such proprietors who showed themselves animated with liberal intentions; and others, called forth by peculiar circumstances, have been restricted to certain localities or simply adopted as an experiment. It was thus that Alexander I published the regulation for the free cultivators, and that the late Emperor Nicholas, our beloved father, promulgated that one which concerns the peasants *bound by contract*. In the Western Governments regulations called "*inventaires*" had fixed the territorial allotments due to the peasants, as well as the amount of their rent dues; but all these reforms have only been applied in a very restricted manner.

We thus came to the conviction that the work of a serious improvement of the condition of the peasants was a sacred inheritance bequeathed to us by our ancestors, a mission which, in the course of events, Divine Providence called upon us to fulfil.

We have commenced this work by an expression of our Imperial confidence towards the nobility of Russia, which has given us so many proofs of its devotion to the Throne, and of its constant readiness to make sacrifices for the welfare of the country.

It is to the nobles themselves, conformable to their own wishes, that we have reserved the task of drawing up the propositions for the new organization of the peasants—propositions which make it incumbent upon them to limit their rights over the peasants, and to accept the onus of a reform which could not be accomplished without some material losses. Our confidence has not been deceived. We have seen the nobles assembled in committees in the districts, through the medium of their confidential agents, making the voluntary sacrifice of their rights as regards the personal servitude of the peasants. These committees, after having collected the necessary *data*, have formulated their propositions concerning the new organization of the peasants attached to the soil in their relations with the proprietors. . . .

Having invoked the Divine assistance, we have resolved to carry this work into execution

In virtue of the new dispositions above mentioned, the peasants attached to the soil will be invested within a term fixed by the law with all the rights of free cultivators.

The proprietors retaining their rights of property on all the land belonging to them, grant to the peasants for a fixed regulated rental the full enjoyment of their close; and, moreover, to assure their livelihood and to guarantee the fulfilment of their obligations towards the Government, the quantity of arable land is fixed by the said dispositions, as well as other rural appurtenances.

But, in the enjoyment of these territorial allotments, the peasants are obliged, in return, to acquit the rentals fixed by the same dispositions to the profit of the proprietors. In this state, which must be a transitory one, the peasants shall be designated as "temporarily bound." . . .

By a special disposition concerning the domestics, a transitory

state is fixed for them, adapted to their occupations and the exigencies of their position. On the expiration of a term of two years, dating from the day of the promulgation of these dispositions, they shall receive their full enfranchisement and some temporary immunities.

It is according to these fundamental principles that the dispositions have been formulated which define the future organization of the peasants and of the domestics, which establish the order of the general administration of this class, and specify in all their details the rights given to the peasants and to the domestics, as well as the obligations imposed upon them towards the Government and towards the proprietors. . . .

As the new organization, in consequence of the inevitable complexity of the changes which it necessitates, cannot be immediately put into execution, as a lapse of time is necessary, which cannot be less than two years or thereabouts; to avoid all misunderstanding and to protect public and private interests during this interval, the system actually existing on the properties of landowners will be maintained up to the moment when a new system shall have been instituted by the completion of the required preparatory measures.

For which end, we have deemed it advisable to ordain—

1. To establish in each district a special Court for the question of the peasants; it will have to investigate the affairs of the rural communes established on the land of the lords of the soil.

2. To appoint in each district justices of the peace to investigate on the spot all misunderstandings and disputes which may arise on the occasion of the introduction of the new regulation, and to form district assemblies with these justices of the peace.

3. To organize in the seigneurial properties communal administrations, and to this end to leave the rural communes in their actual composition, and to open in the large villages district administrations (provincial boards) by uniting the small communes under one of these district administrations.

4. To formulate, verify, and confirm in each rural district or estate a charter of rules in which shall be enumerated, on the basis of the local Statute, the amount of land reserved to the

peasants in permanent enjoyment, and the extent of the charges which may be exacted from them for the benefit of the proprietor as well for the land as for other advantages granted by him.

5. To put these charters of rules into execution as they are gradually confirmed in each estate, and to introduce their definite execution within the term of two years, dating from the day of publication of the present manifesto.

6. Up to the expiration of this term, the peasants and domestics are to remain in the same obedience towards their proprietors, and to fulfil their former obligations without scruple.

7. The proprietors will continue to watch over the maintenance of order on their estates, with the right of jurisdiction and of police, until the organization of the districts and of the district tribunals has been effected . . .

And now we hope with confidence that the freed serfs, in the presence of the new future which is opened before them, will appreciate and recognize the considerable sacrifices which the nobility have made on their behalf. They will understand that the blessing of an existence supported upon the base of guaranteed property, as well as a greater liberty in the administration of their goods, entails upon them, with new duties towards society and themselves, the obligation of justifying the protecting designs of the law by a loyal and judicious use of the rights which are now accorded to them. For if men do not labour themselves to insure their own well-being under the shield of the laws, the best of those laws cannot guarantee it to them.

It is only by assiduous labour, a rational employment of their strength and their resources, a strict economy, and, above all, by an honest life, a life constantly inspired by the fear of the Lord, that they can arrive at prosperity and insure its development

The authorities intrusted with the duty of preparing by preliminary measures the execution of the new organization, and of presiding at its inauguration, will have to see that this work is accomplished with calmness and regularity, taking into account the requirements of the seasons, in order that the cultivator



may not be drawn away from his agricultural labours. Let him apply himself with zeal to those labours, that he may be able to draw from an abundant granary the seed which he has to confide to that land which will be given him for permanent enjoyment, or which he has acquired for himself as his own property.

And now, pious and faithful people, make upon thy forehead the sacred sign of the cross, and join thy prayers to ours to call down the blessing of the Most High upon thy first free labours, the sure pledge of thy personal well-being and of the public prosperity.

Given at St. Petersburg, the 19th day of February (March 3), of the year of Grace 1861, and the seventh of our reign.

ALEXANDER.

### 31. ANARCHISM, COMMUNISM, AND SOCIALISM <sup>1</sup>

[There has been an unfortunate tendency, especially in the United States, to confuse the terms anarchism, communism, and socialism. It is difficult to define these terms exactly, but there are certain fundamental distinctions which should be clearly recognized. Some of these are set forth by Ramsay MacDonald, who for many years was the leader of the Labour Party in England.]



**F**IRST of all I shall deal with the relation of Socialism as a system of political and economic thought to other systems with which it is often confused—particularly with Communism and Anarchism.

Communism presupposes a common store of wealth which is to be drawn upon by the individual consumer, not in accordance with services rendered, but in response to a "human right

<sup>1</sup> James Ramsay MacDonald, *The Socialist Movement* (Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1911), pp. 122-125. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Henry Holt and Company.

to sustenance." It may be in accordance with Communist principles to make this right to consume depend upon the duty of helping to produce, and to exile from the economic community every one who declines to fulfil that duty. Some communists insist that one of the certain results of their system will be the creation of so much moral robustness that in practice this question will never arise for actual answer. But be that as it may, the distributive philosophy of Communism is as I have stated, and it contains the difference between that system and Socialism. "From all according to their ability; to each according to his needs" is a Communist, not a Socialist, formula. The Socialist would insert "services" for "needs." They both agree about the common stock; they disagree regarding the nature of what should be the effective claim of the individual to share in it. Socialists think of distribution through the channels of personal income; Communists think of distribution through the channels of human rights to live. Hence Socialism requires some medium of exchange whether it is pounds sterling or labour notes; Communism requires no such medium of exchange. The difference can best be illustrated if we remember the difference between a customer going to a grocer and buying sugar, and a child of the family claiming a share of that sugar at the breakfast table. Or the position may be stated in this way: Socialism accepts the idea of income, subject to two safeguards. It must be adequate to afford a satisfactory standard of life, and it must represent services given and not merely a power to exploit the labour of others. Communism only considers the sum total required by an individual to satisfy his wants and would limit consumption only as regards the use to which it is put.

Communist economic theories are often joined to Anarchist political ones, and in this conjunction are not unrarely confused with Socialism. Anarchism as a political theory . . . is the negation of the coercive state, and there is far more in common between it and anti-Socialist individualism of the Herbert Spencer type than between it and Socialism, of which it is indeed the direct antithesis. The Anarchist theory presupposes either no state, or a state bound together by moral and social motives by

which is maintained a purely voluntary relationship. So we may express the difference between Socialism and Anarchism as being political, the one believing in the continuance of the legislative, and therefore coercive, state, the other believing only in an administrative and voluntary state. Anarchism is in reality a form of individualism and cannot be dissociated from individualistic theories.

There is another difference. Underlying the philosophy of Anarchism is the belief in the goodness of human nature, which, with the exception of the doctrines of Fourier also shines so brightly in the beliefs and expectations of the earlier Socialists. The Socialism of today does not build itself up upon the goodness, but upon the sociality, of human nature.

Besides, as a matter of experience, all over the world, from France to America and from Italy to Japan, the Anarchist movement is in conflict with the Socialist movement, and the earlier history of modern Socialism is storm-swept by the furious conflicts of Anarchism with Socialism. And yet, by a curious twisting of actual fact, many people associate these two opposing systems of political thought, as though they were the same, the reason probably being that every kind of opposition to the existing order is grouped together and made identical in minds not inclined to discriminate in an intelligent way.



## VII. NATIONALISM



## 32. THE ORIGINS OF NATIONALISM <sup>1</sup>

[Nationalism is the most significant emotional force at work in the world of to-day. It controls our educational systems, exerts a profound influence on international relations, and dominates western culture. The selection which follows explains its origin.]



AN understanding of the process of manufacturing patriots, however, does not in itself serve to explain why national patriotism has come to occupy such an all-pervading place in the culture and ideology of western civilization. This is perhaps one of the mysteries which western man, in his ceaseless efforts to understand himself, can never quite comprehend. Neither the historian, the sociologist, the political scientist, nor the psychologist has succeeded in offering any satisfactory explanation of the origins and causes of the strange fervor of nationalism which has now become the dominant pattern of group loyalty and political allegiance in the contemporary world. While this is not the place to offer new answers to old riddles, certain suggestions may nevertheless be made regarding the circumstances under which national patriotism sprang up in western Europe. These suggestions are purely tentative and are of value only in so far as they correspond to historical reality and help to explain the content and significance of nationalism at the present time.

Cultural anthropologists have observed that in almost every preliterate society there develops a pattern of attitudes, values, folkways, and *mores* which may be collectively designated as "ethnocentrism." This pattern gives unity and cohesion to the

<sup>1</sup> Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1933), pp 281-285 Reprinted by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

group, identifies it and distinguishes it from other groups, and involves on the part of its members a feeling of fellowship toward other members and a corresponding feeling of strangeness towards outside groups. Ethnocentrism implies friendship with the members of the "in-group" and hostility toward members of all "out-groups." The in-group is the focus of all social life. Each new generation is initiated into the rituals and ceremonies which symbolize its solidarity. Law, language, art, religion, government, morality, family institutions, economic activities are all phases of the group culture, all strands in the ties which bind the individuals into a social whole. These fruits of social living are enjoyed only by the members of the group and are denied to outside groups, even though they may be extended to individual aliens in accordance with the ancient custom of hospitality. Through them the community is made aware of itself as a collective entity set apart from outside communities. "Stranger" is usually "enemy" and foreign cultures are strange and hostile.

Nationalism may be regarded as an advanced form of ethnocentrism, in which the limits of social solidarity and cohesion are coterminous with the bounds of the language and culture of people in a large community inhabiting extensive territories. A "nation" consists of a relatively large number of people spread over a relatively large area and bound together by common ties of language and culture. The communities which composed the civilizations of the Near East and the Mediterranean basin in ancient times were, for the most part, not nations in this sense. In their political organization they were city-states, military monarchies, or "world empires," consisting either of small communities of culturally homogeneous people or of large aggregations of culturally diverse peoples brought under unified control through war and political subjugation. The same was true of the peoples of the western world in the early medieval period. Group solidarity, civic loyalty, and political organization rested not upon national communities but upon smaller or larger units. Nationalism appeared only as "nations" came into existence and attained awareness of their own identity.



This process was made possible by the peculiar conditions prevailing in western Europe in the feudal period. Here, in a small but extremely variegated portion of the world, a number of linguistically and culturally diverse peoples were thrown into intimate contact with one another. These peoples were the descendants of the migrating barbaric tribes which had settled down upon the land and developed, each within its own sphere, the various dialects which came to be fused into national languages, the customs and institutions which came to be fused into national cultures, and the sense of kinship and fellow feeling which is the psychological prerequisite of nationhood. Had each group been living in complete isolation from different neighboring groups, its members would probably have developed no sense of their identity. Had all the groups been different in language and culture, but small as to numbers and as to the areas which they inhabited, with no basis for unified political control, they likewise would probably have developed no sense of their identity on a national scale but would have remained divided into particularistic communities inspired by local and provincial loyalties. In Italy and the Germanies such a situation prevailed for many centuries before cultural interpenetration and assimilation, combined with the pressure of foreign invaders, produced a sense of nationhood. But in the west an English nationality, a French nationality, and a Spanish nationality emerged out of the diffusion of language and culture over wide areas and out of the imposition of unified military and administrative control over these areas. War against neighboring out-groups, political unification under national kings within the in-group, and a transition from local manorial economy to provincial or national economy were doubtless the three factors of major importance in laying the foundations of nationalism.

It seems probable that conflicts between culturally divergent populations played a significant rôle in producing within each community that sense of its own identity, that feeling of solidarity and common interest, that conception of the personality or ego of the group which is the essence of national patriotism. Contacts of war would seem to be more effective than any other

kind in producing the type of group cohesion which lies back of nationalism. No emotion unifies a group so readily as hatred for a common enemy. Group hostility to the foreign foe arouses the most elemental types of defensive behavior which serve to give the primitive group a solidarity it could never attain otherwise. International relations in the formative period of nationalism were for the most part those of war. Anglo-Saxon England attained a degree of national unity for the first time when Alfred the Great rallied his subjects to resist the Danish invasion. Norman England was already an embryonic national State, with a national government of considerable power and authority and with a population increasingly impressed with its "English-ness" by virtue of chronic conflicts with the Scots, the Irish, and the French. In France, localism and provincialism gave way to a common consciousness of "French-ness" in the course of the Hundred Years' War, when its inhabitants at long last organized themselves for effective resistance against the English invaders and found a fitting symbol of the national cause in the person of the first great heroic figure of the French nation, Jeanne d'Arc. In Spain, constant warfare against the southern Saracens gave birth to Spanish nationalism and produced that blending of patriotic sentiment and crusading Catholicism which became its distinctive characteristic. In every case nationalism was born of war against alien groups.

All of the later nationalisms between the fifteenth century and the twentieth were similarly born of conflict situations between societies already differing from one another in language, religion, and institutions, and made more aware of these differences by increased contacts with aliens. Dutch nationalism attained full flower in the long struggle against Spanish rule of the Netherlands. Swiss nationalism emerged out of conflicts with Austria. Sweden became a nation through conflicts with Russians and Poles and Germans. American nationalism was generated by the War of the Revolution. In the nineteenth century, Italian nationalism attained political unity for Italy as a result of common resistance to foreign invasion and common conflicts against Austria. The German nation became a unified State through

conflict with Danes, Austrians, and Frenchmen, after Napoleonic domination and the "war of liberation" earlier in the century converted Prussians and Bavarians and Suabians and Wurttembergers into "Germans." The peculiarly intense and fanatical nationalism of the Balkan peoples has been the product of armed revolt against the Turks and of the presence within the peninsula of a large number of divergent linguistic and religious groups, each of which became aware of itself through contact and conflict with its neighbors. Irish nationalism, Turkish nationalism, Japanese nationalism, Indian nationalism, and Chinese nationalism were likewise products of conflict against alien rulers, alien invaders, or alien foes across the frontier. . . .

Similarly, a nation acquires its ego by contacts with other nations, and it seemingly becomes acutely aware of its own identity to the degree to which such contacts are intimate, rich, and varied. Contacts of war would seem to promote national solidarity more effectively than contacts of peace, for war requires cooperation and cohesion in the interest of self-preservation. It emotionalizes and dramatizes the symbols, the flags the songs, the slogans, the traditions, and the leaders which give unity to the group and distinguish it from other groups. National patriotism is the most complete expression of ethnocentrism. Its devotees are imbued with an intense consciousness of the collective personality of the national community, and this collective personality emerges out of social contacts and interactions between divergent groups not dissimilar to those contacts and interactions between single human beings which produce and enrich the individual personality. The history of this process remains to be written by social psychologists with historical training or by historians who are also social psychologists.

33. NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM <sup>1</sup>

[The preceding extract provided an explanation of some of the forces which have combined to develop nationalism as it exists in the modern world. The selection which follows directs attention to one of its most important aspects, patriotism, which lies at the very center of contemporary society.]



OBVIOUSLY this brings before us the relation of the citizen to the state. Men, whatever be the purpose of their political allegiance, exalt their service to the state under the virtue of patriotism. Come at it from whatsoever angle one will, it all goes back to the thought so well conveyed by Sir Walter Scott:

Breathes there a man, with soul so dead,  
Who never to himself hath said,  
This is my own, my native land?

The three aspects of this devotion to "my native land," as outlined by Stocks in his *Patriotism and the Super-State*, are significant. These are love of country; desire for the good of one's country; and willingness to serve one's country.

There easily creeps into a patriotism centered upon love of country a fervor that raises national virtues wholesale to a supreme place as the standard of international measurement. It may be a Shakespeare, speaking through John of Gaunt:

This fortress built by Nature for herself  
Against infection and the hand of war;  
This happy breed of men, this little world,  
This precious stone set in the silver sea,  
Which serves it in the office of a wall,  
Or as a moat defensive to a house,

<sup>1</sup>Charles Hodges, *The Background of International Relations* (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1931), pp. 400-403. Reprinted by permission from *Background of International Relations* by Hodges, published by John Wiley and Sons, Inc

Against the envy of less happier lands;  
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England.

Of the same stamp, perhaps lacking lyrical rhapsody, is the host of German, French, and other national phrases, each glorifying its own country, which has given an ominous import to the course of events leading to the Great War. For instance, it is German patriotism which asserts: "We are not mere mortals, we are more—because we are Teutons, because we are Germans. Our race with its culture has a higher value than any other in the world."

More discriminating is patriotism conceived as desire for the good of one's country. Here we come in contact with more tangible things. They range from material prosperity to its effect upon the prestige of the state abroad and the foreign policies upon which its international future rests. Thus patriotism effects a connection between the various objects of a state's ambitions, as well as between the means deemed most likely to attain such ends. Power, riches, and material comfort all figure in the place a state occupies among the nations of the world. The material factors stand out every day in the emphasis that is placed on national strength, whether it be in terms of bullion or battle-ships, industry or standing armies. All in all, power exerts an overwhelming fascination upon the patriot; and it has exerted at every turn of history a momentous influence upon the course of international relations. The very strength of patriotic sentiment which brings a nation from obscurity in the beginning of its rise to eminence may in the days of its power produce an overbearing, chauvinistic lust for even greater national place. The Athenians standing against the invading Dorians and the Athenians obliterating Milos because the latter too would live, are at the opposite ends of the pages of the history of patriotism.

At the present time, the emphasis that is placed upon nationalism in the realm of business finds its chief strength in the patriotic outlook of the citizens of a country. Were it not for this factor of economic nationalism, it would be impossible to have had the subway walls in the capital of an empire plastered with appeals to buy this or that product primarily upon the

ground that it was "British-made." The high wall of the American tariff undoubtedly has its greatest strength in the patriotic appeal to maintain the "home market" free from foreign goods, rather than on economic grounds alone. This economic patriotism, however, has its limits. In Denmark postal authorities were cancelling stamps with the words "Buy Danish Goods." The less nationally-minded world trader, in the person of a Copenhagen firm of importers, finally appealed to the supreme court of the Kingdom to prevent this slogan from appearing on their envelopes on the ground that it affected their business activities abroad adversely. This judicial appeal to mitigate patriotism was successful. Of the same sort are the British and Continental attacks on America's supremacy in the cinema world. The "menace" of Hollywood, first assailed as producing miles of films whose extravagant portrayals of life under Western Civilization jeopardized the supremacy of the white man as they were exported east of Suez, became subsequently a danger to youth in Britain, Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in the Occident. Parliaments gravely debated the necessity of "100 per cent" films for national consumption, and applied various discriminations. The American "invasion," with its cosmopolitan galaxy of stars, directors, financial impresarios, and camera-men, continued to defy the "patriotization" of the silent drama. Even "talkies" have yet to dethrone Hollywood.

The acid test of patriotism, however, is willingness to serve one's country. This may range from the rhetoric of a politician to the sacrifice of a man who lays down his life in a conflict invoked to determine the right behind a country in this contentious world of states. Here, as is quite correctly emphasized, we come to a straightforward relationship between a man and his allegiances. It needs no invidious comparison, no deification of abstractions. It goes back to the very foundations of common life—the willingness to serve in order to be served. On the one hand, there may be what has been called "the sheer paganism" of the slogan: "Our country . . . may she always be in the right, but our country, right or wrong." On the other, there is the recognition that "the nation is founded on ideals and these



### "AU REVOIR"

(*Mr. Punch's History of the Great War*, p xi Cassell and Company, Ltd, London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne, 1919.)

### REUNITED


These two cartoons appearing in *Punch* epitomize the nationalistic fervor aroused in France over the question of Alsace-Lorraine. (*Mr. Punch's History of the Great War*, p 277. Cassell and Company, Ltd., London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne, 1919.)





Hegel

(From Frederick B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution*, 2nd printing, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1935.)




Garibaldi


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Bismarck



Mazzini



From Ewing Galloway, N. Y.



are effective insofar as they inspire loyalty. Loyalty in its turn is pride in what the members of a nation believe that nation to be, and a willingness to strive for the ends which have been accepted by the group as a whole."

Patriotism, therefore, becomes a mixture of elements, partly very simple and partly very complex in character. Yet they are all bound up together as a psychological force, and their power at times is overwhelming. Here come out the many sides of human nature—the herd instinct, the fighting instinct, egoism in the form of self-preservation and self-aggrandizement. Hence, patriotism constantly crops out at the emotional "x" factor in international relations. Now defensive and again aggressive in its motive, it becomes the dynamic element in the mobilization of national differences. On the whole, patriotism in the nation-state has been thrown behind these differences to assure their accentuation and their ultimate head-on collision. Little wonder that patriotism today has been turned in many quarters into a "cult of nationalism," with the worship of national might untrammelled by any larger concepts of international rights.

#### 34. THE REGENERATION OF GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

[The interval between the great defeat at Jena and the victory over Napoleon at Leipsic was a significant one in the history of the German nation. During these years the foundations of the German Empire were laid, German nationalism was aroused, and a military machine constructed which played a large part in the final defeat of the conqueror.]



THE regeneration of Germany began in Prussia, the state which had fallen lowest and suffered most. By a stroke of rare good fortune Frederick William could command the ser-

<sup>1</sup> George Madison Priest, *Germany Since 1740* (Ginn and Company, Boston, 1914), pp. 55-66. Reprinted by courtesy of the Princeton University Press. (Condensed.)

vices of Baron Stein, the greatest German statesman of the time, and in October, 1807, Frederick William put the reorganization of Prussia into Stein's hands. Through public economy and through the sale of royal domains Stein assisted in satisfying the extortionate demands of the French, a noble work in itself. A series of practical reforms, which he introduced, laid a new foundation for Prussian public life. Stein freed the peasant from hereditary subjection to a landlord and gave him the possibility of earning a piece of land of his own as well as the choice of his employment; Stein thus liquidated the last vestige of serfdom and of feudalism in Prussia. By releasing the cities from their former Government officials and permitting them, with a few restrictions, to govern themselves, Stein liberated urban life from the bureaucratic methods of the eighteenth century and began the education of the people in political affairs. Stein thus struck the most binding fetters of Prussian society and stirred the initiative and the development of the free self-conscious will of his countrymen. His ultimate goal was an intelligent harmonious cooperation of Government and people, and if he had established a legislative body representative of the whole kingdom, as he desired to do, he would have made Prussia even then a constitutional monarchy. But a letter from Stein in which he expressed the hope of a speedy uprising against France was intercepted by French agents; Napoleon pressed his dismissal, and in November, 1808, Frederick William reluctantly let him go. Stein's immediate successor was soon followed by Hardenberg, who favoured and advanced Stein's reforms.

Stein's reorganization of the state was paralleled in the army by the work of Scharnhorst, who was appointed minister of war in 1807. Scharnhorst abolished flogging and other outlived forms of discipline, thus raising the soldiers' self-respect; he also provided the troops with modern firearms and drilled them for war instead of for parade. Napoleon had fixed the maximum number of the Prussian army at 42,000; but while the number remained the same, Scharnhorst changed the individuals from time to time and eventually secured a military force nearly four times as large as Napoleon's limit. Those who had

been drilled constituted the *Landwehr*, or "national defense," and as they scattered among the whole population, they strengthened in private life the martial spirit of the people at large. Scharnhorst was ably assisted by his officers, especially by Blucher, Gneisenau, and Yorck. Gneisenau excelled in planning campaigns and battles; Yorck, a man of great natural reserve, was famous for his resoluteness and tenacity; Blucher was the man of action, the most picturesque figure of the time. Blucher had served in the Seven Years' War, still under twenty years of age, first in the Swedish army and later as a Prussian soldier. After the Battle of Jena he was stationed in Pomerania, it is said that he was seized at times by such fury at the insults to Prussia, he would charge at the flies on the wall with his drawn sword, crying "Napoleon!" Uncouth in manners and speech, at times a slave to gambling, he was idolized by the soldiers who nicknamed him "Marshal Forward."

In the winter of 1807-1808 in the Berlin Academy, with French spies in his audience and the sound of French boots and drums outside on Unter den Linden, the philosopher Fichte delivered his *Addresses To The German Nation*. With far-reaching eloquence Fichte extolled love of country as the most powerful incentive to human life and progress. He denounced the plea that success was not endangered if one man did not participate; to the contrary, in the spirit of Kant, he preached a gospel of individual responsibility, stern self-discipline, and unwavering rational morality. The effect of Fichte's teachings was so immediate and so profound throughout Prussia that Napoleon said afterward that he was defeated by "German ideologists," Fichte and his kind; but at the time of the *Addresses* Napoleon did not fear "the professor" any more than he feared Scharnhorst's constant drilling. Fichte's lectures on patriotism were reenforced by performances of Schiller's *Maid Of Orleans* and *William Tell*. As the soldiers were stirred to emulate the martial spirit of Wallenstein, the whole kingdom was awakened by the *Maid* and *Tell* to a new love of country and to a new sense of national honor. In 1809 the University of Berlin was established and in the following year was opened

to over four hundred students; here in the Prussian capital young men of intellect and character gathered in order to learn at first hand the new spirit of the time. Also in Berlin the founder of gymnastic exercises in Germany, "Father" Jahn, gathered young men and boys about him to develop them physically for the coming struggle. The Tugendbund, or "league of virtue," which was formed in Konigsberg in 1808, purposed to develop German, and especially Prussian, intellectual and moral strength, but all its members knew that its ultimate aim was a triumph over Napoleon. Its life was brief, however, as the French exaggerated its influence, and at Napoleon's behest it was formally dissolved by Frederick William in 1810. In addition to all these forces in Prussian life there was also that of the fortunes of the royal family. Prussian love for Frederick William and Queen Louise was stung to the quick by Napoleon's ridicule of the royal pair and by their troubled residence in Konigsberg. The death of the queen in 1810, after a long and painful illness, was like a call to arms. But it was not until three years later that memory of her played its part in the liberation of Prussia. . . .

Toward the end of December, 1812, the news of the collapse of the Grand Army began to spread all over Germany. Napoleon was no longer invincible. Germany's opportunity had come. Frederick William still felt bound by his treaty with France, but even he could not check the tide of resolute patriotism that swept over Prussia. Baron Stein returned from his exile in Russia eager to hasten the certain uprising of the people and eager to give it a German character, a stamp of German nationality; for he saw that the independence not of Prussia alone but of all Germany might now be restored. In January, 1813, Frederick William fled from the French pressure in Berlin and went to Breslau where he would be nearer Russia and Austria. Events of great import followed thick and fast. On February 3 there appeared, over Hardenberg's name but really from the king, a proclamation declaring the state in danger and calling for a volunteer corps of chasseurs. The former friendship and alliance between Alexander and Frederick Wil-

liam was renewed at Kalisz on February 28. Ten days later, on Queen Louise's birthday, Frederick William founded the Order of the Iron Cross, as an incentive to acts of bravery. Prussia declared war on France March 16. And the very next day Frederick William issued his most famous proclamation: *To My People*. In this epoch-making document he called upon his subjects in all his provinces, the people of Brandenburg, Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania, to remember the heroism of the Tyrolese and to prepare for a last decisive struggle for their existence, independence, and prosperity. Frederick William further gave permission for the formation of volunteer corps which might include non-Prussians. In a proclamation of March 25 the note was loudly sounded that the restoration of a constitution for all Germany, of free untrammelled life and spirit, was the issue; German princes who refused their support were to be crushed by public opinion and, if necessary, subjected by arms.

Frederick William did not appeal to his people in vain. Out of a population of five millions there came forth an army of 271,000, or one out of eighteen. Nine thousand volunteers were enrolled in Berlin in three days. Offices were deserted; universities closed their doors; as Arndt says, "Mere boys left their schools eager to bear arms and reciting hymns of Tyrtæus and verses from Klopstock's *Hermann's Battle*." From the rich and poor there poured forth a flood of contributions to the funds of war. Precious heirlooms were sold to raise money; women contributed their gold wedding rings; it was later considered a disgrace if a family still owned any silverware. To the people at large it was a holy war, a crusade, and in this spirit it was sung by poets of the time: by Theodore Körner, a member of Lützow's volunteer "free corps," who found his death (August, 1813) on the battlefield at the age of twenty-two; by Arndt, a rugged fire-eater already well seasoned by a strenuous life; and by Schenkendorf, who fought through the war with only one arm. The volume, intensity, and thrilling power of the war-songs of this period in German history have never been surpassed by any nation.

Korner sang truly, "In the north breaks the dawn of freedom." Many young men like Korner himself went from other states of Germany to be enrolled in Prussian volunteer corps; Stein too was not a Prussian by birth, nor was Scharnhorst or Blucher or Gneisenau or Fichte. Through the cooperation of thousands of individuals from other states the uprising assumed a national character, but hardly a German state except Prussia was ready to throw down the gauntlet to Napoleon. The rulers of other states were still bound to him in fear or in favor; some of them had to be dragged into the war; and the patient masses were willing to await a sign from their rulers or a sign from heaven in the shape of a Prussian victory. From Prussia came the initiative to the war and the enterprise; thence came the first German sinews of the war. The spirit and the tone of the actual conflict of 1813 were likewise Prussian to the core. Consciously or unconsciously these Germans were impelled by Kant's gospel of moral duty. Each of them owed it to his country and to himself to right the wrong of bondage to a foreigner. When toward the end of the war the states of the Rhine Confederation allied themselves with Prussia, the hour of Napoleon's overthrow had already struck. Prussia had already borne the chief strain and stress of the conflict. To Prussia therefore belongs of right the chief honor and glory of the German War of Liberation.

35. NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE <sup>1</sup>

[Southeastern Europe furnishes an excellent opportunity to study the forces of nationalism at work. Here, in the years before the Great War, it was rapidly breaking down the *status quo* and laying the foundation upon which the modern structure rests.]



WHEN the great period of nationalist wars and revolutions came to an end in 1878, the political geography of Europe had been materially simplified and clarified. By the unification of Germany and Italy, one-half of the great unnationalised area which still survived in 1815 had been satisfactorily cleared up. But in the other half, represented by the Austrian and Turkish Empires, the national principle had only achieved an incomplete and partial victory. This area therefore continued to be the field of fitful disturbances, and the sphere of the rivalries of the consolidated Powers; and all the troubles and alarms of the last forty years have mainly centered in this region. Its perturbed politics formed the immediate cause of the Great War, and will continue to be a source of future disturbances, unless a just and permanent settlement can be attained. For that reason it is desirable to glance at the nature of the movements which were at work in this area during the nationalist period, and the reason for the incompleteness of their results.

Both geographically and historically this whole area, which constitutes a positive museum of races, may be regarded as a single unit. Its dominant feature is the long chain of the Carpathian and Bohemian mountains, which curves from south-east to north-west round the Danube valley like a huge breakwater. Round this breakwater have swirled and eddied all the floods of racial migration that have swept from the East across

<sup>1</sup> Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1917), pp. 95-105. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company

Europe: sometimes they have been checked by the breakwater, and their course diverted; sometimes great fragments of them have been caught and retained, or forced to drop down into the Balkan peninsula, which hangs below like a huge bag without any outlet. The result has been a racial confusion unparalleled in any other part of Europe; and the main political divisions of the area have never at any time even approximately corresponded with the lines of racial division. This in itself would have mattered little, for, as we have seen, nationality does not depend upon racial unity. But the chief races have settled in blocks which are defined fairly clearly; the lines of political division between states have cut across these blocks; and the racial kinship of the politically severed races on the two sides of the boundaries has prevented the elements which were politically united from combining to form a new and national unity. Thus the line of division between the Austrian and the Turkish Empires, as it was drawn in 1815, cut across the very middle of the block of Rumanians who inhabit both sides of the Carpathian chain, and across the very middle of the block of Serbian Slavs who inhabit the valley of the middle Danube, with its tributaries the Morava, the Save, and the Drave. And what added to the confusion was that in the northern and southern halves of this area, the ruling races, each in a minority in its own region, prided themselves upon emphasising their superiority to their subjects, and maintained their power by playing off the conflicting races one against the other. These ruling races were three.

South of the Danube the Turks had held sway since the fourteenth century over Greeks, Serbs, Rumans, Bulgars, and Albanians, with a régime of slipshod tolerance varied by spasms of outrage, which never for a moment encouraged the subject races to forget that they were oppressed, or to identify their interests with those of their masters. And as the Turkish rulers, always few in number, had never aspired to anything more than a mere military dominion, and had never shown any capacity to grasp the idea of Law, there had never been any chance of their performing the function which the Norman conquerors



performed in England, of welding disunited peoples into a nation. Ever since the Turkish conquest it had been apparent that the only cure for the evils which they had brought was their complete extrusion from Europe; and their desolating ascendancy over peoples who were (unlike themselves) capable of civilisation, had for long only been kept alive by the mutual jealousies of the Powers which aspired to supplant them.

These Powers were two, Austria and Russia. Austria had been the principal enemy of the Turk during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and had gained much territory then at his expense. Since the early eighteenth century she had fought no Turkish war, and she has never taken up arms against the Turk during the nineteenth century. But she had not abandoned the long-cherished ambition of extending her dominion southwards to the Ægean Sea and the desirable port of Salonika; and, as her Empire already consisted of a medley of subject races, she saw no objection to adding to their number. She waited on events for such chances of snapping up territory without fighting for it as occurred in 1878, when she obtained control over the Serbian regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina; meanwhile she used all her diplomatic weapons to prevent her rival Russia from seizing the prey she had marked down for herself.

The Russian people dreamed of freeing from an infidel yoke the city of Constantinople, which is the traditional capital of the Orthodox or Greek form of Christianity, and which would also give to the land-locked Empire free access to open seas. But they were also moved by a genuine sympathy for the subject-races of the Balkans, most of whom were their cousins in race, and all of whom shared their adherence to the Greek Church. Thus it was not merely a desire for dominion, but also a sincere and genuine sympathy which drove Russia forward in the Balkans. For that reason this despotic Power has in this region been the friend and patron of national freedom, and all the little Balkan States owe their national independence mainly or wholly to her. During the first half of the nineteenth century, as the result of two wars (1812 and 1826-9), she helped to establish the independence of Greece, and won local autonomy

for a small part of the future Serbia and for the two provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were subsequently united to form Rumania. At every point her efforts were opposed, and in part frustrated, by Austria; while Britain also, through fear for India, helped to keep alive the stagnant and deadening rule of the Turk. The first half of the century, therefore, saw only the modest beginning of national movements within the Turkish Empire; and between 1830 and 1876 there was a long pause in the expansion of the nationalist system in this region.

To the north of the Danube, within that part of the unnationalised area which constituted the Austrian Empire, there were two ruling races, the Germans of Austria proper and the adjacent provinces of Tyrol, Styria, and Carinthia, and the Magyars or Hungarians who inhabited the central Danubian plain. For a thousand years, since their migration from Asia in the eighth century, the Magyars (who are racially akin to the Turks) had dominated the whole of the region now known as the Kingdom of Hungary, and had exercised a proud and intolerant sway over the surrounding subject races—the Slavonic Slovaks to the north, the Rumans of Transylvania to the south-east, the Slavonic Croats and Serbs to the south and south-west. Outnumbered by their subjects, they kept aloof from them, employed them as serfs, avoided inter-marriage, and so failed utterly to weld the mixed population of this region (as they might have done) into a nation; what they especially valued was their racial ascendancy, not the equal liberty of nationhood. But their power had been broken by the Turks in the early sixteenth century, and when they escaped from the Turkish yoke, at the end of the seventeenth century, it was only to pass under the dominion of the Germans of Austria. They retained the memory of their old proud independence and some shadow of their old parliamentary system; and when the thrill of the nationalist movement was passing over Europe from 1820 onwards, it found ready fuel among them. They were eager to establish their freedom from Austrian rule, but only in order that they might fix their own yoke more securely upon the necks of their

Slavonic and Rumanian subjects. Racialism, not nationalism, was their inspiration.

The Germans of Austria proper had their subject races, quite apart from the Magyars and their vassals. Besides the purely German provinces, the Austrian section of the Dual Monarchy included the Slavonic Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, who had had their days of greatness and power in the fifteenth century when John Hus was their prophet and Ziska their unconquerable general; but their national liberties had been ruthlessly crushed by the Austrians in the Seventeenth century. During the thirties they were reviving the memories of their ancient greatness, restoring the purity of their language, and preparing like other subject nations to strike for freedom. Austria also controlled the province of Galicia, once part of the kingdom of Poland; but the Poles formed the majority only in the western part of the province; in its eastern half Polish nobles ruled over, and were hated by, a serf-population of Ruthenians or Little Russians.

Such was the medley of races and potential nations among which the national idea suddenly began to produce a great fermentation during the 'forties; it culminated in the amazing and confusing revolution of 1848, which broke out simultaneously among all these conflicting peoples, and most fiercely among the Magyars. A reasonable reorganization of the Austrian Empire on national lines would have been difficult. But it would not have been impossible. The concession of full local autonomy to each of the principal groups which possessed geographical coherence—the Czechs, the Poles, the Magyars, the Rumanians, the Croats and Serbs—might have been combined with a federal organisation which would have kept the whole Empire together; and it is not impossible that in course of time the Serbians of free Serbia as well as those who remained under the Turkish yoke, and the Rumanians of Moldavia and Wallachia, might have been willing to join with their brothers under the shelter of a great federal union of the small nationalities which would have solved the national problem in the region where it presents

the greatest difficulties, and would have formed a bulwark for the peace of the world. But any such arrangement was rendered impossible by the passion for dominion of the two ruling races, who could not endure to see their subjects placed on a level with themselves, and who would have been outnumbered in the fédération as a whole by the vassals who had escaped from their control. So the Magyars preferred to try to establish the freedom of Hungary as a whole from Austrian control, while at the same time they declined to listen to the claims of Croats or Rumans, and even insisted that Magyar should be the one officially recognised language in the law-courts, the army, and the administrative offices. Consequently the Austrians were able to turn against them the whole strength of the subject peoples; and in the end none of the peoples gained any advantage at all, and the old system of brutal repression and obscurantism was revived in full. This outcome of the 1848 revolution in the Austrian Empire was, in fact, as great a tragedy for the national cause and for the peace of Europe as the contemporaneous failure of the liberal-nationalist movement in Germany. In the result, the Austrian Empire was gravely weakened, and for that reason was unable to withstand the Italian national movement in 1859-60, and the sudden attack of Prussia in 1866.

The great defeat of 1866 did, however, bring about a reconstruction of the Austrian system, which seemed to give some satisfaction to the national cause, and which was hailed at the time as a great victory. There was some discussion between 1865 and 1867 of the institution of a sort of national-federal system, such as was described above. But this opportunity also was lost, because it did not satisfy the passion for dominion of either of the ruling races; and the ultimate settlement took the form of the *Ausgleich* or Compromise of 1867, whereby the Dualism of the Dual Monarchy was finally established, and the Magyars acquired complete ascendancy on the one half, and German-Austrians in the other half. "You manage your barbarians, and we will manage ours," said the Austrian Chancellor to his Magyar fellow; and that was the spirit of the settlement. It was a triumph for racialism, not for nationalism; it established

dominion, not liberty; and henceforth the repression of the subject-peoples within the empire, and hostility to their brethren without, has been the common policy of Austrians and Hungarians alike; has enabled them to forget their old feuds; and has caused the Austrian Empire to appear an even more implacable foe of the national cause, and an even greater danger to European peace, than before 1867.

The effect of this policy upon the national cause was illustrated in the crises of 1876-8 in the Turkish empire. In 1876 the Serbs of Bosnia had revolted against the Turks, and were naturally aided by their fellows in free Serbia and Montenegro; at the same time the appalling outrages perpetrated by the Turks in Bulgaria aroused the indignation of most of Europe, and caused one of the great parties in Britain to break away violently from the traditional policy of "maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire" and to adopt the view that the Turk must be chased "bag and baggage" out of Europe. Above all, this recrudescence of Turkish tyranny brought Russia again into the field, after a long interval. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 ended in the complete defeat of the Turks, and Turkey was forced to accept a treaty whereby the whole of the area inhabited by the Bulgarians was to be turned into a free state, while the area of free Serbia was to be increased, and both Serbia and Rumania were no longer to be subject to the suzerainty of the Turk.

The solution of the Balkan problem might have been completed by the union of the revolting Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina with free Serbia. But this did not suit the aims of the Austrians, and the Magyars. If a really solid and powerful Serbian realm were to be established just across the Danube, "our barbarians" of the same race, whom it was so difficult to keep in subjection, might become dangerous. The maintenance of racial dominion within the Austrian empire required the denial of national freedom outside. Austria stipulated that Bosnia and Herzegovina should (while remaining part of the Turkish Empire) be placed under the administration of the Dual Monarchy. She also demanded that the Russo-Turkish treaty should

be revised; and accordingly a Congress was held at Berlin (with Bismarck to act as "honest broker"), where more than half of the proposed free state of Bulgaria was restored to Turkish misrule, and the remainder was left under Turkish suzerainty. Here, for the first time, Austria and Germany combined to support Turkey in preventing the establishment of national liberty among the long-oppressed peoples of the Balkans. And, unhappily, on this single occasion in the whole history of the national movement, Britain ranged herself against the national cause, because the traditional fear of Russia was still dominant in the minds of the party then in power. "We put our money on the wrong horse," said Lord Salisbury, who was present at Berlin, when, much later, he looked back over British policy in this sphere. It is not likely that the attitude of the British representatives materially affected the result; for the "natural allies" as Bernhardi calls them, Germany, Austria, and Turkey, the standing foes of national freedom, had at last begun their ill-omened partnership, and the other powers, the traditional friends of nationalism, were as yet on bad terms with one another. But it was an unhappy close to the great era of nationalist advance.

36. TACTICS OF THE IRISH NATIONALISTS<sup>1</sup>

[The Irish Nationalist Party was few in numbers but under the leadership of Parnell exercised a powerful influence in the House of Commons. Until the House changed its rules by adopting "closure," a method of eliminating debate by a vote, the small group of Irish members were often successful in stopping for hours the conduct of government business. The following extract from the memoirs of T. P. O'Connor, a famous member of the Irish Party, is a good illustration of their tactics.]



THE FORTY-ONE HOURS SITTING, JANUARY 31—FEBRUARY 2,  
1881

**B**UT the next manoeuvre of the Government let loose the tempest. This was the proposal of Mr Gladstone that the Coercion Bill should have precedence of all other business before the House. Then our men rushed into the debate, speaking to practically an empty House. Biggar was named and suspended, and then passions were let loose. Irish member after member proposed amendment after amendment. The debate was continued, but it had become aggravated by a provocative speech from Sir William Harcourt, who said the Government were determined to go on until the Prime Minister's motion was carried. It was quite clear soon that the Irish members were determined to persevere, and thus there came the first of the all-night sittings; the House did not adjourn till five minutes after two o'clock. There was worse soon to come, for this led on to the famous forty-one hours sitting, which stands out so conspicuously in Parliamentary history. It began by the declaration by Mr. Gladstone that they intended to finish the first stage of the

<sup>1</sup> T. P. O'Connor, *Memoirs of an Old Parliamentarian* (D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1929), Vol I, pp 158-162 Reprinted by permission of D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc.

Coercion Bill at that sitting. The announcement was received by an ominous cheer.

For a while things went on with some tranquillity, and even tamely, until Mr. Gladstone, replying to several questions which were put to him, repeated that he had every intention of pushing the Bill through in that sitting. Then the storm was not long in breaking forth. Parnell intervened with one of those speeches of cold bitterness which he could on occasion infuse into his utterances. Attempt after attempt was made to get the Government to some compromise; but they steadily refused. The English members who had occasionally interfered now lapsed into silence, so Irish member had to succeed Irish member. Appeals after appeals were made to us, but we remained deaf to them all. In succession almost every one of us made a speech. Some of us were able to hold on for even two hours, and Mr. Sexton made the speech of three hours to which I have already alluded.

By this time there was electricity in the air, and there began to be rumours of some drastic and desperate action on the part of the Speaker. It is one of the mysteries of the House of Commons how these portents of big events, however carefully an attempt has been made to conceal them, gradually appear. They are part of that crowd psychology which we must always take into account when appraising the life of the House.

The Speaker had left the chair to take some necessary rest, and this added to the sense of dull unreality in which the five or six members, mostly half asleep, listened to the succession of Irish speakers, who were repeating the same arguments, almost the same language.

My own adventures on this fateful night will give some idea of the life the small Party to which I belonged had to live in those strenuous days. In order to be prepared for the debate, which might go on for several nights still, I went home to my room in the Westminster Palace Hotel. Sleep at that time was fortunately at my command, no matter at what hour of the day or night, and I was able to sleep quite tranquilly from midnight to close upon four o'clock in the morning. I then pulled myself together and got back to the House, to begin to prepare my



contribution for the prolongation of the debate. As a matter of fact, I threw myself down on a sofa in a spare corner of the House of Commons—one could always find a quiet spot in that gallery which is above and behind the Chamber itself. For over two hours again I slept, to prepare myself for my coming effort. When I went down to the House I found Sexton speaking; Leamy and Biggar were to follow, and it had been arranged that I should follow Biggar. I had determined not to be too brief in my speech, and to give to the members, already tired out with their forty-one hours of sitting, still several hours more of impatience and waiting. Meantime Biggar had to pause for the replacement of Dr. Lyon Playfair, the temporary Deputy Speaker, by Mr. Brand. At once it was seen that something portentous was toward. It was still very early in the morning, and although the House had been almost empty during the last few hours, the Chamber suddenly became crowded; there was excitement in the very air. Everybody now knew that something very drastic was coming.

The Irish members were still undefeated, except that they knew that a heavy blow was going to be struck at them. The Speaker was evidently perturbed and nervous as he declared that, in view of the continued obstruction, he had decided to put the question immediately. He had the manuscript in his hand, which was visibly trembling. From it he read out the solemn and fateful declaration that he had determined there and then to bring the long debate to an end. In short, to make a *coup d'état*.

#### THE SPEAKER'S CLOSURE, FEBRUARY 2, 1881

Never shall I forget the scene that followed directly after. From all sides of the House—except, of course, from our own little group—there was a thunder-clap of cheers, louder than any I had ever heard; but that was not all. One could almost detect amongst the raucous echo of the cheers the passionate frenzy which our prolonged resistance had created. That very painful moment has always remained vividly in my memory, especially the expressions on the faces of the members of the

Tory Party, as they looked in triumph and hate at us, to whom they considered they had dealt a crushing blow.

For a moment we were staggered. It was Parnell's interval of rest, and one of us went over to rouse him from his bed in the Westminster Hotel. We had not yet made up our minds how to meet the staggering blow, and we could do nothing but silently take part in the division that was immediately called. Silently and sullenly both sides trailed into the division lobby.

Mr. Justin M'Carthy, that benign and striking figure, to whom was entrusted the lead during this time of storm and passion, rose to oppose the taking of the next division; the Speaker, however, stood firm. Loud shouts began to come from all parts of the House, and it was evident that Mr. M'Carthy was not going to be heard. It was then that Mr. O'Connor Power showed that sense of Parliamentary fitness of which he was always a master. Jumping to his feet, with that pock-marked face of his looking dark and menacing with rage, he shouted "Privilege! Privilege!" Beckoning angrily to his comrades to follow, he led an immediate retreat, and the Irish members walked in a body out of the House. We went straight away to what was then the Conference Room, and scarcely had we got there when Parnell appeared from the Westminster Hotel. He was fresh and smiling and composed, as we were not. Our feelings took expression in the greatest cheer Parnell had received from his followers for many a long day. In spite of everything, we felt that we had won.

It will give some idea of the courage, tenacity, and endurance of the little Irish Party that it received this deadly blow at nine in the morning; that at twelve, when the House reassembled, and after in most cases a sleepless and laborious night, they were once more all in their places. There was no sign of fatigue; still less any sign of being cowed or beaten. In question after question, in suggested motion after motion, they showed that they were ready once more to go on with the fight. Their voices were, perhaps, shrill; their nerves may have been a little jangled; but their spirits were still unsubdued.

## VIII. LIBERALISM



### 37. A DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY <sup>1</sup>

[The following definition, written by James Bryce, shows that no exact meaning of the term "democracy" can be agreed upon. It should, however, make clear to the student certain evidences of democracy and enable him to recognize them as they are encountered in his studies.]



THE word Democracy has been used ever since the time of Herodotus to denote that form of government in which the ruling power of a State is legally vested, not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of the community as a whole. This means, in communities which act by voting, that rule belongs to the majority, as no other method has been found for determining peaceably and legally what is to be deemed the will of a community which is not unanimous. Usage has made this the accepted sense of the term, and usage is the safest guide in the employment of words.

Democracy, as the rule of the Many, was by the Greeks opposed to Monarchy, which is the rule of One, and to Oligarchy, which is the rule of the Few, i.e. of a class privileged either by birth or by property. Thus it came to be taken as denoting in practice that form of government in which the poorer class, always the more numerous, did in fact rule; and the term *Demos* was often used to describe not the whole people but that particular class as distinguished from the wealthier and much smaller class. Moderns sometimes also use it thus to describe what we call "the masses" in contradistinction to "the classes." But it is better to employ the word as meaning neither

<sup>1</sup> James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1921), Vol. I, pp. 20-23. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, The Macmillan Company.

more nor less than the Rule of the Majority, the "classes and masses" of the whole people being taken together.

So far there is little disagreement as to the sense of the word. But when we come to apply this, or indeed any broad and simple definition, to concrete cases, many questions arise. What is meant by the term "political community"? Does it include all the inhabitants of a given area or those only who possess full civic rights, the so-called "qualified citizens"? Can a community such as South Carolina, or the Transvaal, in which the majority of the inhabitants, because not of the white race, are excluded from the electoral suffrage, be deemed a democracy in respect of its vesting political power in the majority of qualified citizens, the "qualified" being all or nearly all white? Is the name to be applied equally to Portugal and Belgium, in which women do not vote, and to Norway and Germany, in which they do? Could anybody deny it to France merely because she does not grant the suffrage to women? Or if the electoral suffrage, instead of being possessed by all the adult, or adult male, citizens, is restricted to those who can read and write, or to those who possess some amount of property, or pay some direct tax, however small, does that community thereby cease to be a democracy?

So again, what difference is made by such limitations on the power of the majority as a Constitution may impose? There are communities in which, though universal suffrage prevails, the power of the voters is fettered in its action by the rights reserved to a king or to a non-elective Upper House. Such was the German Empire, such was the Austrian Monarchy, such are some of the monarchies that still remain in Europe. Even in Britain and in Canada, a certain, though now very slender, measure of authority has been left to Second Chambers. In all the last mentioned cases must we not consider not only who possess the right of voting, but how far that right carries with it a full control of the machinery of government? Was Germany, for instance, a democracy in 1913 because the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage?

Another class of cases presents another difficulty. There are

countries in which the Constitution has a popular quality in respect of its form, but in which the mass of the people do not in fact exercise the powers they possess on paper. This may be because they are too ignorant or too indifferent to vote, or because actual supremacy belongs to the man or group in control of the Government through a control of the army. Such are most of the so-called republics of Central and South America. Such have been, at particular moments, some of the new kingdoms of South-Eastern Europe, where the bulk of the population has not yet learnt how to exercise the political rights which the Constitution gives. Bulgaria and Greece were nominally democratic in 1915, but the king of the former carried the people into the Great War, as the ally of Germany, against their wish, and the king of the latter would have succeeded in doing the same thing but for the fact that the Allied fleets had Athens under their guns.

All these things make a difference to the truly popular character of a government. It is the facts that matter, not the name. People used to confound—some persons in some countries still confound—a Republic with a Democracy, and suppose that a government in which one person is the titular and permanent head of the State cannot be a government by the people. It ought not to be necessary nowadays to point out that there are plenty of republics which are not democracies, and some monarchies, like those of Britain and Norway, which are. I might multiply instances, but it is not worth while. Why spend time on what is a question of words? No one has propounded a formula which will cover every case, because there are governments which are “on the line,” too popular to be called oligarchies, and scarcely popular enough to be called democracies. But though we cannot define either Oligarchy or Democracy, we can usually know either the one or the other when we see it. Where the will of the whole people prevails in all important matters, even if it has some retarding influences to overcome, or is legally required to act for some purposes in some specially provided manner, that may be called a Democracy. In this book I use the word in its old and strict sense, as denoting a government in

which the will of the majority of qualified citizens rules, taking the qualified citizens to constitute the great bulk of the inhabitants, say, roughly, at least three-fourths, so that the physical force of the citizens coincides (broadly speaking) with their voting power. Using this test, we may apply the name to the United Kingdom and the British self-governing Dominions, to France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Greece, the United States, Argentina, and possibly Chile and Uruguay. Of some of the newer European States it is too soon to speak, and whatever we may call the republics of Central America and the Caribbean Sea, they are not democracies.

Although the words "democracy" and "democratic" denote nothing more than a particular form of government, they have, particularly in the United States, Canada, and Australia, acquired attractive associations of a social and indeed almost of a moral character. The adjective is used to describe a person of a simple and friendly spirit and genial manners, "a good mixer," one who, whatever his wealth or status, makes no assumption of superiority, and carefully keeps himself on the level of his poorer or less eminent neighbours. I have heard a monarch described as "a democratic king." Democracy is supposed to be the product and the guardian both of Equality and of Liberty, being so consecrated by its relationship to both of these precious possessions as to be almost above criticism. Historically no doubt the three have been intimately connected, yet they are separable in theory and have sometimes been separated in practice. . . .



38. THE REFORM BILL OF 1832<sup>1</sup>

[The Reform Bill of 1832 is a landmark in British political history and shows a definite break with the conservative tendency which had dominated English politics since the outbreak of the French Revolution. The following selection written by G. M. Trevelyan, an eminent British historian, presents a clear picture of the process by which this reform was accomplished and provides a good illustration of the democratic method of affecting political change.]



THE Whigs had made a bad start. But when on March 1, 1831, Lord John Russell introduced the Reform Bill into the Commons, and revealed the well-kept secret that all the "nomination" boroughs were to be abolished, without compensation to the borough-owners, Ministers sprang to the summit of popularity at a single bound. The Tories were dumfounded. They had confidently expected a weak measure, buying up a few of the rotten borough seats to give them to a few great cities; such a Bill would have left the nation cold and the reformers divided; lacking support from outside, it could pass the Houses only by agreement, after being further whittled down; finally the Whigs would be turned out as incompetent sciolists and power would revert to its long-tried possessors. But instead of lending themselves to this plan, Ministers had summoned the whole nation to their support, to overawe the recusants at Westminster. The bold appeal was not merely a winning move in the political game, but it established the fundamental principle of the "new constitution," namely, that in the last resort the opinion of the nation was to count for more than the opinion of the legislators.

The anger and amazement of Opposition were shared in a less degree by many of the Government's supporters in the

<sup>1</sup> G. M. Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century* (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1928), pp. 235-239.

Commons, who relished their position as privileged senators of the modern Rome, and had no wish to become mere elected persons in a paradise of Benthamite utility. If, as soon as Russell had sat down, Peel had moved the rejection of the "revolutionary measure" on first reading, it was believed that the Bill would have been lost. But the Opposition, having come to the House expecting something very different, had no plan ready, and Peel's genius did not lie in dramatic moves and lightning decisions. The opportunity was let slip. As the second reading debate dragged on night after night, many who had at first been doubtful or hostile, were converted by the unmistakable evidences of the national will. Three weeks after its introduction the Bill passed its second reading by one vote, in the most exciting division since the Grand Remonstrance.

A defeat in Committee soon narrowed the issue to a choice between a new Ministry with a much modified Bill, or a General Election to save Bill and Ministry together. In such circumstances a modern Prime Minister could claim a dissolution of Parliament as of right. But under George III and his sons dissolution was, in custom as well as in law, a personal prerogative of the king. Would William dissolve at Grey's request? The decisive crisis in the fortunes of the Bill had come, and the choice lay with a retired admiral of no great brains or experience in affairs of State, but with an instinct of personal loyalty to his Ministers which sharply distinguished him from his father and brother before him.

In January 1831, while the draft Bill had been a secret between William and his confidential servants, Grey had persuaded his master to allow him to introduce it—a permission necessary under the custom of the Constitution as George III had defined it. Grey had persuaded the King that the Bill was an 'aristocratical' measure, designed to save the Constitution from more revolutionary changes. And so it was in Grey's mind. Its 'democratical' implications only began to be apparent to William after it had become public, when the joy of the Radicals of whom he lived in terror, and the rage of the Tories with whom he lived in intimacy, gradually made him realise what he had done. In

April he had to decide whether he would accept Grey's resignation or his advice to dissolve. The straw that weighed down the balance in his mind was the fact that there had been a majority of one for the second reading. With many misgivings he granted Grey his dissolution.

The General Election was almost as onesided and enthusiastic, so far as popular opinion was concerned, as the elections for the Restoration Parliament. The Reformers carried almost all the open constituencies, including seventy-four English county seats out of eighty. But no amount of popular intimidation could shake the hold of the proprietors on the nomination seats. In their last Parliament the rotten borough members voted two to one against the Bill, in much the same numbers as before the election.

But there was now a majority of 136 for the Bill. It passed through the Commons that summer under Lord Althorp's patient management in Committee, and went up to the Lords, where it was thrown out on second reading by a majority of forty-one votes.

Under the old system of government, the average Englishman had had so little to do with politics that he was taken by surprise at this perfectly inevitable event, which had been long anticipated in Parliamentary circles. The popular enthusiasm, suddenly brought up against an obstacle which it had not expected and could at first see no legal way to remove, exploded in outrages against bishops and peers who had voted against the Bill. A single false step by the Ministers might have precipitated anarchy. The Army, smaller than at any other period in our modern annals, was insufficient to keep order in England and Scotland, in addition to its usual task in Ireland. Peel's police as yet only existed in London. It was impossible to raise volunteer forces to put down Reform mobs. The workmen in the North were drilling and arming to fight the Lords. In the South the ricks were blazing night after night. Unemployment and starvation urged desperate deeds. The first visitation of cholera added to the gloom and terror of the winter of 1831-1832.

Employers and City men clamoured more loudly every week for a creation of peers to pass the Bill and save social order. The working classes, if it came to blows, would fight not for this Bill of the Ten Pound householders, but for a Bill that enfranchised their own class, and for much else besides. Civil strife, if it came, might easily degenerate into a war between 'haves' and 'have-nots.' The Bill seemed the sheet-anchor of society. Even the burning of the central part of Bristol by Radical ruffians failed to cause a serious reaction, each side drawing its own moral from the event.

Grey kept his head. He neither resigned nor, as the King urged, whittled down the Bill. On the other hand he refused, in spite of the remonstrance of the leading members of his Cabinet, to force the King to a premature decision about peer-making, before the time came when circumstances would be too strong for William's reluctance.

Before Christmas a new Bill was introduced, modified in detail to meet some reasonable criticisms and so save the face of the "waverers" among the peers, but not weakened as a democratic measure. It quickly passed the Commons, and was accepted by nine votes on the second reading in the Lords.

The final crisis, known as the 'Days of May,' was provoked by an attempt of the Lords to take the Bill out of the hands of the Ministers in charge, and amend it in their own way. This was countered by the resignation of the Cabinet. Resignation in the previous autumn, when the Lords had thrown the Bill right out, would have produced anarchy. Now it secured and hastened the last stages of a journey of which the goal was already in sight. In October 1831, the country, taken by surprise by the Lords' action, was not properly organised, as the riots had shown. But in May 1832, the Political Unions had the situation in hand. Grey's resignation was not followed by violence or rioting, but by a silent and formidable preparation for ultimate resistance in case he did not speedily return. The English genius for local self-government, voluntary combination and self-help, which had little or no expression in the close municipalities, found its outlet in these unofficial Political Unions of citizens

determined alike on order and on freedom. These organisations, improvised by the British people, constituted the strongest proof of its fitness to work self-governing institutions of a more official character. Abhorred by the King and Tories who clamoured for their suppression, the Unions were tolerated by the Whig Ministers on the condition of their ceasing to arm and drill.

Grey had resigned because the King refused to create peers. But William was now prepared to do anything short of that to get the Bill through intact. He appealed to Wellington to form a Tory Ministry for the purpose of carrying 'the Bill, the whole Bill and nothing but the Bill' through the House of Lords—on the precedent of Catholic Emancipation three years before. The most fearless, if not always the wisest, of public servants accepted this extraordinary commission, the nature of which was not understood in the country, where people naturally supposed that the victor of Waterloo, who had pronounced against all Reform, was coming back to rule them by the sword. If Wellington had succeeded in forming a Ministry, the Political Unions would have led resistance, with what result it is impossible to say. But the actual cause of the Duke's abandoning the task was not his fear of popular resistance, but the refusal of Peel and the Tories in the House of Commons to take part in a scheme so absurd and dangerous, no longer with a hope of modifying the Bill, but solely to save the face of the Lords. The King was obliged to come to terms with Grey, and could only get him back by a written promise to create any number of peers necessary to carry the Bill. The threat when known in the Upper House sufficed, and the Reform Bill became law.

39. THE POLITICAL CAPACITY OF THE FRENCH<sup>1</sup>

[The establishment of the Third Republic did not end the struggle for political democracy in France. The enemies of the Republic, strongly entrenched in the Church, the judiciary, and the army, continued the fight, as is evidenced by the struggle to separate Church and State. Professor Shotwell gives us a clear analysis of the forces in operation and emphasizes certain essential features of the French system as contrasted with Anglo-American democracy.]



THE nineteenth century was to France what the seventeenth was to England—a period of political re-adjustment. The political revolution which began in 1789 ended only in 1879, when the monarchist MacMahon resigned the presidency in the face of a parliament that had slowly and steadily grown republican. One must understand the Revolution if one is to understand subsequent French history, and this has been possible only within the last few years. Carlyle, from whom most readers of English literature derive their impressions of it, misconceived it altogether. The gigantic tragedy which he so wonderfully depicts was not the main content of the Revolution. There were really two revolutions in one: a social revolution of the summer and autumn months of 1789, in which the whole social structure of France was overturned, and a political experiment, which has taken almost a century of adjustment. The social revolution, so long obscured by the dramatic occurrences which followed, was the real event of 1789. The old régime with its inequalities, its oppression, its injustice, disappeared forever from France. But political reconstruction proved a long and difficult task. The first republic was forced upon the country by a band of enthusiasts; it is doubtful if the republicans ever had a majority throughout


<sup>1</sup>James T. Shotwell, "The Political Capacity of the French," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXIV (1909), 118-123. Reprinted by courtesy of the author and *Political Science Quarterly*




Political reform had been the consistent objective of the Liberal Party under the leadership of Gladstone but his great rival, Disraeli, stole his thunder by passing the Reform Bill of 1867. (*Punch Cartoons on Disraeli*)




This cartoon reflects the hostility of the 1880's toward women suffrage. (Charles L. Graves, *Mr. Punch's History of Modern England*, Vol. III, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York.)




Lincoln



Gladstone



Gambetta



Bright

LIBERAL LEADERS



the country before 1877. In the long interval France gave up monarchy slowly and reluctantly, and various monarchic or aristocratic forms of government were tried. A second nominal republic was even established; but except for the opening months, February to June, 1848, when it was faced by the insistent demands of the laboring class, it was merely a continuation of the conservative Orleans monarchy, minus the king. Finally, after Sedan, all the possible forms of government were presented side by side to the nation for its choice. After seven years it finally chose the republic. Two years later every branch of the government was in republican hands. The long political revolution was over.

The history of the Third Republic therefore properly begins in the autumn of 1879. What of the stability of its government? During the last eighteen years there have been on an average no less than two premiers every year! To one looking merely at the façade, this seems an absolute condemnation of French political capacity. Has this long evolution produced only a sort of opera bouffe, in which the main interest centers in the entrances and exits? Each time a new premier has been announced, our editors have sharpened their pens and our political theorists have commented upon the pathetic spectacle of a nation that does not know its own mind. In reality a change of cabinets in France has not the significance it would have in England. It does not mean a reversal of policy. Generally it means more efficiency in carrying out the same policy. The new cabinet takes up the burden where the last one lays it down. Behind them all stands Parliament, absolute master of the whole situation, ready to dismiss the new ministers as soon as they show weakness or commit a blunder. The passing of French ministries is rather a sign of stable policy than of variability, as would be the case in England.

It seems to have escaped most critics that the only real test of a government is what it accomplishes. Critics of France have been so blinded by the Anglo-Teuton tradition that they seldom take the trouble to inquire what this nondescript governmental machine of France has been able to do. Now if one looks back

over the history of the Third Republic since it has been under republicans, one will find a more logical development of reform, a more regular and consistent line of legislation, than can be matched where the English system prevails. One searches in vain for those headlong party measures which the next election nullifies. There is no senseless swinging of the pendulum from extreme conservatism to extreme radicalism. Variations occur, it is true, but not with chaotic abruptness. The choice is not between Gladstone, with home rule and anti-imperialism, and a Salisbury waiting to undo and mar all that Gladstone has done, nor between Republicanism and Democracy as these two parties have faced each other in the past in our political arena. It has not been a choice between opposite poles, but between more or less of the same thing. The extremists have always been excluded from power, since the Republic has been governed by republicans.

A glance at the product of the French Parliament since 1879 shows that France today, as well as England, is a land where "freedom slowly broadens down," if not from precedent to precedent, at least from statute to statute. To be sure freedom is a larger thing than acts of legislatures, but it is also larger than decisions of judges. Reforms of abuses which the state can prevent constitute merely those definite stages in the advance of freedom which the historian can register as indices of the nation's purpose. Yet here the work of the Parliament of the Third Republic will bear comparison with that complex and often hidden line of progress to be traced in England through law courts, local government and Parliament. A country which seems a paradise of anarchy when one reads of its shifting ministries exhibits upon examination a surprising degree of regularity, where year by year the scope of reforms is enlarged, the democratic bases of the republic are strengthened and its enemies in army or church suppressed. The roll of these laws fills too many pages to be repeated here. They are mainly directed toward the three chief problems of our day in Europe—militarism, clericalism and social reform. The first of these, drawing its life out of the wrecked hopes of the monarchists and

the unshushed memory of national disaster, fought savagely, but without honor, through Boulangism and the Dreyfus affair. It has at last been subdued by a law of which few out of France have so much as heard—the law which obliges rich men's sons to share the hardships and the dangers of the poor recruit; a measure which closed many a fashionable school and made the imperialist expansionist and the chauvinist aristocrat less ready to press for war with its attendant horrors. Clericalism was ousted from the common schools twenty years ago in a hard-fought battle. Now the first generation taught in those secularized schools has become an important part of the French electorate, and the interference of the clergy in politics has been ended by their emphatic renunciation of the concordat. The political rôle of the clergy is over; it has fought savagely, and not always honorably, to maintain its ancient prerogatives in a nation which had passed out of its tutelage. The struggle has been long and not always upon the surface; the breaking of the concordat is only one of its forms. But from the day when Gambetta unmasked the clericalism supporting MacMahon and his monarchists—*"le cléricisme, voilà l'ennemi"*—Until Briand gently commiserated the church he had overthrown, the republicans never ceased in their warfare with its disciplined forces. Social reform has been less persistent. It has been sidetracked several times by the other questions. Yet it has no such era to record as that black and stagnant period when England was ruled by Balfour, relying on a majority won from a nation's agonized interest in the Boer War. Jules Ferry tried in vain to hush discontent by schemes of oriental empire. Clémenceau, then the eternal voice of rebuke, overturned ministry after ministry which was too weak to face the problems of social reform. Less bravely than when fighting army or clergy, but still continually attacking one or another social or economic evil, the Parliament of France has pushed ahead, growing radical in temper, until even the conservatives upon its right would be accounted radical in our Congress.

This output seems all the more remarkable when we recall that it has been accomplished by a Parliament almost lacking

ministerial direction. Even for their relatively short terms of office the ministers are continually on trial. They are watched by Parliament with as keen an eye as were the generals of the reign of terror by the "deputies on mission." An interpellation is waiting for them in case of failure or weakness in office, and Parliament becomes at once a sort of political tribunal, passing sentence in its vote of confidence. This distrust of ministers is an ancient tradition in France. It dates from before the Revolution. The jealousy which foiled Mirabeau's plan for a constitutional monarchy with himself as prime minister rose again to mock Gambetta almost a hundred years later. It is not altogether unreasonable in a country so highly centralized. The minister of the interior, for instance, is like a general in command of a vast civil army. From the telegraph station at his office he can keep in touch from hour to hour with every prefect. They are his generals of divisions, posted in every department of France to carry out his will to the letter. How much more thoroughly he has the country in hand than even a Louis XIV, who had to wait weeks for an answer while couriers went riding over the miry roads with commands to his intendants! Nor are there any provincial estates to oppose his will today. The control of Louis XIV over France was not to be compared with that of Clémenceau. It is natural that Parliament should hold such a minister strictly to account and unlikely that it will ever lessen its jealous control.

As executive officers the cabinet ministers have enormous power. They are like a committee of sovereigns, presiding over the machinery of state—haunted forever, of course, by the shadow of an interpellation. They are the official heads of the vast civil and military hierarchy of the state. It is in this capacity that they appear most frequently before the public: at functions in the provincial towns, decorated with orders and the tri-color scarf, saluted by garrisons and acclaimed by functionaries. Parliament cannot take away these prerogatives of immediate executive control. Indeed it tends to strengthen and increase them. Nine-tenths of the laws of this country would be merely administrative ordinances in France. English laws and most of our

own are so frained as to try and meet every contingency. We are however learning that, no matter how carefully a law is made, a lawyer and a judge can find their way through or around it. The French saw this long ago, and they make their laws hardly more than statements of general principles, leaving to the government the duty of carrying them out in the spirit in which they were passed. Thus Parliament throws the responsibility for the carrying-out of its intentions upon the ministers, to an extent undreamed of here or in England

#### 40. THE OCTOBER MANIFESTO <sup>1</sup>

[The defeat at the hands of Japan was the direct cause of the Russian Revolution of 1905, but its fundamental causes lay deeply buried in the social structure. The general strike which was called in the autumn of 1905 rendered the situation critical, and the manifesto was issued in the hope that the liberal groups could be conciliated, that they would support the Government, and stop the revolution.]



THE rioting and agitation in the capitals and in many localities of OUR Empire fills OUR heart with great and deep grief. The welfare of the Russian Emperor is bound up with the welfare of the people, and its sorrows are HIS sorrows. The turbulence which has broken out may confound the people and threaten the integrity and unity of OUR Empire.

The great vow of service by the Tsar obligates US to endeavor, with all OUR strength, wisdom, and power, to put an end as quickly as possible to the disturbance so dangerous to the Empire. In commanding the responsible authorities to take measures to stop disorders, lawlessness, and violence, and to protect peaceful citizens in the quiet performance of their duties, WE

<sup>1</sup> F. A. Golder, *Documents of Russian History* (The Century Co., New York, 1927), pp. 627-628 Reprinted by permission of The D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc.

have found it necessary to unite the activities of the Supreme Government, so as to insure the successful carrying out of the general measures laid down by US for the peaceful life of the state.

We lay upon the Government the execution of OUR unchangeable will:

1. To grant to the population the inviolable right of free citizenship, based on the principles of the freedom of person, conscience, speech, assembly, and union.

2. Without postponing the intended elections for the State Duma and in so far as possible, in view of the short time that remains before the assembling of that body, to include in the participation of the work of the Duma those classes of the population that have been until now entirely deprived of the right to vote, and to extend in the future, by the newly created legislative way, the principles of the general right of election.

3. To establish as an unbreakable rule that no law shall go into force without its confirmation by the State Duma and that the persons elected by the people shall have the opportunity for actual participation in supervising the legality of the acts of authorities appointed by US.

We call on all the true sons of Russia to remember their duties toward their country, to assist in combating these unheard-of disturbances, and to join US with all their might in reestablishing quiet and peace in the country.

Given in Peterhof, on the seventeenth [thirtieth] day of October in the year of our Lord 1905, and the eleventh year of OUR reign.

NICHOLAS

41. THE GERMAN REVOLUTION<sup>1</sup>

[The Democratic movement in Germany had been arrested by the successful achievements of Bismarck and, although representative government had been established by the creation of the Reichstag, power remained in the hands of the Monarch. During the pre-war period increasing dissatisfaction had been evidenced and, had not the war intervened, concessions to the rising spirit of democracy would doubtless have been made. When the war broke out the democratic movement was submerged temporarily by the rising tide of nationalism, only to appear again as the war continued and it became apparent that victory was to elude the Germans. The defeat of the German armies in 1918 brought on a crisis which terminated in the downfall of the monarchy and the establishment of the Republic.]



ALL premeditated revolutions are unsuccessful," remarked Goethe to Eckermann, "for they are without God, who stands aloof from such bungling. If, however, there exists an actual necessity for a great reform, God is with it and it prospers." The Revolution of November 1918 belongs to the latter category, and its outbreak was foretold by thoughtful observers. "It is no good telling me," wrote Czernin in his celebrated memorandum of April 1917, "that the monarchical idea is too firmly rooted in Berlin and Vienna for the monarchy to be overthrown. This war has no precedent. If the monarchs do not make peace in the next few months, their peoples will make it over their heads, and then the waves of revolution will sweep away everything for which our sons are fighting today." The German people is not temperamentally inclined to violent courses, but the bow that is drawn too taut will always snap. The earthquake in Ger-

<sup>1</sup> George P. Gooch, *Germany* (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925), pp. 161-168. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Charles Scribner's Sons.

many represented, not a calculated attempt to carry out certain clearly defined political and social ideas, but an automatic reaction to a situation that had become unbearable. It was indeed rather a collapse than a revolution, rather an event than an act. The Imperial edifice had lost both its material strength and its emotional appeal, and a touch sufficed to hurl it into the abyss. Never was there less deliberate planning, yet never was there less resistance to overcome.

The change was carried through by the Socialists, while the bourgeoisie looked on, too stunned either to hinder or to help. Defeat had come with a rush, which allowed no time for psychological adjustment. Though it had been impossible to conceal the August retreat, and though both the Generals and the Government knew that the war was lost, gigantic official placards announced as late as the first half of September that ultimate victory was assured. So deeply rooted was public confidence in the military demigods that the optimist continued to dream of annexations, and the pessimist was the man who anticipated a compromise. And then, like bolts from the blue, came Austria's shrill cry of despair, the sudden capitulation of Bulgaria, and Prince Max's hurried appeal to President Wilson. In a single fortnight the fortifying certainty of victory passed into the agonizing consciousness of defeat. The Reichstag Resolution of 1917, it is true, had envisaged an anticlimax; but since that fleeting moment of hesitation Russia and Roumania had laid down their arms, and Ludendorff's offensive had revived the hopes that had been frustrated at the Marne. Though the government had long been aware of the uncertainty of the issue, it had continued to base its policy on the assumption that defeat was unthinkable. The sinews of war continued to be provided by loans; the Prussian franchise remained unreformed; the Belgians and the people of North-Eastern France were exploited and dragooned without a thought that the tables could ever be turned, or that there might be an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. The realisation of the imminence of defeat was accordingly followed by a revulsion of feeling against the military leaders, the political rulers, and even the institutions of State.



Since the war was lost, the sooner it ended 'he better. If the Kaiser were an obstacle to peace, let him go. If thrones were a hindrance, let them fall. The wheel had come full circle. The Hohenzollern Empire had been cradled in victory, and it perished of defeat.

When a revolution becomes a historical necessity, it is of little consequence by whose hand the flood-gates are opened. In the present case the lever was pulled by a handful of sailors. The German armies had never experienced a mutiny like that in the French lines in the spring of 1917; but in 1917 a miniature mutiny had occurred in the fleet, and its ringleaders were shot. The bravery of the naval arm had been amply proved in the waters of the North Sea; but when on 28th October 1918 the fleet was ordered to steam out, and it was rumoured that a final desperate struggle with the British was to be staged before the approaching fall of the curtain, some of the crews, first in one vessel, then in another, extinguished the fires. The mutineers explained their attitude in a proclamation. "If the English attack us, we will defend our coasts to the last, but we will not ourselves attack. Further than Heligoland we will not go." It was mutiny, not revolution, a defensive gesture against aimless carnage, not an assault on the political or social institutions of the Fatherland.

The authorities responded by wholesale arrests, but their attempts to restore discipline stiffened the back of the mutineers. On 1st November a meeting was held in the Kiel Town Hall and a deputation was sent to demand the immediate release of their comrades, but was met with a refusal to negotiate. On 2nd November a company disobeyed orders to disperse gatherings of the mutineers. On 3d November a monster demonstration of sailors and workers was held, some imprisoned mutineers were set free, cheers were raised for the Republic, and the first blood was shed by the firing of a patrol. On 4th November the whole navy was in a ferment, a Soldiers' Council was formed, and Admiral Souchon expressed his readiness to meet the mutineers. Among the demands presented, that for the liberation of their comrades was at once accepted. The red flag was hoisted on all

the warships, and the sailors telegraphed to Berlin for Haase and Ledebour.

The telegram summoning the Independent leaders was held up, but the Government despatched Noske, a Majority Socialist, to Kiel to report and take control. On arriving at the station on the evening of 4th November he was met by men with red badges, and instantly realised that a mutiny had grown into a revolution. The demands of the Soldiers' Council were conceded, the soldiers undertook to maintain order, the military measures that had been ordered were countermanded, and Noske was elected Governor of Kiel. On 5th November the whole working-class population joined the revolt and formed Workmen's Councils, which were joined by the existing Soldiers' Councils. On the same day warships sailed into Hamburg and Lubeck under the red flag. In Lubeck power passed without a struggle into the hands of a Soldiers' Council, which issued the first political manifesto of the Revolution. "From to-night Lubeck is in our hands. We are serving our comrades at the front and at home. The corrupt system and the military dictatorship of yesterday must disappear. Our aim is an immediate armistice and peace. We urge the people of Lubeck to preserve perfect tranquillity. We shall do nothing to endanger it. Everything continues as usual. We expect willing cooperation." Bremen accepted the new order on the same day, but blood was shed in Hamburg, where futile efforts were made to suppress the revolt. On 6th November the fire spread eastward to Schwerin and Rostock, and southward to Hanover, Brunswick, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Magdeburg, Halle, Leipzig, Dresden, Frankfurt. Within a week the cities of North-West Germany were in the hands of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. There were a few individuals in the rebel ranks who aimed at a revolution in the political system of the country; but the great majority had at first no thought beyond preventing further bloodshed in a struggle that was virtually ended. To achieve this result it was necessary to obtain control of the machine. That the Russian model of Councils was followed was due to its practical convenience, not to Russian gold. Everywhere the officials surrendered and the garrisons joined

the revolt. In the northern towns the sailors took the first step, but in the interior it was the urban workers who seized the helm.

While the red flag was being hoisted in the cities of the north, the first German State to proclaim itself a Republic was Bavaria. But while in the north the movement was elemental and impersonal, arising from disobedience to a preposterous naval command, in the south the stone was set rolling by a single hand. Kurt Eisner, a scholarly Jew, who had edited *Vorwärts* and suffered imprisonment for his views, had settled in Munich a few years before the war. Though the Bavarian Socialists were with few exceptions adherents of the Majority faction, Eisner boldly raised the banner of the Minority, and in the winter of 1917-18 he reached the conclusion that the coming offensive ought to be stopped by a general strike. A speech to this effect during the widespread strike of January 1918 was followed by imprisonment for treason; but he was released in October, and immediately resumed his efforts to stop the war.

When the news of the successful mutiny in Kiel reached Munich, Eisner addressed a mass meeting on 5th November, and on the following day he summoned the people to a still greater demonstration for the 7th. Though the Socialists formed but a small proportion of a Catholic and Conservative population, the soil was ready for the seed. A resolution drawn up by Eisner was passed with acclamation. "The German people knows itself to be one with all the peoples of Europe in the will to safeguard the future of the world by a universal alliance of law and liberty, and looks forward with confidence to the fulfilment of the world-peace proclaimed by President Wilson." The meeting proceeded to demand the resignation of the Kaiser, an oath of allegiance by the army to the Constitution, and the removal of all obstacles to the complete democratisation of Germany. When the speeches were over the demonstrators marched through the town, and were joined by soldiers from their barracks. The guard of the palace was disarmed, and cries of "Down with the Kaiser, Long live the Republic!" were raised. Eisner became Chairman of the Provisional Workers',

Soldiers', and Peasants' Council, which, on the following day, 8th November, announced the change of government to the world. "Bavaria is forthwith a Free State. A Government of the people will at once be installed. A Constituent Assembly, elected by all adult men and women, will be summoned as soon as possible. A new era dawns. Bavaria will prepare Germany for the League of Peoples. The democratic and social Republic of Bavaria has the moral force to obtain for Germany a peace which saves her from the worst. We rely on the active support of the whole population. All officials retain their posts." . . .

Within a day or two of the explosions in Kiel and Munich, Berlin joined the revolutionary movement and set the seal on its success. . . .

On the memorable 9th of November the Berlin workers were summoned from the factories during the breakfast hour, and poured into the streets. There were plenty of troops, machine-guns, and police in the city, but they were stricken with paralysis. Socialist emissaries hurried round the barracks, and received the assurance that under no circumstances would the soldiers shoot. The Chancellor was informed of their reply, and a special edition of *Vorwärts* announced his order that the military should make no use of their weapons. The time was now ripe for a change of government. A deputation from the Majority Socialists, led by Ebert and Scheidemann, visited the Chancellor's palace and found the Cabinet in session. As spokesman of the party, Ebert informed the Ministers that the people desired to take control of their fortunes; that the overwhelming majority of the population stood behind him; that resistance was impossible, as a large part of the garrison had joined the people. To the Chancellor's question whether he could answer for the maintenance of order, Ebert replied in the affirmative. The Chancellor now informed his visitors that he had just received a telegram announcing the abdication of the Kaiser. Prince Max then formally resigned the Chancellorship to Ebert, who promptly announced the event. . . .

## IX. IMPERIALISM



## 42. ECONOMIC TAPROOT OF IMPERIALISM<sup>1</sup>

[Modern Imperialism is essentially economic in nature and is a direct outcome of the Industrial Revolution. As productive capacity increased in industrial countries a surplus of goods and capital was created which sought relief in a program of colonial expansion. This condition has been brilliantly analyzed by the English economist, Mr. J. A. Hobson, from whose study of Imperialism the following selection is taken.]



NO mere array of facts and figures adduced to illustrate the economic nature of the new Imperialism will suffice to dispel the popular delusion that the use of national force to secure new markets by annexing fresh tracts of territory is a sound and a necessary policy for an advanced industrial country like Great Britain. It has indeed been proved that recent annexations of tropical countries, procured at great expense, have furnished poor and precarious markets, that our aggregate trade with our colonial possessions is virtually stationary, and that our most profitable and progressive trade is with rival industrial nations, whose territories we have no desire to annex, whose markets we cannot force, and whose active antagonism we are provoking by our expansive policy.

But these arguments are not conclusive. It is open to Imperialists to argue thus: "We must have markets for our growing manufactures, we must have new outlets for the investment of our surplus capital and for the energies of the adventurous surplus of our population; such expansion is a necessity of life to a nation with our great and growing powers of production.

<sup>1</sup> J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism* (James Pott and Co, New York, 1902), pp. 76-86. Reprinted by permission of James Pott and Co. (Condensed.)

An ever larger share of our population is devoted to the manufactures and commerce of towns, and is thus dependent for life and work upon food and raw materials from foreign lands. In order to buy and pay for these things we must sell our goods abroad. During the first three-quarters of the century we could do so without difficulty by a natural expansion of commerce with continental nations and our colonies, all of which were far behind us in the main arts of manufacture and the carrying trades. So long as England held a virtual monopoly of the world markets for certain important classes of manufactured goods, Imperialism was unnecessary. During the last thirty years this manufacturing and trading supremacy has been greatly impaired; other nations, especially Germany, the United States, and Belgium, have advanced with great rapidity, and while they have not crushed or even stayed the increase of our external trade, their competition is making it more and more difficult to dispose of the full surplus of our manufactures at a profit. The encroachments made by these nations upon our old markets, even in our own possessions, make it most urgent that we should take energetic means to secure new markets. These new markets must lie in hitherto undeveloped countries, chiefly in the tropics, where vast populations live capable of growing economic needs which our manufacturers and merchants can supply. Our rivals are seizing and annexing territories for similar purposes, and when they have annexed them close them to our trade. The diplomacy and the arms of Great Britain must be used in order to compel the owners of the new markets to deal with us: and experience shows that the safest means of securing and developing such markets is by establishing 'protectorates' or by annexation. The present value of these markets must not be taken as a final test of the economy of such a policy; the process of educating civilised needs which we can supply is of necessity a gradual one, and the cost of such Imperialism must be regarded as a capital outlay, the fruits of which posterity will reap. The new markets may not be large, but they form serviceable outlets for the overflow of our great textile and metal industries, and, when the vast Asiatic and African populations of the in-



terior are reached, a rapid expansion of trade may be expected to result.

"Far larger and more important is the pressure of capital for external fields of investment. Moreover, while the manufacturer and trader are well content to trade with foreign nations, the tendency for investors to work towards the political annexation of countries which contain their more speculative investments is very powerful. Of the fact of this pressure of capital there can be no question. Large savings are made which cannot find any profitable investment in this country; they must find employment elsewhere, and it is to the advantage of the nation that they should be employed as largely as possible in lands where they can be utilised in opening up markets for British trade and employment for British enterprise.

"However costly, however perilous, this process of imperial expansion may be, it is necessary to the continued existence and progress of our nation; if we abandoned it we must be content to leave the development of the world to other nations, who will everywhere cut into our trade, and even impair our means of securing the food and raw materials we require to support our population. Imperialism is thus seen to be, not a choice, but a necessity."

The practical force of this economic argument in politics is strikingly illustrated by the recent history of the United States. Here is a country which suddenly breaks through a conservative policy, strongly held by both political parties, bound up with every popular instinct and tradition, and flings itself into a rapid imperial career for which it possesses neither the material nor the moral equipment, risking the principles and practices of liberty and equality by the establishment of militarism and the forcible subjugation of peoples which it cannot safely admit to the condition of American citizenship.

Is this a mere wild freak of spread-eaglim, a burst of political ambition on the part of a nation coming to a sudden realisation of its destiny? Not at all. The spirit of adventure, the American "mission of civilisation," are, as forces making for Imperialism, clearly subordinate to the driving force of the

economic factor. The dramatic character of the change is due to the unprecedented rapidity of the industrial revolution in the United States during the last two decades. During that period the United States, with her unrivalled natural resources, her immense resources of skilled and unskilled labour, and her genius for invention and organisation, has developed the best equipped and most productive manufacturing economy the world has yet seen. Fostered by rigid protective tariffs, her metal, textile, tool, clothing, furniture, and other manufactures have shot up in a single generation from infancy to full maturity, and, having passed through a period of intense competition, are attaining, under the able control of great trustmakers, a power of production greater than has been attained in the most advanced industrial countries of Europe.

An era of cut-throat competition, followed by a rapid process of amalgamation, has thrown an enormous quantity of wealth into the hands of a small number of captains of industry. No luxury of living to which this class could attain kept pace with its rise of income, and a process of automatic saving set in upon an unprecedented scale. The investment of these savings in other industries helped to bring these under the same concentrative forces. Thus a great increase of savings seeking profitable investment is synchronous with a stricter economy of the use of existing capital. No doubt the rapid growth of a population, accustomed to a high and an always ascending standard of comfort, absorbs in the satisfaction of its wants a large quantity of new capital. But the actual rate of saving, conjoined with a more economical application of forms of existing capital, has exceeded considerably the rise of the national consumption of manufactures. The power of production has far outstripped the actual rate of consumption, and, contrary to the older economic theory, has been unable to force a corresponding increase of consumption by lowering prices.

This is no mere theory. The history of any of the numerous trusts or combinations in the United States sets out the facts with complete distinctness. In the free competition of manufactures preceding combination the chronic condition is one of

"over-production," in the sense that all the mills or factories can only be kept at work by cutting prices down towards a point where the weaker competitors are forced to close down, because they cannot sell their goods at a price which covers the true cost of production. The first result of the successful formation of a trust or combine is to close down the worse equipped or worse placed mills, and supply the entire market from the better equipped and better placed ones. This course may or may not be attended by a rise of price and some restriction of consumption: in some cases trusts take most of their profits by raising prices, in other cases by reducing the costs of production through employing only the best mills and stopping the waste of competition.

For the present argument it matters not which course is taken; the point is that this concentration of industry in "trusts," "combines," &c., at once limits the quantity of capital which can be effectively employed and increases the share of profits out of which fresh savings and fresh capital will spring. It is quite evident that a trust which is motivated by cut-throat competition, due to an excess of capital, cannot normally find inside the "trusted" industry employment for that portion of the profits which the trust-makers desire to save and to invest. New inventions and other economies of production or distribution within the trade may absorb some of the new capital, but there are rigid limits to this absorption. The trust-maker in oil or sugar must find other investments for his savings: if he is early in the application of the combination principles to his trade, he will naturally apply his surplus capital to establish similar combinations in other industries, economising capital still further, and rendering it ever harder for ordinary saving men to find investments for their savings.

Indeed, the conditions alike of cut-throat competition and of combination attest the congestion of capital in the manufacturing industries which have entered the machine economy. We are not here concerned with any theoretic question as to the possibility of producing by modern machine methods more goods than can find a market. It is sufficient to point out that the manu-

facturing power of a country like the United States may grow so fast as to exceed the demands of the home market. No one acquainted with trade will deny a fact which all American economists assert, that this is the condition which the United States has reached within the last few years, so far as the more developed industries are concerned. Her manufactures are saturated with capital and can absorb no more. One after another they are seeking refuge from the waste of competition in "combines" which secure a measure of profitable peace by restricting the quantity of operative capital. Industrial and financial princes in oil, steel, sugar, railroads, banking, &c., are faced with the dilemma of either spending more than they know how to spend, or forcing markets outside the home area. Two economic courses are open to them, both leading towards an abandonment of the political isolation of the past and the adoption of the imperialist methods in the future. Instead of shutting down inferior mills and rigidly restricting output to correspond with profitable sales in the home markets, they may employ their full productive power, applying their savings to increase their business capital, and, while still regulating output and prices for the home market, may "hustle" for foreign markets, dumping down their surplus goods at prices which would not be possible save for the profitable nature of their home market. So likewise they may employ their savings in seeking investments outside their country, first repaying the capital borrowed from Great Britain and other countries for the early development of their railroads, mines, and manufactures, and afterwards becoming themselves a creditor class to foreign countries.

It is this sudden demand for foreign markets for manufactures and for investments which is avowedly responsible for the adoption of Imperialism as a political policy and practice by the Republican party to which the great industrial and financial chiefs belong, and which belongs to them. The adventurous enthusiasm of President Roosevelt and his "manifest destiny" and "mission of civilisation" party must not deceive us. It is Messrs. Rockefeller, Pierpont Morgan, Hanna, Schwab, and their associates who need Imperialism and who are fastening it upon the

shoulders of the great Republic of the West. They need Imperialism because they desire to use the public resources of their country to find profitable employment for the capital which otherwise would be superfluous. . . .

The suddenness of this political revolution is due to the rapid manifestation of the need. During a period of ten years the United States has nearly trebled the value of its manufacturing export trade, and, if the rate of progress of the last few years continues, within this decade it will overtake our more slowly advancing export trade, and stand first in the list of manufacture-exporting nations.

This is the avowed ambition, and no idle one, of the keenest business men of America; and with the natural resources, the labor and the administrative talents at their disposal, it is quite likely that they will achieve their object. The stronger and more direct control over politics exercised in America by business men enables them to drive more quickly and more straightly along the line of their economic interests than in Great Britain. American Imperialism is the natural product of the economic pressure of a sudden advance of capitalism which cannot find occupation at home and needs foreign markets for goods and for investments.

The same needs exist in European countries, and, as is admitted, drive Governments along the same path. Over-production in the sense of an excessive manufacturing plant, and surplus capital which cannot find sound investments within the country, force Great Britain, Germany, Holland, France to place larger and larger portions of their economic resources outside the area of their present political domain, and then stimulate a policy of political expansion so as to take in the new areas. The economic sources of this movement are laid bare by periodic trade-depressions due to an inability of producers to find adequate and profitable markets for what they can produce. The Majority Report of the Commission upon the Depression of Trade in 1885 put the matter in a nut-shell. "That, owing to the nature of the times, the demand for our commodities does not increase at the same rate as formerly; that our capacity for

production is consequently in excess of our requirements, and could be considerably increased at short notice; that this is due partly to the competition of the capital which is being steadily accumulated in the country." The Minority Report straightly imputes the condition of affairs to "over-production." Germany is at the present time suffering severely from what is called a glut of capital and of manufacturing power: she must have new markets; her Consuls all over the world are "hustling" for trade; trading settlements are forced upon Asia Minor; in East and West Africa, in China and elsewhere the German Empire is impelled to a policy of colonisation and protectorates as outlets for German commercial energy.

Every improvement of methods of production, every concentration of ownership and control, seems to accentuate the tendency. As one nation after another enters the machine economy and adopts advanced industrial methods, it becomes more difficult for its manufacturers, merchants, and financiers to dispose profitably of their economic resources, and they are tempted more and more to use their Governments in order to secure for their particular use some distant undeveloped country by annexation and protection.

The process we may be told is inevitable, and so it seems upon a superficial inspection. Everywhere appear excessive powers of production, excessive capital in search of investment. It is admitted by all business men that the growth of the powers of production in their country exceeds the growth in consumption, that more goods can be produced than can be sold at a profit, and that more capital exists than can find remunerative investment.

It is this economic condition of affairs that forms the tap-root of Imperialism. If the consuming public in this country raised its standard of consumption to keep pace with every rise of productive powers, there could be no excess of goods or capital clamorous to use Imperialism in order to find markets: foreign trade would indeed exist, but there would be no difficulty in exchanging a small surplus of our manufactures for the food and raw material we annually absorbed, and all the savings

that we made could find employment, if we chose, in home industries.

#### 43. FINANCIAL IMPERIALISM IN EGYPT <sup>1</sup>

[The practice of governmental intervention to protect investors in the securities of backward states frequently terminates in the loss of political independence by the debtor country. The classic illustration of this feature of Imperialism is afforded by the experience of Egypt, where governmental extravagance, financed by excessive borrowing abroad, invited foreign supervision of the budget; and eventually, after European lives had been jeopardized by a native revolt, resulted in the establishment of a British protectorate.]



THE establishment of British control over Egypt was due to the most curious chain of unforeseen and unexpected events which even the records of the British Empire contain. Nominally a part of the Turkish Empire, Egypt had been in fact a practically independent state, paying only a small fixed tribute to the Sultan, ever since the remarkable Albanian adventurer, Mehemet Ali, had established himself as its Pasha in the confusion following the French occupation (1806). Mehemet Ali had been an extraordinarily enterprising prince. He had created a formidable army, had conquered the great desert province of the Soudan and founded its capital, Khartoum, and had nearly succeeded in overthrowing the Turkish Empire and establishing his own power in its stead: during the period 1825-40 he had played a leading rôle in European politics. Though quite illiterate, he had posed as the introducer of Western civilisation into Egypt; but his grandiose and expensive policy had imposed terrible burdens upon the *fellahin* (peasantry), and

<sup>1</sup> Ramsay Muir, *The Expansion of Europe* (Constable and Co., London, 1926), pp. 206-212. Reprinted by courtesy of the author and Constable and Co.

the heavy taxation which was necessary to maintain his armies and the spurious civilisation of his capital was only raised by cruel oppressions.

The tradition of lavish expenditure, met by grinding the peasantry, was accentuated by Mehemet's successors. It inevitably impoverished the country. Large loans were raised in the West, to meet increasing deficits; and the European creditors in course of time found it necessary to insist that specific revenues should be ear-marked as a security for their interest, and to claim powers of supervision over finance. The construction of the Suez Canal (opened 1869), which was due to the enterprise of the French, promised to bring increased prosperity to Egypt; but in the meanwhile it involved an immense outlay. At the beginning of our period Egypt was already on the verge of bankruptcy, and the Khedive was compelled to sell his holding of Suez Canal shares, which were shrewdly acquired for Britain by Disraeli.

But financial chaos was not the only evil from which Egypt suffered. There was administrative chaos also, and this was not diminished by the special jurisdictions which had been allowed to the various groups of Europeans settled in the country. The army, unpaid and undisciplined, was ready to revolt; and above all, the helpless mass of the peasantry were reduced to the last degree of penury, and exposed to the merciless and arbitrary severity of the officials, who fleeced them of their property under the lash. All the trading nations were affected by this state of anarchy in an important centre of trade; all the creditors of the Egyptian debt observed it with alarm. But the two powers most concerned were France and Britain, which between them held most of the debt, and conducted most of the foreign trade, of Egypt; while to Britain Egypt had become supremely important, since it now controlled the main avenue of approach to India.

When a successful military revolt, led by Arabi Pasha, threatened to complete the disorganisation of the country (1882), France and Britain decided that they ought to intervene to restore order, the other powers all agreeing. But at the last moment France withdrew, and the task was undertaken by



Britain single-handed. In a short campaign Arabi was overthrown; and now Britain had to address herself to the task of reconstructing the political and economic organisation of Egypt. It was her hope and intention that the work should be done as rapidly as possible, in order that she might be able to withdraw from a difficult and thankless task, which brought her into very delicate relations with the other powers interested in Egypt. But withdrawal was not easy. The task of reorganisation proved to be a much larger and more complicated one than had been anticipated; and it was greatly increased when the strange wave of religious fanaticism aroused by the preaching of the Mahdi swept over the Soudan, raised a great upheaval, and led to the destruction of the Egyptian armies of occupation. Britain had now to decide whether the revolting province should be reconquered or abandoned. Reconquest could not be effected by the utterly disorganised Egyptian army; if it was to be attempted, it must be by means of British troops. But this would not only mean a profitless expenditure, it would also indefinitely prolong the British occupation, which Britain was desirous of bringing to an end at the earliest possible moment.

The romantic hero, Gordon, was therefore sent to Khartoum to carry out the withdrawal from the Soudan of all the remaining Egyptian garrisons. On his arrival he came to the conclusion that the position was not untenable, and took no steps to evacuate. There was much dangerous delay and vacillation; and in the end Gordon was besieged in Khartoum, and killed by the bands of the Mahdi, before a relief force could reach him. But this triumph of Mahdism increased its menace to Egypt. The country could not be left to its own resources until this peril had been removed, or until the Egyptian army had been fully reorganised. So the occupation prolonged itself, year after year.

The situation was, in fact, utterly anomalous. Egypt was a province of Turkey, ruled by a semi-independent Khedive. Britain's chief agent in the country was in form only in the position of a diplomatic representative. But the very existence of the country depended upon the British army of occupation, and

upon the work of the British officers who were reconstructing the Egyptian army. And its hope of future stability depended upon the work of the British administrators, financiers, jurists, and engineers who were labouring to set its affairs in order. These officials, with Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) at their head, had an extraordinarily difficult task to perform. Their relations with the native government, which they constantly had to overrule, were difficult enough. But besides this, they had to deal with the agents of the other European powers, who, as representing the European creditors of the Egyptian debt, had the right to interfere in practically all financial questions, and could make any logical financial reorganisation, and any free use of the country's financial resources for the restoration of its prosperity, all but impossible.

Yet in the space of a very few years an amazing work of restoration and reorganisation was achieved. Financial stability was re-established, while at the same time taxation was reduced. The forced labour which had been exacted from the peasantry was abolished, they were no longer robbed of their property under the lash, they obtained a secure tenure in their land; and they found that its productive power was increased, by means of great schemes of irrigation. An impartial system of justice was organised—for the first time in all the long history of Egypt since the fall of the Roman Empire. The army was remodelled by British officers. Schools of lower and higher grade were established in large numbers. In short, Egypt began to assume the aspect of a prosperous and well-organised modern community. And all this was the work, in the main, of some fifteen years.

Meanwhile in the Soudan triumphant barbarism had produced an appalling state of things. It is impossible to exaggerate the hideousness of the régime of Mahdism. A ferocious tyranny terrorised and reduced to desolation the whole of the upper basin of the Nile; and the population is said to have shrunk from 12,000,000 to 2,000,000 although exact figures are of course unattainable. One of the evil consequences of this régime was that it prevented a scientific treatment of the flow of the

Nile, on which the very life of Egypt depended. Scientific irrigation had already worked wonders in increasing the productivity of Egypt, but to complete this work, and to secure avoidance of the famines which follow any deficiency in the Nile-flow, it was necessary to deal with the upper waters of the great river. On this ground, and in order to remove the danger of a return of barbarism, which was threatened by frequent Mahdist attacks, and finally in order to rescue captives who were enduring terrible sufferings in the hands of the Mahdi, it appeared that the reconquest of the Soudan must be undertaken as the inevitable sequel to the reorganisation of Egypt. It was achieved, with a wonderful efficiency which made the name of Kitchener famous, in the campaigns of 1896-98. The reconquered province was nominally placed under the joint administration of Britain and Egypt; but in fact the very remarkable work of civilisation which was carried out in it during the years preceding the Great War was wholly directed by British agents and officers.

#### 44. A TYPICAL BLANK TREATY <sup>1</sup>

[The process of African treaty making was interesting. Armed with bundles of blank treaty forms and fortified with copious supplies of gin and cheap presents, representatives of the Great Powers set out on treaty-making expeditions. The treaty given below is typical of the forms used by the Royal Niger Company in acquiring sovereign rights in the valley of the Niger. In fairness to the Company it should be noted that the gin bottle played a minor rôle in their diplomacy, although employed freely in other parts of Africa by England and her rivals.]



WE, the undersigned Chiefs of \_\_\_\_\_, with the view to the bettering of the condition of our country and people, do this day cede to the Royal Niger Company

<sup>1</sup> Sir Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty* (H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1894), Vol. I, pp. 467 ff.

(Chartered and Limited), for ever, the whole of our territory extending from

We also give to the said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) full power to settle all native disputes arising from any cause whatever, and we pledge ourselves not to enter into any war with other tribes without the sanction of the said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited).

We understand that the said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) have full power to mine, farm, and build in any portion of our country.

We bind ourselves not to have any intercourse with any strangers or foreigners except through the said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited).

In consideration of the foregoing, the said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) bind themselves not to interfere with any of the native laws or customs of the country, consistently with the maintenance of order and good government.

The said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) agree to pay native owners of land a reasonable amount for any portion they may require.

The said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) bind themselves to protect the said Chiefs from the attacks of any neighbouring aggressive tribes.

The said Royal Niger Company (Chartered and Limited) also agree to pay the said Chiefs \_\_\_\_\_ measures native value.


We, the undersigned witnesses, do hereby solemnly declare that the \_\_\_\_\_ Chiefs whose names are placed opposite their respective crosses have in our presence affixed their crosses of their own free will and consent, and that the said \_\_\_\_\_ has in our presence affixed his signature.

Done in triplicate at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 188 .


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This is an amusing representation of the Powers preparing to penetrate into China at the close of the nineteenth century. (A. B. Maurice and F. T. Cooper, *The History of the Nineteenth Century in Caricature*, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1904.)



This famous cartoon published in *Punch*, October 2, 1907, epitomizes the Convention of 1907 with respect to Persia. (Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of *Punch*.)




The Slave Trade




Ira Hiller

Conquest



Commerce  
(From *Nigerian Handbook*.)



Development  
(From *Nigerian Handbook*.)

## Declaration by Interpreter.

I, \_\_\_\_\_, of \_\_\_\_\_, do hereby solemnly declare that I am well acquainted with the language of the \_\_\_\_\_ country, and that on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of 188 \_\_\_\_\_, I truly and faithfully explained the above Agreement to all the Chiefs present, and that they understood its meaning.

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45. INDIRECT RULE <sup>1</sup>

[The establishment of European control over the primitive peoples of Africa raised many problems, none of more fundamental importance than that of administration. Speaking in general terms, three systems of control have evolved: direct rule which has been applied in most of the French colonies; settler rule which has grown up in those areas inhabited by a large number of Europeans; and indirect rule which was developed by Lord Lugard in Nigeria and since adopted in Tanganyika. The latter system has worked with marked success and possesses the advantage of preserving much that is good in native institutions.]



THE system of native administration generally adopted in the Protectorate of Nigeria is known as 'Indirect Administration,' and, based on several principles, is designed to adapt for the purposes of local government the tribal institutions which the native peoples have evolved for themselves, so that the latter may develop in a constitutional manner from their own past, guided and restrained by the traditions and sanctions which they have inherited, moulded or modified as they may be on the advice of British Officers, and by the general control of those officers. It is an essential feature of the

<sup>1</sup> Sir Donald Cameron, *The Principles of Native Administration and Their Application* (Lagos, 1934), pp. 1-5. (Condensed.)

system that, within the limitations and in the manner which will be discussed below, the British Government rules through these native institutions which are regarded as an integral part of the machinery of government (just as the Administrative Officers are an integral part of the machinery of government) with well-defined powers and functions recognised by Government and by law, and not dependent on the caprice of an executive officer.

The time is past when this system can be regarded as a sacred and mysterious art peculiar to Nigeria and understood only by a chosen few. Indirect Administration has become an everyday instrument of government and, after all, the conception is older than Nigeria, as Lord Lugard has himself pointed out. The novel element in Nigeria, at the beginning of the present century, was the bold manner in which the doctrine was employed, that is, in using for the purpose the Chiefs of an alien race whose forefathers had invaded and conquered the greater part of Northern Nigeria but a hundred years before; Chiefs who now, in their turn, had been overthrown by British arms. It was a wise step—if I may be bold enough to record my judgment on such a matter—and for that reason the name of Lugard will always be associated with Nigeria. . . .

The primary and compelling reason for the adoption of this system of Indirect Administration is not difficult to understand. . . . Nigeria is a large country and it has a large population. Its area is some 373,000 square miles, with an African population of some 19,300,000 including the Mandated Territory of the Cameroons. The Protectorate is divided into twenty-two provinces and eighty-five divisions, each of the latter with its own staff of Administrative Officers. Why must we have Administrative Officers in a country like Nigeria? They are not to be found in the Dominions or in the United Kingdom; the County of Surrey has no staff of Administrative Officers. The reason is, of course, that in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions the people are educated and have, through the course of many generations, imbibed the precepts of law and order which must regulate the conduct of a civilised people; they can



readily learn, through the newspapers and otherwise, the day to day acts and regulations of the Government which affect their lives. This is not so in the Protectorate of Nigeria, save in a very minor degree. Other means must therefore be found for communicating with primitive and ignorant peoples; we must in fact administer the people, whereas in the United Kingdom it is for the reason I have given sufficient to administer the law.

Now, there are over nineteen millions of Africans in the Protectorate and the Administrative staff numbers but 347 including those on leave, a proportion of from one-third to one-fourth. It must be self-evident that not every tribesman can be reached directly by an Administrative Officer and it was therefore necessary to seek some other instrument to complete the chain of communication as between the Government and the people of this vast dependency. What more natural than that we should use for the purpose—if we can find them—the tribal institutions of the people themselves? I mean by the term “tribal institution” the tribal authority which according to tradition and usage has in the past regulated the affairs of each unit of native society and which the people of to-day are willing to recognise and obey, if—I repeat the words again—if we can find it.

The system was introduced in Northern Nigeria early in the century by Sir F. (now Lord) Lugard for the same reason, roughly speaking. The number of officers available to administer the country more directly through an Administrative Service was altogether inadequate and there were no funds from which the staff could be augmented, conditions which continued for many years. As the system grew there was, naturally enough at first, a tendency to endeavour to place every unit possible under some Moslem Emir, a tendency which might well have been checked in later years when a much larger Administrative staff had become available. . . .

There are advantages to the people, of course, to be derived from the system of Indirect Administration, many of them already manifest in Nigeria. Everyone will doubtless subscribe to the proposition that it is our duty to do everything in our

power to develop the native politically on lines suitable to the state of society in which he lives. Our desire is to make him a good African, and we shall not achieve this if we destroy all the institutions, all the traditions, all the habits of the people, super-imposing upon them what we consider to be better administrative methods and better principles, but destroying everything that made the administration really in touch with the thoughts and customs of the people. We must not in fact destroy the African atmosphere, the African mind, the whole foundations of his race, and we shall certainly do this if we do not bring to the political application of the policy we have adopted a full understanding of its objects and an appreciation of the steps which we must take towards their fulfilment. When I write that our desire is to make the native "a good African" I mean that he should be trained in accordance with his environment instead of being given a European veneer totally out of keeping with the conditions under which he must live in Africa, where his home and people are. We want to make him proud of being an African (just as a Canadian is proud of being a Canadian) on the basis of a true African civilisation stimulated in the first instance by our own culture and example.

46. RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM IN PERSIA <sup>1</sup>

[By the Entente of 1907 England and Russia divided Persia into three zones: the northern becoming a Russian sphere of influence; the southern going to England under a similar arrangement; while the region lying between retained a most precarious independence. This arrangement, to quote from the preamble, was designed "to respect the integrity and independence of Persia." The extract which follows from the book written by Mr Morgan Shuster, the American financial adviser to the Persian Government, and whose efforts to give Persia an honest administration were thwarted by Russia and England, serves to illustrate the interpretation given by the Russians to the Agreement of 1907.]



ON December 24 a message was received from the Acting Governor at Tabriz, stating that the Russian troops stationed there had started to massacre the inhabitants. Shortly after this the Indo-European lines were cut (by bullets, it was afterwards alleged) and news ceased. Additional Russian troops were on the way to Tabriz from Julfa. The exact origin of the fighting at Tabriz is not clear. It was reported that some Russian soldiers claiming to be stringing a telephone wire, mounted the roof of the police headquarters about 10 o'clock at night, on December 20, were challenged by the Persian sentries, and replied with shots. Serious street fighting commenced the next morning, and continued for several days. The Acting Governor reported that the Russian troops indulged in terrible brutality, killing women and children in the streets and hundreds of other non-combatants. There were about 4,000 Russian troops and two batteries of artillery around the city. About 1,000 of the Tabriz fidais took refuge in an old citadel, called the "Ark." They were without artillery and poorly armed. The Russians

<sup>1</sup> W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (The Century Co., New York, 1920), pp. 216-223 Reprinted by courtesy of D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc.

bombarded the place for some time, killing a large number of the fidais. The superior numbers and the artillery of the Russians finally conquered, and there then ensued a period of terrorism during which no Persian's life or honor was safe. At one time Mons. Poklewski-Koziell, the Russian Minister at Teheran, telegraphed to the General in command of the Russian troops at Tabriz, telling him to stop fighting, as matters were being arranged at the capital. The General replied to the Minister that he (the former) took his orders from the Viceroy of the Caucasus at Tiflis, and not from Teheran.

On New Year's Day, which was the 10th of *Muharram*, a day of great mourning and held sacred in the Persian religious calendar, the Russian Military Governor, who had hoisted Russian flags over the Government buildings at Tabriz, hung the Sikutu'l-Islam, who was the chief priest of Tabriz, two other priests, and five others, among them several high officials of the Provincial Government. As one British journalist put it, the effect of this outrage on the Persians was that which would be produced on the English people by the hanging of the Archbishop of Canterbury on Good Friday. From this time on the Russians at Tabriz continued to hang or shoot any Persian whom they chose to consider guilty of the crime of being a "Constitutionalist." When the fighting there was first reported a prominent official of the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, in an interview to the press, made the statement that Russia would take vengeance into her own hands until the "revolutionary dregs" had been exterminated.

Many on reading this gruesome threat shuddered to recall Russian vengeance in Turkestan, where in 1881 Skobeloff massacred 8,000 defenseless Turcomans at Denghil Tepe on the principle that with Asiatics the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the number slain. And the fate of the Chinese settlement at Blagovestchenk on the Amoor, where in 1900, the Russians, desiring to strike terror into the Chinese and save trouble in dealing with them in the future, told the inhabitants that they should move. When the Chinese explained that they had no steamer or other means of conveyance, the Russian

humorists told them to move into the river, and thereupon drove the entire population into the water to drown.

With these incidents in mind it is not difficult to understand the semi-official *Novoe Vremya's* utterance that "in this case true humanity requires cruelty. The *whole population* of Tabriz must be held responsible and punished. . . . There is a limit even to Russian indulgence."

Experience has amply demonstrated that the Russian Government, having the power, never does *less* than it promises in cases of this kind. It is safe to say that the horrors of Tabriz will never become fully known. The Russians saw well to that. Unrestrained shootings, hangings, tortures, blowing of men from cannon, and the cynical butchery of women and children in the streets of their town—and even worse things—make a fair record for the officers and troops of a nation whose ruler promotes peace tribunals and poses as the friend of mankind.

One significant fact: at the same time that the fighting broke out at Tabriz, the Russian troops at Resht and Enzeli, hundreds of miles away, shot down the Persian police and many inhabitants without warning or provocation of any kind. And the date happened to be just after the Persian Cabinet had definitely informed the Russian Legation that all the demands of Russia's ultimatum were accepted,—a condition which the British Government had publicly assured the Persians would be followed by the withdrawal of the Russian invading forces, and which the Russian Government had officially confirmed, "*unless fresh incidents should arise* in the meantime to make the retention of the troops advisable."

In the light of these events is it probable that it was the comparatively helpless and foredoomed Persians who at Tabriz, Resht and Enzeli started simultaneous attacks upon vastly superior bodies of Russian soldiers?

47. RECENT CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE<sup>1</sup>

[The British Empire is the result of several centuries of empire-building. Its structure has been greatly altered during the post-war era and the relationship of its component parts to England is of primary importance. The selection which appears below is taken from a recent study by Professor Keith, long a foremost British authority on the Empire, and should serve to make clear to the student the nature of these many changes.]



THE events of the last ten years have seen a determined and successful effort to destroy the existing fabric of the Empire in order to assert the autonomy of the Dominions. The motive power has come from the three Dominions which in point of population are least British, if we restrict that term to cover English and Scottish. In 1931 Canadians of English race were reckoned at no more than 26.42 per cent of the population; the Scots were 12.97, the Irish 11.86, and the French 28.22. and . . . since 1931 the proportions had fallen in every case save the French. In the Irish Free State English and Scots form a negligible and declining minority, and in the Union of South Africa the racial predominance of the Dutch elements is unquestioned. These are the Dominions, moreover, where French, Irish, and Afrikaans compete with growing effect with English as a medium of everyday life. Canada, moreover, is naturally deeply affected by the political outlook of the great republic to the south, with which it is in the most intimate commercial, financial, and intellectual contact. The vital question of defence is simplified immensely for the Dominion by the existence of the Monroe Doctrine, which explains the refusal of the Dominion to make preparations for

<sup>1</sup> A. B. Keith, *The Governments of the British Empire* (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935), pp. 606-612. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

self-defence, and its complete lack of response to the suggestions of Australia in favour of Canadian co-operation in view of the risk of menace from the East, in special from Japan. On the other hand, the French-Canadian population is opposed to what might seem the natural policy of seeking inclusion in the United States; it fears that its language, its law, its religion, its culture, might fare as badly as have those of Louisiana. British elements in Canada value the British connection, and realise that, while within the Empire, Canada enjoys a more effective status than she would as an independent republic dwarfed by the United States. But even the British are unable to take interest in the affairs of Europe, sharing with the people of the United States an incapacity either to understand or to sympathise with the grave problems which the United Kingdom as part of the European system cannot evade.

In the Irish Free State hostility to the United Kingdom is the inevitable outcome of the long history of relations between England and Ireland. Unhappily for both countries, the existence of the Scots and English elements in Northern Ireland precludes the settlement on the lines of an Irish Republic eloquently urged by Mr de Valera in April 1935. Whether the United Kingdom would accept the project of a republic limited to the Irish Free State, it is impossible to say. The demand of the Free State for the reunion of the North precludes apparently an effective demand for republican status for the Free State area alone. The issue of defence adds further complication, though Mr de Valera has declared that a republican Government would guarantee to the United Kingdom complete security against any use of its territories or waters for purposes of hostile attacks.

In the Union the tradition of republicanism goes back to the beginning of British connection with the Cape. The hope that the generous treatment meted out to the Boers after the South African war might reconcile them to the sovereignty of the Crown has never been fulfilled, and the concessions made to Union autonomy have left a republican opposition which is rather likely to gain than to lose strength. Moreover, the Brit-

ish population has clearly lost of late leadership and direction, with the passing out of politics of its former chiefs, and in the United South African Nationalist Party the principles of the Nationalists have manifestly prevailed; the surrender of the British elements has been complete, save for a tiny remnant, now reorganised as the Dominion Party.

These three Dominions have successfully secured the disappearance of all that was formal in Imperial unity. The Union and the Free State have removed the British Government from any intervention between them and the King; the Canadian Government still uses the Signet in the appointment of the Governor-General and the Great Seal of the Realm in its treaty-making, but otherwise it recognises the old bonds of connection only in so far as its federal character renders necessary, namely in the amendment of the constitution and in the appeal to the Privy Council. The Free State has abolished the appeal; in the Union the power to abolish exists, and may soon be used.

No doubt, if the result of this plenitude of sovereign power were the desire to create real bonds of union, the situation would be gratifying. But, despite profuse assurances that freedom is the necessary prelude to co-operation, there has been vouchsafed no sign of the latter. The Minister of Defence of the Union has explained categorically that the Union cannot plan co-operation with the British Government in case of hostilities, as that might fetter its freedom to proclaim neutrality. Mr de Valera stressed in April 1935 the fact that he had not even been asked to participate in discussions of defence on the occasion of the King's Jubilee celebrations, which he felt bound to decline to attend. Nor is Canada prepared to adopt any arrangement with the United Kingdom which might fetter its right to refuse assistance in a British war. It is not denied that a British war would, under present circumstances, mean a war in defence of League of Nation ideals; but the Dominion regards the obligations imposed by the League as too onerous, and has endeavoured to have Article X. deprived of all substance.

All three Dominions have accepted the right to separate representation at foreign courts and have developed their dis-



tinct position in the League of Nations. In one field, however, they appreciate the advantages of co-operation, that of trade exchanges. They have come to realise that the British market has greater advantages than at one time appeared, and at Ottawa the unity of the Empire was revived to the extent that its units decided that they were entitled *inter se* to grant preferences to which foreign nations would have no claim despite the existence of most-favoured-nation clauses in treaties. Unfortunately, trade relations are apt to cause friction; the failure of Canada to afford better terms for British manufacturers, and Canadian demands which prevent the purchase of cheap lumber from Russia, afford reasons for doubting the permanent value of the Ottawa accord of 1932, from the point of view of the United Kingdom. But trade advantages, coupled with sentiment and the real advantages of political connection with a great power, unquestionably suggest the maintenance of the connection between Canada and the Union and the United Kingdom, so long at least as the United Kingdom is not engaged in a great European conflict.

Australia and New Zealand have significantly shown little desire to accept the Statute of Westminster; it is noteworthy that in the Commonwealth it is the Labour Party, which has a strong republican and anti-British element connected with it, which has shown most enthusiasm for autonomy, and which insisted on selecting an Australian to be Governor-General. Neither Dominion appoints diplomatic representatives overseas; both are deeply concerned with the danger of troubles arising in the Pacific and desire to work in effective combination with the British Government to secure their position. Hence the contributions of New Zealand to the naval base at Singapore and the Australian determination to maintain an effective if small fleet unit whose vessels will be fit for exchange with British ships. Newfoundland in her distress found no help in Canada, and her loyalty to the British connection has been signally rewarded.

In the dependent Empire strong reasons tell in favour of the maintenance of unity. Britain has been generous to the West Indian Islands, which could not stand by themselves and would

fare less well under United States control. In West and East Africa, despite the lamentable record of Kenya, British rule has been beneficial to the native races; it would be a misfortune if Northern Rhodesia were to fall under Union control, and even Southern Rhodesia would be a heavy loser by merger in a predominantly Afrikaans-speaking South Africa. The doctrine of trusteeship for native races is of far higher moral quality than that of domination and exploitation, however insidious may be the temptation to follow the latter. Ceylon can enjoy under British protection a degree of autonomy which would be denied to it otherwise. Mauritius, Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, and the Malay States are obviously gainers by British rule. The position of Gibraltar is determined by necessities of defence; in Malta there is the additional consideration that the vast mass of the population are not Italian by race, and that under the new British policy their language and culture are at last receiving due recognition.

India presents grave problems. Maintenance of effective British responsibility is inconsistent with political advance in Western style, and, without much consideration either of past history or of the present world position of democratic rule, the British Government is pledged to introduce British principles of self-government into India. This project, however, has been coupled with the idea of creating an Indian federation to include the Indian States which are governed by autocrats. It has seemed possible, by creating a federal legislature with disproportionate representation for the States, to secure a conservative central Government and legislature, thus minimising the risk of introducing responsible government in the provinces. The working of so complex and artificial a scheme must be awaited with interest. One unfortunate feature of the movement for self-government has been the demand in India for complete independence with separation from the British Crown. The demand has been asserted to be the logical concomitant of Dominion status as promised to India in 1929 and 1935 as its ultimate goal. There are obviously grave dangers in such an ideal for India, which is hardly likely to be able to preserve its inde-

pendence without British support. Unfortunately, the difficulties which attend relations between India and the Dominions, and which offer no possibility of solution in the only acceptable sense of affording free entry to Indian emigrants, render the presence of India in the Empire difficult to maintain permanently. On the other hand, the interests of the States point to their insistence on membership of the Empire as the essential condition of their own security.

#### 48. THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA <sup>1</sup>

[The steady encroachment of the powers on China produced a crisis in 1899, when the Boxer Rebellion broke out. While the relief expedition was being organized, John Hay, the American Secretary of State, wrote the following note to Ambassador Andrew D. White, which may be regarded as the official statement of the open door policy.]



Department of State,  
Washington, September 6, 1899

SIR: At the time when the Government of the United States was informed by that of Germany that it had leased from His Majesty the Emperor of China the port of Kiao-chao and the adjacent territory in the province of Shantung, assurances were given to the ambassador of the United States at Berlin by the Imperial German minister for foreign affairs that the rights and privileges insured by treaties with China to citizens of the United States would not thereby suffer or be in anywise impaired within the area over which Germany had thus obtained control.

More recently, however, the British Government recognized by a formal agreement with Germany the exclusive right of the

<sup>1</sup> United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1899), pp. 129-130.

latter country to enjoy in said leased area and the contiguous "sphere of influence or interest" certain privileges, more especially those relating to railroads and mining enterprises; but as the exact nature and extent of the rights thus recognized have not been clearly defined, it is possible that serious conflicts of interest may at any time arise not only between British and German subjects within said area, but that the interests of our citizens may also be jeopardized thereby.

Earnestly desirous to remove any cause of irritation and to insure at the same time to the commerce of all nations in China the undoubted benefits which should accrue from a formal recognition by the various powers claiming "spheres of interest" that they shall enjoy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation within such "spheres," the Government of the United States would be pleased to see His German Majesty's Government give formal assurances, and lend its cooperation in securing like assurances from the other interested powers, that each, within its respective sphere of whatever influence—

First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.

The liberal policy pursued by His Imperial German Majesty in declaring Kiao-chao a free port and in aiding the Chinese

Government in the establishment there of a custom-house [*sic*] so clearly in line with the proposition which this Government is anxious to see recognized that it entertains the strongest hope that Germany will give its acceptance and hearty support.

The recent ukase of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia declaring the port of Ta-lien-wan open during the whole of the lease under which it is held from China to the merchant ships of all nations, coupled with the categorical assurances made to this Government by His Imperial Majesty's representative at this capital at the time and since repeated to me by the present Russian ambassador, seem to insure the support of the Emperor to the proposed measure. Our ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg has in consequence been instructed to submit it to the Russian Government and to request their early consideration of it. A copy of my instruction on the subject to Mr. Tower is herewith inclosed for your confidential information.

The commercial interests of Great Britain and Japan will be so clearly served by the desired declaration of intentions, and the views of the Governments of these countries as to the desirability of the adoption of measures insuring the benefits of equality of treatment of all foreign trade throughout China are so similar to those entertained by the United States, that their acceptance of the propositions herein outlined and their cooperation in advocating their adoption by the other powers can be confidently expected. I inclose herewith copy of the instruction which I have sent to Mr. Choate on the subject.

In view of the present favorable conditions, you are instructed to submit the above considerations to His Imperial German Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to request his early consideration of the subject.

Copy of this instruction is sent to our ambassadors at London and at St. Petersburg for their information.

I have, etc.,

JOHN HAY

49. SINO-JAPANESE RIVALRY IN MANCHURIA <sup>1</sup>

[Beginning with the attack on China in 1894 and continuing until the present time, Japan has pursued a consistent policy of attempting to dominate China and strip her of her outlying possessions. This effort at Japanese expansion is a natural outgrowth of the imperialistic forces at work in Japan since the late nineteenth century. The extract which follows is written by Professor George H. Blakeslee, a leading American authority on Far Eastern affairs, and counselor to the American member of the Lytton Commission sent by the League of Nations to intervene in the struggle between China and Japan in December, 1931.]



JAPAN'S policy toward China, due in large part to the need for increased industrialization, has had two general aims: the development of an economic entente with China as a whole, and the maintenance of Japan's special position in Manchuria.

In its attempt to realize these aims Japan has alternated between friendship toward China and the use of force. The friendship policy, associated with the name of Baron Shidehara when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, was the official policy of the Japanese government in the summer of 1931, but an increasing conviction had developed in Japan that it was not bringing the desired results, especially in Manchuria. . . .

Manchuria is a great, fertile region only partially developed and settled. It had been universally recognized, before September 1931, to be a part of China; yet Japan and Russia had been granted within it exceptional, semi-sovereign rights.

Japan's rights and interests included the South Manchuria Railway, the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, mines and fac-

<sup>1</sup> George H. Blakeslee, *Conflicts of Policy in the Far East* (Foreign Policy Association and World Peace Foundation, New York, 1934), pp. 14-18. Reprinted by courtesy of the Foreign Policy Association and World Peace Foundation.

tories, and many concessions from Chinese authorities. Its total investments in 1931 were estimated to amount to over \$800,000,000. The Japanese regarded Manchuria as a source of raw materials, a market, and an advanced military post against Russia.

The main issue between Japan and China related to Japan's status in Manchuria. The Chinese naturally interpreted Japan's concessions strictly and wished eventually to terminate them. They were convinced that the Japanese wanted to take Manchuria away from them and were determined to prevent it. They therefore embarked on an ambitious plan to develop Manchuria themselves, especially by the construction of a number of new Chinese railroads, some of which would compete with the Japanese lines. The Japanese, however, as was equally natural, wished to maintain their position, and were resolved to defend it. An increasing number of them, too, were coming to feel that Japan should control Manchuria, either by military force, as some of the army circle wished, or by bringing it in some way under Japanese economic domination as was more generally desired. In fact the Japanese had come to call Manchuria the "life line of Japan," due to its relatively abundant natural resources. There was thus a fundamental clash between the policies of Japan and China.

During the summer of 1931 friction increased as an immediate result of the competition of the new Chinese railroads, and of the murder by Chinese troops of a Japanese captain, Nakamura, who was travelling in interior Manchuria under a passport which concealed his military status. The seriousness of the situation was realized during the latter part of the summer, and the Japanese Foreign Office, under Baron Shidehara, made efforts to bring about a diplomatic solution of the difficulties. But many Japanese army officers were working for a military settlement.

Following an explosion on or in the neighborhood of the Japanese South Manchuria Railway tracks near Mukden, on the evening of September 18, 1931, Japanese troops occupied within twenty-four hours the leading Chinese towns and cities in

southeastern Manchuria. Subsequent Japanese military movements led eventually to the occupation of most of Manchuria; to the creation, under Japanese leadership, of the independent state of Manchoukuo; and to the signature on September 15, 1932 of a protocol of close alliance between Japan and the new state. . . .

Immediately after the explosion, at the request of China and with the acquiescence of Japan, the Council of the League of Nations, which happened to be in session at the time, took jurisdiction of the Sino-Japanese issue. It made earnest but unsuccessful efforts to induce the Japanese to withdraw their troops in Manchuria within the South Manchuria Railway zone. On December 10, 1931 the Council unanimously passed a resolution providing for the appointment of a commission of five to study the Sino-Japanese controversy "on the spot." Lord Lytton of England was appointed Chairman; an American, Major General Frank R. McCoy, an experienced soldier-diplomat, was one of the other members. After an intensive study of the problem for over six months in Japan and China, including Manchuria, the Commission signed a report, generally known as the Lytton Report, which was published October 2, 1932.

As to Manchuria, the report stated that conditions previous to September 1931 were unsatisfactory, that both Chinese and Japanese were to blame, and that it would be undesirable to restore the *status quo ante*. But as to developments since the explosion, the Commission was forced by the evidence to find against the Japanese contentions on every essential point. The Commission's chief conclusions were: (1) the military action of the Japanese after the explosion on September 18, 1931 was not justified on the principle of self-defense; (2) the state of Manchoukuo was created primarily by Japanese and not by Chinese; (3) the inhabitants of Manchuria were in general opposed to Manchoukuo and regarded it as a Japanese government; and (4) the recognition and maintenance of Manchoukuo were in violation of the fundamental peace treaties.

As a solution, the Commission recommended that Manchuria should be made an autonomous region, under the sovereignty of



China, but with foreign advisers who should have adequate power to provide stability, protection and good government, and that a treaty should make provision for Japan's rights. This recommendation would have preserved the integrity of China and would have given to Japan all of the privileges which it had claimed before 1931.

This report was considered at length by the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, which attempted to bring about some settlement, but the Japanese government refused to accept any solution not based on the independence of Manchoukuo. A Committee of Nineteen, to which the issue was referred, endorsed the substance of the Lytton Report, and recommended further that all states should continue to refuse to recognize the new state of Manchoukuo. On February 24, 1933, the Assembly, by a vote of 42 to 1 (Japan) adopted this Report of the Committee of Nineteen; and on the following day the United States officially gave it its general approval and support. The world as a whole thus condemned Japan and recommended a solution which Japan refused to accept. Japan then announced its withdrawal from the League. . . .

In the meantime the Japanese have been consolidating their position in Manchuria. They have made considerable progress in suppressing the bandits and the Chinese patriot forces, but it will probably be some years before they can establish complete peace and security throughout the country. They are in control of the government of Manchoukuo. Although the Emperor Pu Yi, whose coronation took place on March 1, 1934, and the members of the Manchoukuo Cabinet are all either Chinese or Manchu, Japanese military and civil officials are able to dictate the policy and the action of the new state. The fiction of the independence of Manchoukuo is even more transparent than in the first months after its establishment.

The Japanese also have taken over the "big business" of the region. The former Chinese railroads have now all been placed under the administration of the Japanese South Manchuria Railway Company; and other public utilities—telegraph, telephone, power companies—have been so reorganized that Japa-

nese have the control. The rapid industrial development of the country, much of it officially directed, is largely carried out by Japanese capital and management. Improvements in administration, however, have been introduced. Of particular value is the establishment of a new Central Bank and a new uniform currency which is now displacing the various issues of the debased paper money used in the different parts of the country. An extensive program of railroad and automobile-road building has been undertaken, although some of the railroads appear to be of greater military than economic value.

Japan, in short, now controls Manchuria strategically, politically and economically. But it is giving the region a better administration. This control is exercised in part by the Japanese who are office holders and advisers in the Manchoukuo government, and in part by the Japanese army through a Japanese General who holds concurrently the posts of Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese military forces in Manchuria and Ambassador to Manchoukuo.

## **X. DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WORLD WAR**



## 50. THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY<sup>1</sup>

[One of the unsolved problems confronting democratic government is parliamentary control of foreign policy. Since diplomacy is conducted in secret, it is impossible for foreign ministers to take the people into their confidence, and they feel obliged to return evasive answers when questioned by their colleagues. The extract which follows is a unique and stimulating discussion of this important issue.]



ANOTHER question of fundamental importance to every student of diplomatic history is the question as to who determines policies and how far these are subject to control and revision. The student must determine as clearly as he can, the constitutional position of the foreign office. A knowledge of the relationship of the minister of foreign affairs to the crown on the one hand, and to parliament on the other is vital to any successful research in diplomatic affairs.

Here again the greatest differences both in the theory and the practice of different countries occur. Even in the same country it varies with each generation and not infrequently with successive ministers. The conduct of foreign affairs was, down to a relatively late period, regarded as the peculiar prerogative of the crown. The gradual emancipation of the foreign office from monarchical control constitutes one of the interesting institutional developments of democratic government. But in many countries royal control was replaced by an equally despotic control exercised by a small "junta" of the ministry. The absolut-

<sup>1</sup> W. E. Lingelbach, *Sources of Diplomatic History, The Crusades and Other Historical Essays*, presented to Dana C. Munro by his former students (F. S. Crofts and Co, New York, 1928), pp. 307-317. Reprinted by permission of F. S. Crofts and Co. (Condensed.)

ism of the crown made way for the despotism of the foreign office.

In England, down to the present day, treaties and conventions have been made without the consent or even the knowledge of the House of Commons being necessary. Criticizing the government's Russian policy in 1908, Lord Curzon described the general situation admirably:

We concede, and I think rightly concede in this country a wide and almost unlimited discretion in treaty-making to our governments. They conduct their negotiations in absolute secrecy. Parliament knows little of what is going on, and the public know less. From time to time a minister with artless candour may lift a corner of the veil and disclose the ravishing beauty of the object behind. In the present case we were denied even that privilege. The government has, it is true, power to consult, or not to consult, experts as they please. I think it hardly possible that they have done so in the present instance. They can sign a treaty at any moment they please, and I have noticed as a rather remarkable coincidence that treaties have a habit of being signed a few days after the rising of the House of Commons. In that way immunity from parliamentary criticism for at least six months is secured.

Frequent efforts to reform this condition have occurred. In 1886 the discussion precipitated a long debate on the subject. Since the war the demands have become more numerous, reaching a climax in the debate in 1925 on Mr. Trevelyan's motion which reads in part as follows:—

That no treaty shall be ratified and no diplomatic arrangement or understanding with a Foreign State involving, directly or indirectly, national obligations, shall be concluded without the consent of Parliament, and no preparations for co-operation in war between the naval, military, or air staffs, and the naval, military, or air staffs of a Foreign State shall be lawful unless consequent upon such arrangement or understanding; and this resolution shall be communicated to all States with which this country is in diplomatic relations and to the League of Nations.

Of course, the motion was lost; no one expected it to pass.

On the other hand if this reticence prevails in so important a matter as treaties, it is hardly to be expected that parliament would be adequately informed as to the steps in the negotiations, or on those subtler obligations growing out of conversations or

correspondence between ministers. A recent illustration of the working of the system is seen in the Grey-Cambon Letters, which, in 1912, finally incorporated in writing the relations between France and England, established by the military conversations begun seven years before, and carried on during most of the period without the knowledge of the cabinet or parliament. A record of the first conversation was sent to three of the ministers, and a fourth was told about it. The rest of the cabinet was not informed, according to the secretary's own statement, because of the exigencies of the elections, and because, after all, the ministers were quite inexperienced in such matters. Parliament and the country continued in ignorance. Suspicious ones in parliament asked questions but failed to elicit a satisfactory reply. Not until August 3, 1914, two years later when the war had started, did Grey inform the Commons and the country. Even then he omitted to read the last sentence of his own letter which reads as follows: "If those measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the governments would then decide what effect should be given them." But events moved rapidly. The following day Viviani read the two letters including the last sentence to the Chamber of Deputies and published them in the *Yellow Book*.

In France there is a committee on foreign affairs, but there is little evidence that it has exercised serious control over the policies of the Quai d'Orsay. By Article VIII of the Organic Law "The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies treaties. He communicates them to the Chambers as soon as the interests and safety of the state permit." This manifestly places in his hands the right to determine when the "interests of the state" make it wise for him to inform the legislature of conventions and treaties he may have negotiated. True, treaties of peace and commerce do not become definitive until they have been voted by the two chambers. But as everyone knows these are not the treaties that really matter.

In the debates in 1911 on the German accord of that year, Maurice Dancour introduced a motion asking the foreign minister to prepare a *Yellow Book* on the subject. The debate, he

claimed, could not proceed intelligently without the information the *Yellow Book* would give. Foreign Minister de Selves and Premier Caillaux objected. They must first obtain the consent of foreign governments before publishing certain of the documents. Of course, the debate on the treaty took place without the *Yellow Book*, the government assuring the chamber that it would publish it as soon as its hands were free, "aussitôt qu'il a dependue de lui."

The deputies like the members of the other lower houses have, of course, the right to ask questions. Article 48 of the rules deals with the problem and the concluding paragraph says:

Les ministres ont la faculté de déclarer par écrit que l'intérêt public leur interdit de répondre ou, à titre exceptionnel, qu'il réclament un délai pour rassembler les éléments de leur réponse.

Such rules give little encouragement to the members to occupy themselves with foreign affairs. A careful count made in connection with this study shows that 5,424 questions *écrites* were asked from April, 1910 to April, 1914. In June and July, 1914, during the brief session following the general election and just before the war, 338 more came in.

Strange as it may seem, however, only a small number were addressed to the foreign minister, and of these, all but a few had to do with minor questions. On November 26, 1912, M. Brisson asked the foreign minister to tell the chambers "to what France is engaged by the terms of the secret treaty of alliance between France and Russia, and by those of the Franco-English *Entente*." The minister's reply was that "the government cannot reply to this question." A week later Camille Reboul asked the foreign minister "whether he could make known the claims and the consequences of the treaty of alliance with Russia." He received the same reply. In connection with the interpellations in March 1911, Deputy Jaurès declared:

It is a scandalous and monstrous thing that today in the European and world-wide civilization, there are secret treaties between two great peoples which may be in contradiction to the will of the people themselves and to the stipulations of public law.



In an interesting debate in March, 1912, Jacques Pion of the Right pointed out that five secret treaties had been made between 1902 and 1909, and that the one with Italy was still secret.

As for imperial Germany, there existed, among other insignificant checks, a consultative committee on foreign affairs in the federal council presided over by Bavaria. But its control over the determination of policy was quite unimportant. The emperor exercised autocratic power in the conduct of foreign affairs, although in practice a great deal of latitude seems to have been left for considerable intervals, at least, to the chancellor and influential persons like "his gray Eminence, Holstein," in the foreign office. Every now and then the erratic eruption of the imperial prerogative makes its appearance. The outstanding examples, are of course, the *Daily Telegraph* interview and the Kruger telegram. Another, rather less known, but more eloquent on the subject of the Kaiser's petulant and dangerous intrusions into the affairs of the foreign office appears in the extraordinary marginal comments on the documents relating to the Serbian crisis during the fateful days of July 1914. Against the statement that his ambassador at Vienna had urged moderation on Austria, he wrote "Who authorized him to do this?" On Lichnowsky's dispatch from London the Kaiser's irritation finds expression in such drastic phrases as "the Serbs must be finished as soon as possible." "Serbia's national dignity does not exist." . . . "The question has nothing to do with Grey; it is his Majesty Francis Joseph's affair. What colossal British impudence."

The despotic, almost capricious, management of Austria-Hungary's foreign affairs before the World War is well known. Berchtold's delay in order to prevent Germany's suggestions that Austria moderate her policy, from reaching Francis Joseph while there was still time to act, was exposed soon after the war. Neither the Austrian nor the Hungarian parliaments had anything to do with the minister's policy and the delegations left matters too much to the ministers and the ruler. Berchtold's action is interesting, however, as an outstanding example of the

power possessed by foreign ministers and executives to create a situation which may make war inevitable.

In the United States we flatter ourselves that we have a constitution more or less fool proof on this score. We have a senate committee on foreign affairs and a senatorial veto on diplomatic appointments. But as every student of American diplomatic history knows, the sphere of executive action is very wide. Again and again in our history very serious conditions have been created by the president and the department of state; gentlemen's agreements have been made, conventions like that with Santo Domingo, and actual usurpations as in the case of Panama, have been executed without consulting even the senate committee on foreign relations. Commenting on the San Domingo affair Mr. Roosevelt said, "The Constitution did not exactly give me power to bring about the necessary agreement with San Domingo But the Constitution did not forbid what I did. I put the agreement into effect and I continued its execution for two years before the Senate acted; and I would have continued it to the end of my term if necessary without any action by Congress." If there is any doubt as to the seriousness of the subject, it will surely be quickly dispelled by a perusal of the terms of the understanding with Japan in 1905, as revealed in the Roosevelt-Lodge papers.

According to these, President Roosevelt in 1905, through his personal representative, definitely assured the prime minister of Japan, Count Katsura, of our cooperation with Great Britain, and Japan in the Far East. An "agreed memorandum" of the understanding was formally endorsed on July 31 by the president as follows: "Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura that I confirm every word you said." Our ambassador to Japan, Mr. Lloyd C. Griscom, was not informed, nor did the senate committee on foreign relations know anything about it. On the latter the president expressed himself forcibly on May 6: "As to what you say about the alliance, the trouble is, my dear Kennan, that you are speaking academically. Have you followed some of my experiences in endeavoring to get treaties through

the Senate? I might just as well strive for the moon as for such a policy as you indicate. . . ."

Nevertheless, he committed the nation to a definite policy to which he would have been morally bound to adhere as long as he was in office, whether congress or the nation approved of it or not. Altogether the memorandum constitutes one of the most remarkable executive agreements in American history. . . .

In general it can be taken for granted that the control of foreign affairs by parliament is very slight. Apart from the fact that in most governments the executive is now elected either directly or indirectly by the people, the footprints of democracy are rarely found in the exclusive and jealously guarded preserve of the foreign office. Even conventions and treaties which furnish the student with so much satisfactory source material, cannot be read in the light of parliamentary origin and control. The same is true of the other phases of the foreign policies of different countries. The foreign minister usually acts first and tells parliament afterwards, that is, if he tells at all. What diplomats do not tell would make interesting reading. At any rate when parliament or congress get the information, a *fait accompli* has usually been established which it almost must accept. . . .

In the light of the extreme gravity of the issues involved, issues charged with potential tragedy in the life of nations, it is extraordinary that with all the boasted march of democracy this impenetrable veil is still interposed by mutual consent between the elected representatives of the people and the ministers to whom alone is vouchsafed "to open and shut the doors of the Temple of Janus."

51. THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN<sup>1</sup>

[The Congress of Berlin sought to do more than formulate a peace treaty; it attempted to solve the Eastern Question and prevent a general European war. Ultimately it failed to do either, but did attain its immediate objectives. The Congress is interesting, also, as an illustration of the Concert of Europe in action.]



AMONG the great historic assemblies of its kind, the Congress of Berlin had the most restricted sphere of action. Unlike the Congress of Vienna, it undertook no general reconstruction of Europe; even more than the Congress of Paris, it held itself—officially, at least—to the consideration of one clearly defined group of questions. But if the issues in 1878 were fewer, they were, perhaps, more complex and difficult than on these former occasions. The Congress of Berlin was called to regulate the thorniest and most dangerous question in the whole range of European politics—the Eastern Question; and that at the end of the worst cataclysm which that question had yet produced. Its task was the more delicate because, unlike the preceding congresses, it was not convoked at the close of a general European war, which left one or more of the great Powers defeated and begging for peace, and the rest of them exhausted by their exertions and therefore inclined to compromise. In 1878 the only one of the great Powers that had just been at war, emerged from the contest flushed with triumph; the other great Powers appeared at the Congress with their strength fresh and unimpaired, and several of them were armed and in no mood for tame submission. The Congress of Berlin was called, therefore, not so much to end one war as to avert another. Its office was to dictate terms to the victors rather than to the van-

<sup>1</sup> C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer, R. H. Lord, *Three Peace Congresses of the Nineteenth Century* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1919), pp. 47-53. Reprinted by courtesy of Harvard University Press.

quished. It is notable as the only occasion in the nineteenth century when the Concert of the Powers has been strong enough to bring a victorious belligerent to the bar of Europe and oblige him to submit the results of his victory to the judgment and revision of a congress. As an affirmation of the solidarity of Europe, of the principle that important changes in Europe are matters of European concern and not to be effected without the sanction of Europe, the Congress of Berlin is a unique and striking phenomenon. But as a demonstration that the councils of united Europe are inspired with wisdom, justice, or even common sense, the events of 1878 are not so gratifying. Even more than its predecessors, the Congress of Berlin has left a dubious reputation. On the one hand, its work has been lauded as the wisest diplomatic transaction of modern times; but, on the other hand, it has been said that "no diplomatic performance has ever resulted in such general dissatisfaction."

As everyone knows, the meeting of the Congress of Berlin was the result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 and of the ensuing diplomatic intervention of the other Powers. Russia had undertaken that war in the name of justice and humanity, in the spirit of a crusade. After the Bosnian revolt and the massacres in Bulgaria, after the Concert of Europe had failed pitifully in its effort to obtain from the Turks, by diplomatic means, serious reforms and guarantees against further outrages in the future, Russia alone had had the courage to draw the sword in order to end an intolerable situation. Her enterprise might fairly be called the most just and necessary war undertaken in Europe in the nineteenth century. At the close of the struggle, while announcing that the other Powers should have a voice in the final resettlement of the Balkans, Russia felt herself entitled—and, indeed, obliged—to impose a preliminary treaty of peace upon her prostrate adversary. It is difficult to see how she could have done otherwise. For, since the main cause of the war had been the persistent refusal of the Porte to defer to the will of Europe, it was impossible to terminate hostilities without securing binding guarantees that in the impending negotiations for a final settlement the will of Europe

would not again be thwarted by the obstinacy of the Turks. It is true that some objections may be raised to the precise terms of the treaty. The boundaries of the new Bulgaria, while conforming in the main to the best ethnographic information then available, were too extensive. The treatment of Rumania was somewhat ungenerous. The provisions with regard to the western half of the Balkan Peninsula could not have lasted long; indeed, they were not intended to, but Russia was precluded from attempting a permanent settlement in that half of the peninsula by regard for the wishes of Austria. But, allowing for the circumstances of the moment and the avowedly provisional character of the instrument, one may accept without too much qualification the recent dictum of an English writer that "the Treaty of San Stefano was the wisest measure ever prepared for the pacification of the Balkan Peninsula." Had the other Powers been actuated only by disinterestedness, moderation, and foresight, they would then have assembled in congress resolved, at the least, to confirm the essential arrangements of San Stefano, to stipulate analogous arrangements for the western half of the peninsula, and to provide for the collective guardianship of Europe over the organization and free development of the liberated nations.

Even before the Treaty of San Stefano—before the outbreak of the war, in fact—Russia had repeatedly promised that the definitive settlement of all questions of general European interest arising out of the war should be effected with the participation of all the Powers. When Austria, in February, 1878, proposed that this participation should take the form of a conference, the Tsar readily assented. Soon afterwards it was agreed that in order to lend greater solemnity to the proceedings, the assembly should be raised to the dignity of a congress; all the Powers were to be represented by their leading ministers; and the place of meeting was fixed at Berlin, as the seat of a government assumed to be disinterested and impartial.

But it was impossible to go into the Congress without a preliminary agreement among the Powers as to the basis and nature of the work to be done there. Although the assumption

has recently been made in some quarters that a peace congress may work effectively without any understanding in advance as to the fundamental questions at issue, still everyone familiar with politics knows that public and formal discussions cannot be conducted with any hope of a successful outcome, unless an agreement on the chief questions has previously been arrived at. History shows that conferences and congresses have almost invariably met for the purpose of registering decisions the substance of which has been agreed upon beforehand.

In 1878 the meeting of the Congress was very nearly prevented by the difficulties that arose in the way of such a preliminary understanding. The fundamental question was whether the task of the future Congress should be to confirm and complete the solution of the Eastern Question outlined at San Stefano, or whether it should undertake to tear up that treaty and to "annihilate the results of the war." The latter course would doubtless have suited the wishes of England and Austria. For, unfortunately, the British government was still obsessed with the traditional chimæra of maintaining the independence and integrity of Turkey, not, indeed, for love of the Turks, but because the vital needs of the British empire were supposed to require it. The court of Vienna was eager to make acquisitions without having done anything to deserve them, and also ambitious to substitute itself for Russia as the dominant Power in the Balkans. Hence for three months the meeting of the Congress was postponed, and the peace of Europe seemed to tremble in the balance, while England, Austria, and Russia were diplomatically fencing, trying each other out to see how far each would go in defence of his particular standpoint. How serious the danger of war was, it is difficult to estimate, for undoubtedly there was a good deal of "bluffing" on all sides. At any rate, it was Russia who first showed signs of weakening. Exhausted by the unexpectedly arduous struggle she had just undergone, ill-prepared to risk a new war in which she would presumably have found England, Austria, Turkey, and Rumania arrayed against her, disappointed, too, in the hope of receiving any effective support from Germany—despite the assurances of undying

gratitude and unstinted devotion which Bismarck and his master had so often lavished upon the Tsar—Russia at length turned to her principal opponent, England, with the offer to sacrifice a large part of the Treaty of San Stefano. The outcome of the negotiation was the three secret Anglo-Russian conventions, signed at London on May 30, which contained the most important features of the later Treaty of Berlin. It was to the credit of both sides that each had made large concessions: it was not so creditable, however, that they sought to keep their agreements from the knowledge of the other cabinets (save Germany). If it was essential to the success of the Congress that the two states principally interested should come to a working agreement in advance, it was at least highly desirable that the discussions of the Congress should not be turned into a farce, and the other Powers led into grave miscalculations or suspicions, by sham debates over questions already clandestinely decided.

## 52. THE DUAL ALLIANCE OF 1879<sup>1</sup>

[The long standing friendship between Bismarck and Russia waned for a few years after the Congress of Berlin. Confronted by a hostile Russia, Bismarck was anxious to consummate an alliance with Austria before Andrassy relinquished control of foreign policy. While his bargain with Austria was in some respects unsatisfactory, it did assure him an ally in case Russia supported France in a war against Germany.]



### TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND GERMANY, OCTOBER 7, 1879

**ARTICLE I.** Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the ~~two~~ High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other

<sup>1</sup> A. F. Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1920), Vol I, pp. 27-31. Reprinted by courtesy of Harvard University Press.






This famous cartoon by Tenniel appeared in *Punch* in March, 1890, after the news of Bismarck's retirement. It portrays the new captain, William II, watching the old pilot leave the ship of state. (A. B. Maurice and F. T. Cooper, *The History of the Nineteenth Century in Caricature*, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1904.)


The fundamental reason for the failure of the Hague Conference to result in effective action with respect to the reduction of armaments is clearly revealed by this cartoon published in *Punch*, March 13, 1907. (Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of *Punch*.)





Waterloo

(Reprinted from *The Book of History* by permission of The Grolier Society, Inc., publishers.)



Mechanization of Warfare

(From *First World War*, edited by L. Stallings, published by Simon and Schuster, New York. Reprinted by permission of Otto Kurth.)

THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement.

*Article II.* Should one of the High Contracting Parties be attacked by another Power, the other High Contracting Party binds itself hereby, not only not to support the aggressor against its high Ally, but to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude towards its fellow Contracting Party.

Should, however, the attacking party in such a case be supported by Russia, either by an active cooperation or by military measures which constitute a menace to the Party attacked, then the obligation stipulated in Article I of this Treaty, for reciprocal assistance with the whole fighting force, becomes equally operative, and the conduct of the war by the two High Contracting Parties shall in this case also be in common until the conclusion of a common peace.

*Article III.* The duration of this Treaty shall be provisionally fixed at five years from the day of ratification. One year before the expiration of this period the two High Contracting Parties shall consult together concerning the question whether the conditions serving as the basis of the Treaty still prevail, and reach an agreement in regard to the further continuance or possible modification of certain details. If in the course of the first month of the last year of the Treaty no invitation has been received from either side to open these negotiations, the Treaty shall be considered as renewed for a further period of three years.

*Article IV.* This Treaty shall, in conformity with its peaceful character, and to avoid any misinterpretation, be kept secret by the two High Contracting Parties, and only communicated to a third Power upon a joint understanding between the two Parties, and according to the terms of a special Agreement.

The two High Contracting Parties venture to hope, after the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the meeting at Alexandrovo, that the armaments of Russia will not in reality prove to be menacing to them, and have on that account no reason for making a communication at present; should, however, this hope, contrary to their expectations, prove to be erroneous, the two High Contracting Parties would consider it their loyal

obligation to let the Emperor Alexander know, at least confidentially, that they must consider an attack on either of them as directed against both.

*Article V.* This Treaty shall derive its validity from the approbation of the two Exalted Sovereigns and shall be ratified within fourteen days after this approbation has been granted by Their Most Exalted Majesties.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty with their own hands and affixed their arms.

Done at Vienna, October 7, 1879.

ANDRÁSSY  
L.S.

H. VII v. REUSS  
L.S.

### 53. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE OF 1882<sup>1</sup>

[Italy became the partner of Germany and Austria on May 20, 1882, when the following treaty was signed by representatives of the three powers. Angered by the French seizure of Tunis, and fearful of French intervention on behalf of the Pope, the Italians took the initiative in seeking an alliance with Germany.]



*ARTICLE I.* The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and will enter into no alliance or engagement directed against any one of their States.

They engage to proceed to an exchange of ideas on political and economic questions of a general nature which may arise, and they further promise one another mutual support within the limits of their own interests.

*Article II.* In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other Contracting Parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to the Party attacked.

<sup>1</sup> A. F. Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1920), Vol. I, pp. 65 ff. Reprinted by courtesy of Harvard University Press.

This same obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of any aggression without direct provocation by France against Germany.

*Article III.* If one, or two, of the High Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on their part, should chance to be attacked and to be engaged in a war with two or more Great Powers nonsignatory to the present Treaty, the *casus foederis* will arise simultaneously for all the High Contracting Parties.

*Article IV.* In case a Great Power nonsignatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its Ally.

*Article V.* If the peace of any of the High Contracting Parties should chance to be threatened under the circumstances foreseen by the preceding Articles, the High Contracting Parties shall take counsel together in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to eventual cooperation.

They engage henceforward, in all cases of common participation in a war, to conclude neither armistice, nor peace, nor treaty, except by common agreement among themselves.

*Article VI.* The High Contracting Parties mutually promise secrecy as to the contents and existence of the present Treaty.

*Article VII.* The present Treaty shall remain in force during the space of five years, dating from the day of the exchange of ratifications.

*Article VIII.* The ratifications of the present Treaty shall be exchanged at Vienna within three weeks, or sooner if may be.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Vienna, the twentieth day of the month of May of the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two.

KÁLNOKY  
L.S.

H. VII OF REUSS  
L.S.

C. ROBILANT  
L.S.

#### 54. THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN MILITARY CONVENTION <sup>1</sup>

[The Military Convention which follows marked the successful culmination of French efforts to form a definite alliance with Russia. It was not made public until 1918. The text was kept in an envelope on which the French President had written: "The Military Convention is accepted by the letter of M. de Giers giving to the Convention the force of a treaty."]



FRANCE and Russia, being animated by a common desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against the one or the other of them, have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to fight Germany.

2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of one of the Powers composing it, should mobilize, France and Russia, at the first news of the event and without a previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces and shall move them as close as possible to their frontiers.

3. The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men.

<sup>1</sup> *Documents diplomatiques. L'Alliance franco-russe* (Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1918), No. 71, p. 92. (Translated)

These forces shall engage to the full, with all speed, in order that Germany may have to fight at the same time on the East and on the West.

4. The General Staffs of the Armies of the two countries shall cooperate with each other at all times in the preparation and facilitation of the execution of the measures above foreseen.

They shall communicate to each other, while there is still peace, all information relative to the armies of the Triple Alliance which is or shall be within their knowledge.

Ways and means of corresponding in times of war shall be studied and arranged in advance.

5. France and Russia shall not conclude peace separately.

6. The present Convention shall have the same duration as the Triple Alliance.

7. All the clauses above enumerated shall be kept rigorously secret.

Signature of the Minister :

Signature of the Minister :

General Aide-de-Camp,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Signed: Obrucheff

General of Division,  
Councillor of State,  
Sub-Chief of the General Staff  
of the Army,  
Signed: Boisdeffre

55. THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE <sup>1</sup>

[During the last two decades of the nineteenth century colonial rivalry between England and France became intense. This rivalry reached a climax in the Fashoda Crisis of 1898. Within six years these historic enemies became friends and concluded the Entente of 1904. The most important reason for this diplomatic revolution was the German Naval Program, which threatened England's position at sea and forced her to seek the friendship of France.]



*ARTICLE I.* His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner, and that they give their assent to the draft Khedivial Decree annexed to the present arrangement, containing the guarantees considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the Powers signatory of the Convention of London of 1885. . . .

*Article 2.* The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

<sup>1</sup> *Parliamentary Papers*, 1911, Vol. CIII, Cmd. 5969.



They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901

*Article 3.* His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of Coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels

*Article 4.* The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

*Article 5.* His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the service.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.

*Article 6* In order to ensure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of article 8 of that treaty will remain in abeyance.

*Article 7* In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

*Article 8.* The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government.

The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

*Article 9.* The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

In witness whereof his Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His

Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, duly authorised for that purpose, have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

(L.S.) LANSDOWNE

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON

#### SECRET ARTICLES

*Article 1.* In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other by articles 4, 6, and 7 of the Declaration of today's date would remain intact.

*Article 2.* His Britannic Majesty's Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, or in the judicial organisation of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilised Countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

*Article 3.* The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other *présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of articles 4 and 7 of the Declaration of today's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole,

or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

*Article 4.* If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the arrangement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of today's date, would be none the less at once applicable.

*Article 5.* Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree mentioned in article 1 of the Declaration of today's date not be obtained, the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repayment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged, and Unified Debts after the 15th July, 1910.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

(L.S.) LANSDOWNE

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON

## 56. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE <sup>1</sup>

[In 1907 the Triple Entente was established when England and Russia concluded treaties which adjusted outstanding issues in the Middle East. The treaty which dealt with Persia was the most important, and its terms are given below. The Powers recognized the territorial integrity of Tibet under Chinese suzerainty and agreed on a policy of "hands off." Afghanistan was declared to be outside of Russia's sphere of influence, and England agreed not to annex or occupy the country so long as the Ameer fulfilled his obligations.]



### AGREEMENT CONCERNING PERSIA

THE Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as

<sup>1</sup> *Parliamentary Papers*, 1908, Vol. CXXV, Cmd. 3750.

the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms:—

## I.

Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

## II.

Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

## III.

Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

## IV.

It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement.

## V.

In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II

of the present Agreement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Agreement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter before-hand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Agreement.





## XI. THE WORLD WAR



## 57. THE COMING OF THE WAR <sup>1</sup>

[Historians have engaged in endless controversy since the close of the war over the question of responsibility and are still hopelessly divided on many points at issue. The following summary of the events of July and early August, 1914, does not attempt to settle the dispute but gives the reader a fair and unbiased account of the crisis as it developed from day to day.]



ON Friday morning, July 24, Europe was greeted on waking by news of the ultimatum. Here, everyone realized, was a crisis, a grave crisis. Generals, statesmen, rulers scurried back from vacations. Chancelleries became feverishly active. In the days following, activity became ever more frantic as the shadow of war loomed darker and nearer. Worn by lack of sleep, by efforts to follow the shifting scene, by dread of responsibility for war, worn to hysteria, grave self-contained statesmen contradicted themselves from hour to hour, talked wildly, did very foolish things. In the end, war came. A clear description of those days is impossible: the action is too swift and crowded; on important questions scholars are hopelessly at odds. For our purpose, it will suffice to tabulate the steps toward war and to indicate those parts of the crisis which influenced subsequent diplomatic history.

At the outset, both sides hoped for a peaceful solution. Austria and Germany demanded that the Austro-Serbian conflict be localized, and hoped that the Entente would hold aloof rather than risk war. The Entente pressed for a moderation of the

<sup>1</sup> Raymond J. Sontag, *European Diplomatic History—1871-1932* (The Century Co., Inc., New York, 1933), pp 196-205. Reprinted by permission of D Appleton-Century Company, Inc.

Austrian demands, and hoped that, rather than fight the Entente, Austria and Germany would content themselves with a diplomatic victory which would preserve Serbian independence and territorial integrity. Russia was determined to fight if Austria tried to crush Serbia; France stood solidly with Russia. England refused to promise armed support.

Saturday, July 25. The Russians, to show their determination, began military preparations by proclaiming the "Period Preparatory to War." Sazonov continued to hope that Austria would compromise rather than fight; if these hopes proved false, the military measures would increase the chances of a Russian victory in war. Very secretly, in order to avoid the accusation of aggressive intent, France took precautionary military measures. In the evening, Serbia replied to the ultimatum. The reply was very conciliatory, although on many points there were reservations which made the concessions more apparent than real. The fact that the Serbians ordered mobilization before delivering the reply indicates that they did not expect Austria to accept Serbian terms. Finding that Serbia had not given complete acquiescence, Austria severed relations and ordered mobilization against Serbia.

Sunday, July 26. The nature, though not the exact text, of the Serbian reply and Austria's breach of relations became known. The British Admiralty ordered the fleet, then assembled for review, to remain concentrated. Germany, believing that the Entente would be less likely to intervene if confronted with a *fait accompli*, pressed Austria to declare war on Serbia.

Monday, July 27. Late in the evening, the Germans began to realize that "localization" was impossible. Russia and France would almost certainly fight. Worse, it was possible England might fight. Bethmann wired Vienna: the steady rejection of all proposals to compromise was making a bad impression. What did Berchtold think of the proposal to use the Serbian reply as a basis for negotiations, and what did he think of Sazonov's desire for direct Austro-Russian discussions?

Tuesday, July 28. Austria declared war on Serbia, in order, as Berchtold informed the German ambassador, "to cut the

ground from any attempt at intervention." Optimism immediately vanished at St. Petersburg, where the conviction grew that a general war was inevitable. During the evening, conferences were held. Sazonov wished to mobilize against Austria alone. The military leaders said a partial mobilization was, for tactical reasons, impossible; they urged general mobilization. No decision was reached. In Berlin, the Kaiser had decided that the Serbian reply was "a capitulation of the most humiliating kind, and as a result, *every cause for war falls to the ground.*" He proposed that Austria occupy Belgrade and hold it as a pledge until Serbia carried out the promises made in the reply. Bethmann was afraid to rein in Austria so suddenly. He pressed the Kaiser's proposal on Berchtold's attention, but timidly.

Wednesday, July 29. Alarm spread in Berlin. Reports of Russian military preparation were pouring in; England had sent her fleet to war station at Scapa Flow; Grey hinted plainly that England would be drawn in if France and Germany fought. From Vienna, no word. Bethmann sent telegram after telegram urging the "pledge" plan, and warning of the imminence of war; Berchtold refused to reply. Bethmann tried to avert English intervention by offering to promise not to take any of France's European territory. In St. Petersburg, the Tsar consented to general mobilization. Before the order was dispatched, a telegram arrived from William II telling of his efforts to moderate Austrian demands, and asking the Tsar to avoid military measures which "would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid." The Tsar weakened, canceled the order for general mobilization, and substituted mobilization against Austria alone. The Russian military authorities were in despair; they had no plans for partial mobilization.

Thursday, July 30. Sazonov again urged the necessity for general mobilization. The Tsar hesitated: "Think of the responsibility which you are advising me to take! Think of the thousands and thousands of men who will be sent to their death!" Sazonov persisted. In the end, the Tsar yielded. Sazonov rushed to the telephone and gave the news to the chief of the general staff. "Now you can smash the telephone," said Sazonov. "Give

your orders, General, and then—disappear for the rest of the day." In London, Cambon begged Grey for a promise of support. Grey promised to consult the cabinet. To avoid any chance of being called the aggressor, and in order to make a favorable impression on British opinion, France announced that her troops would withdraw ten kilometers from the German frontier.

Friday, July 31. Grey asked France and Germany for assurances that they would respect Belgian neutrality. France promptly gave assurances; Germany refused to answer. In Berlin, Russian mobilization became known. Germany ordered preliminary mobilization measures—"Threatening Danger of War"—and warned Russia that complete mobilization would follow if Russia did not suspend every war measure within twelve hours. To Paris, Germany sent a demand for a declaration of neutrality.

Saturday, August 1. General mobilization was ordered in France and Germany. Early in the day, France replied to the German ultimatum: "France will act in accordance with her interests." In the evening, Germany declared war on Russia. Italy announced her intention to remain neutral. The British cabinet remained divided. When Cambon renewed his plea for a promise of assistance, Grey could only say: "France must take her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we are not now in a position to promise."

Sunday, August 2. In England, the cabinet wavered during the morning. At noon, the Conservative opposition presented a letter to Asquith demanding that England support France and Russia. On receipt of this letter the opponents of intervention in the cabinet began to weaken. In the afternoon Grey was allowed to tell Cambon that "if the German fleet comes into the Channel, or through the North Sea, to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." Later, at seven in the evening, Germany presented an ultimatum to Belgium: Germany must march through Belgium; if Belgium made no resistance, Germany would quit Belgian territory at the end of the war and make reparation for damage done; if Belgium resisted, she

would be regarded as an enemy. A reply was demanded within twelve hours

Monday, August 3 In the morning, Belgium rejected the German ultimatum, and appealed for aid to the other powers which had guaranteed Belgian neutrality. In the afternoon Grey spoke in the House of Commons. He reviewed the crisis, told of the conversations which had taken place in the previous years between the French and British staffs, reminded the House of Britain's obligations to Belgium, and urged the necessity for war. He was cheered. No vote was taken, but obviously Grey had the House behind him. That evening, Germany declared war on France.

Tuesday, August 4. News reached London that Germany had invaded Belgium. An ultimatum was dispatched: by midnight Germany must promise to respect Belgium neutrality; otherwise, relations would be severed. That Germany would reject the ultimatum was a foregone conclusion. The British ambassador made a farewell call on Bethmann. The Chancellor excitedly lamented the British action: "Just for a word 'neutrality,' a word which in war time has so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her." At midnight, England declared war on Germany.

Such were the steps by which an Austro-Serbian dispute widened into a European war. To fix responsibility is impossible. For Serbia to work for Jugo-Slav unity was natural. The Jugo-Slav movement, stimulated by Serbia, with Russian encouragement, drove Austria to desperation; statesmen in Vienna felt they must fight to preserve the existence of the Monarchy. Germany, alarmed by increasing isolation, felt that Austria must be supported, both to ensure the continued existence of the Dual Monarchy, and to retain Austria as an ally. Russia and France saw in the Austrian action an attempt to reverse the verdict of the Balkan wars, and to establish Austro-German hegemony in the Near East. Such an alteration of the balance of power Russia and France refused to tolerate. Pan-Slav feel-

ing made Russia toss caution to the winds; France had felt for two years that her very existence would be precarious if she abandoned Russia. England cared little about the Balkans; she would like to have kept clear of the whole imbroglio. But if she stayed out, and, as most Englishmen predicted, Germany won, German hegemony on the Continent would be complete; then the Germans could concentrate on the task of preparing to subdue England. In the unlikely event that France and Russia won, the situation would be no better. They would break the truce in their colonial rivalry with England. The die was cast before the Belgian issue arose; definite decision might have been shunned for a week or two, but probably not beyond the first French defeat. Belgium merely provided an issue over which men could wax enthusiastic. Protection of the balance of power might be a necessity; the balance of power was not something for which one could fight with enthusiasm.

No one wanted a European war, but the very methods by which Europe had sought to prevent war made for war. Allies and arms were thought necessary for security. Fear of impairing the loyalty of allies hampered energetic efforts for peace in 1914. Negotiations were further impeded by surreptitious military preparations which went on all through the crisis, intensifying apprehension and hastening the breakdown of diplomatic discussions. In the years since the World War there has been a disposition to conclude that all governments were guilty and all peoples were innocent. That conclusion has little meaning. All the actors in the mighty drama made mistakes, but each tried to do what he thought the interests of his country required. Since 1871 Europe had been seeking means to obtain both security and realization of national aspirations without recourse to war. The quest had failed. The responsibility for failure was collective, not individual.

In closing this tragic chapter it is necessary to examine certain elements in the history of the five weeks which attained importance later, particularly after the war. As the extent of the catastrophe became apparent, each side tried to clear itself from blame. When the Entente won, its thesis triumphed and



became embedded in the Treaty of Versailles as an indictment against Germany. Blame for the precipitation of war was fixed on Germany because, first of all, Austria was thought to be a blind tool of Germany. Earlier parts of this narrative show how unjustified this conclusion was. On the contrary, Germany after 1906 felt dangerously dependent on Austria. Germany's case also looked bad because she was thought not to have put restraint on Austria during the crisis. To prevent the German people from seeing how Austria had pushed recklessly forward despite protests from Berlin, the German government was forced to suppress the evidence which showed how, after July 27, Austria had been urged to negotiate.

Further, there was the damning fact that Germany had been the first to declare war. In part, this count in the indictment arose from ignorance. After the war began, the Entente powers, by suppressing or altering some documents and forging others, carefully concealed the fact that Russia was the first power to order general mobilization. When the priority of Russian mobilization was finally proved, the argument shifted: Germany should have replied to mobilization by mobilization. There are two answers to that argument. Most statesmen and soldiers knew that general mobilization meant certain war. The Russians knew what they were doing, as the agonized protest of the Tsar attests. Furthermore, the Germans felt they would be defeated if they allowed Russia to complete her mobilization before war began. Russia and France, it must be remembered, possessed overwhelmingly superior man-power. The Russian army was thought to be a very powerful fighting force. In 1913 the French military authorities actually feared Russia was getting so strong that she would feel the French alliance was no longer necessary. The Germans were confident of victory, but only because they had speed to counterbalance numbers. The advantage of speed would be lost if Russia and France were allowed to mobilize. Then Germany would be forced to divide her forces and to encounter enemy forces greatly superior in number. Therefore, the Germans believed they could not wait; and France and Russia did not expect them to wait.

The last count in the indictment is Belgium. The invasion of Belgium was branded the greatest crime in history. A crime it certainly was, but treaties had been broken before, and they have been broken since 1914. In time of war every nation violates international law in the name of national necessity. The German plan of campaign had contemplated the invasion of Belgium ever since the beginning of the century. Invasion was thought to be necessary in order to attain speedy success. The eastern frontier of France was mountainous and heavily fortified; Belgium and northwestern France were flat and moderately fortified. To deal a stunning blow at France, in time to check Russia, Belgium must be invaded. The plan was an open secret. The building of a network of strategic railways to the Belgian frontier showed clearly the German purpose. Armed opposition from England was apparently not seriously anticipated. Belgian neutrality had last been prominently mentioned during the Boulanger crisis. At that time the British had shown a disposition to permit Germany to cross Belgium. From that time until 1914 no British statesman affirmed the determination of England to protect Belgian neutrality. Englishmen who attribute the entrance of their country into the war of 1914 to the violation of Belgian neutrality might well accuse British statesmen of culpable negligence.

The extent of German guilt is debatable. The extent of German stupidity was colossal. When nations break treaties they find excuses; excuses can always be found. Bethmann did not make excuses. He admitted Germany's guilt and in his agitation used the expression "a scrap of paper." A more terrible blunder no statesman ever made. What he said was known to statesmen. Even Lord Salisbury once publicly referred to treaties in similar words, but not during a crisis. Bethmann's words clung to Germany like the taint of leprosy and did the German cause incalculable damage. The paradox is that these words were spoken by one of the few statesmen who tried to act with the same regard for honor in public life as he did in private life, a statesman too honest to deny having used the words, as he might easily have done.

These observations on the crisis are not intended as an apology for German policy or action. The German contribution to European discord from 1871 to 1914 has been set forth in earlier pages of this narrative. The myth of Germany's sole guilt still distorts international thought and action. Therefore a discussion of the facts is necessary. The Germans also invented a mythical account of the origins of the war: since 1904 the Entente powers, led by England, had slowly been forging an iron ring around Germany; by 1914 the quarry was helpless, the Entente struck. Germans were taught, and are still taught, to believe themselves the innocent victims of a diabolical plot. The encirclement theory bears as little relation to truth as the theory of Germany's sole and deliberate guilt. Fear and suffering burned both myths indelibly into the minds of men, with tragic consequences for the world.

## 58. ENGLAND'S DILEMMA<sup>1</sup>

[Students of the Crisis of 1914 are substantially agreed that had England taken a definite stand for or against intervention, war might have been averted. In other words, if Germany had known definitely that England intended to support France she would have refused to support Austria; or, had France and Russia known that England was determined to follow a policy of neutrality, they would have been more conciliatory. The letter which is given below is typical of Grey's indefinite attitude. Bertie was the British Ambassador to France.]

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE

(No. 513)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

Sir,

M. Cambon referred today to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin saying that it was the uncertainty with

<sup>1</sup> *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, XI, No. 367 (H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1926).

regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favor of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral; I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet today, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. The commercial and financial situation was exceedingly serious; there was danger of a complete collapse that would involve us and everyone else in ruin; and it was possible that our standing aside might be the only means of preventing a complete collapse of European credit, in which we should be involved. This might be a paramount consideration in deciding our attitude.

I went on to say to M. Cambon that though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask

both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon expressed great disappointment at my reply. He repeated his question of whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, so far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. The latest news was that Russia had ordered a complete mobilization of her fleet and army. This, it seemed to me, would precipitate a crisis, and would make it appear that German mobilization was being forced by Russia.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870, we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase in German strength; and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, & c

E. GREY

59. OPPOSING PLANS OF CAMPAIGN<sup>1</sup>

[The selection which appears below was written by Captain Liddell Hart, an outstanding military historian, and is a concise summary of the plans formulated by the general staffs prior to the outbreak of the World War. The German plan is of especial significance, since its objectives have been so generally misunderstood, and since it determined to a large degree the course of the War on the western front.]



IN this survey the German plan justly takes priority, for not only was it the mainspring which set in motion the hands of the war clock in 1914, but it may even be said to have governed the course of the war thereafter. It is true that from the autumn of 1914 onwards this course outwardly seemed to be of the nature of a stupendous "siege" of the Central Powers, an idea incompatible with the terms we have used. But the conception of the Germanic Alliance as a besieged party, although true of the economic sphere, suggests a loss of initiative which their strategy contradicts. Although the initial German plan miscarried, even in its failure it dictated the general trend of operations thereafter. Tactically, most of the fighting resembled siege operations, but the actual strategy on land long erred rather by its disregard of these tactical conditions than by its conformity with them.

The Germans were faced with the problem that the combined forces of themselves and Austria were decidedly inferior to those of France and Russia. To offset this adverse balance, however, they had a central position and the anticipation that Russia's mobilization would be too slow to allow her to exert serious pressure in the opening weeks. While this assumption

<sup>1</sup> From *The Real War 1914 to 1918*, by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, pp. 45-53. An Atlantic Monthly Press Publication. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown & Company.



### THE HARVEST IS RIPE

The Dutch cartoonist, Raemaekers, published many famous cartoons during the war which were fundamentally hostile to Germany and were used effectively by allied propagandists. Others, like the above, were effective protests against the horror and futility of war. (From *Raemaekers' Cartoon History of the War*, Vol. I, The Century Co., New York, 1919.)

## THE "SCRAP OF PAPER"

These are the signatures and seals of the representatives of the Six Powers to the 'Scrap of Paper'—the Treaty signed on 18th January 1918, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.


Belgium is signed for Belgium. Belgium for Belgium.

The Germans have broken their pledged word and devastated Belgium. Help to keep your Country's honour bright by restoring Belgium her liberty.

## ENLIST TO-DAY

### THE SCRAP OF PAPER

This is an excellent illustration of British propaganda intended to encourage enlistments. (Hoover War Library)




The Congress of Vienna

(By Isabey. From Frederick B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution*, 2nd printing, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1935.)



Signing of the Versailles Treaty

(By Oren. From Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe*, Vol. II, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1936.)



From World Wide Photos

The League of Nations

ASPECTS OF PEACEMAKING



might suggest a decisive blow at Russia before she was ready, it was equally probable that she would concentrate her main forces too far back for such a German blow to reach—and the experience of Napoleon was not an example to encourage an advance deep into the interior of Russia, with its vast distances and poor communications. The plan long since adopted by Germany was, therefore, to deliver a rapid offensive against France while holding the Russian advanced forces at bay, and later, when France was crushed, to deal with the Russian army. But this plan, in turn, was complicated by the great natural and artificial barriers which the French frontier offered to an invader. It was narrow, only some 150 miles across, and so afforded little room to manœuvre or even to deploy the masses that Germany planned to launch against her foe. At the southeastern end it abutted on Switzerland, and after a short stretch of flat country known as the Gap of Belfort the frontier ran for 70 miles along the Vosges Mountains. Behind and prolonging this natural rampart ran an almost continuous fortress system, based on Epinal, Toul, Verdun, and twenty miles beyond the last-named lay not only the frontiers of Luxembourg and Belgium, but the difficult Ardennes country. Apart from the strongly defended avenues of advance by Belfort and Verdun, the only feasible gap in this barrier was the Trouée de Charmes between Epinal and Toul, left open originally as a strategic trap in which the Germans could be first caught and then crushed by a French counterstroke.

Faced with such a mental and physical blank wall, the logical military course was to go round it—by a wide manœuvre through Belgium. Graf Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906, conceived and developed the plan by which the French armies were to be enveloped and a rapid decision gained, and as finally formulated it came into force in 1905. To attain its object Schlieffen's plan concentrated the mass of the German forces on the right wing for a gigantic wheel and designedly took risks by reducing the left wing, facing the French frontier, to the slenderest possible size. The swinging mass, pivoting on the fortified area Metz-Thionville, was to

consist of fifty-three divisions, backed up as rapidly as possible by Landwehr and Ersatz formations, while the secondary army on the left wing comprised only eight divisions. Its very weakness promised to aid the main blow in a further way, for if a French offensive pressed the left wing back towards the Rhine, the attack through Belgium on the French flank would be all the more difficult to parry. It would be like a revolving door—if a man pressed heavily on one side the other side would swing round and strike him in the back. Here lay the real subtlety of the plan, not in the mere geographical detour.

The German enveloping mass was to sweep round through Belgium and northern France, and, continuing to traverse a vast arc, would wheel gradually east. With its extreme right passing south of Paris and crossing the Seine near Rouen, it would then press the French back towards the Moselle, where they would be hammered in rear on the anvil formed by the Lorraine fortresses and the Swiss frontier.

Schlieffen's plan allowed ten divisions to hold the Russians in check while the French were being crushed. It is a testimony to the vision of this remarkable man that he counted on the intervention of Britain, and allowed for an expeditionary force of 100,000 "operating in conjunction with the French." To him also was due the scheme for using the Landwehr and Ersatz troops in active operations and fusing the resources of the nation into the army. His dying words are reported to have been: "It must come to a fight. Only make the right wing strong."

Unhappily for Germany, if happily for the world, the younger Moltke, who succeeded him, lacked his moral courage and grasp of strategy. Moltke retained Schlieffen's plan, but he whittled away the essential idea. Of the nine new divisions which became available between 1905 and 1914, Moltke allotted eight to the left wing and only one to the right. True, he added another from the Russian front, but this trivial increase was purchased at a heavy price, for the Russian army of 1914 was a more formidable menace than when Schlieffen's plan came into force. In the outcome two army corps were taken from the French theatre at the crisis of the August campaign, in order

to reenforce the eastern front. Schlieffen's death-bed entreaty was lost on his successor.

Moltke also made a change of great political significance in the plan. Schlieffen had intended that the right wing should deploy along not only the Belgian but also the Dutch frontier as far north as Crefeld. By crossing the strip of Dutch territory known as the "Maastricht Appendix" it would be able to turn the flank of the Liége forts, which barred the way through the narrow Belgian gateway north of the Ardennes. He hoped that German diplomacy might secure permission for this passage through Holland, but he did not wish to violate the territory of either Belgium or Holland if he could avoid the moral reproach. For it was his calculation that the undisguised deployment there of part of his force would so alarm the French as to induce them to cross the southern frontier of Belgium and occupy the natural defensive position in the Meuse Valley, south of Namur. Thereby they would provide a pretext for his own advance into neutral territory. Even should this subtle trap fail, Schlieffen calculated that he would be able to capture Liége in time to avoid any check on his main advance. And he was willing to cut his margin of time so close as to afford German statecraft the fullest chance to escape the charge of rape.

Such vision and boldness were beyond Moltke's capacity, and he decided that Liége must be taken by a *coup de main* immediately after the outbreak of war. Thus for a fancied addition to military security he deliberately invited the condemnation of neutrals, provoked Belgium to resistance, and drew the weight of Britain into the scales against his own forces. Moltke's method of "drawing" the enemy was certainly the antithesis of Schlieffen's. And it is a glaring example of the dangers, even the military dangers, which may ensue if strategy is allowed to dominate policy.

If the fault of the final German plan was a lack of courage, that of the French plan was due to an excess. In their case, also, a miasma of confused thought seemed to creep over the leadership in the years just before the war. Since the disasters of 1870 the French Command had planned an initial defensive, based on

the frontier fortresses, followed by a decisive counter-stroke. To this end the great fortress system had been created and gaps like the Trouée de Charmes left to "canalize" the invasion ready for the counter. But in the decade before 1914 a new school of thought had risen, who argued that the offensive was more in tune with French character and tradition, that the possession of the "75"—a field gun unique in mobility and rapidity of fire—made it tactically possible, and that the alliance with Russia and Britain made it strategically possible. Forgetful of the lessons of 1870, they imagined that *élan* was proof against bullets. Napoleon's much quoted saying that "the moral is to the physical as three to one" has much to answer for; it has led soldiers to think that a division exists between the two, whereas each is dependent on the other. Weapons without courage are ineffective, but so also are the bravest troops without sufficient weapons to protect them and their morale. Courage soon oozes when soldiers lose confidence in their weapons.

The outcome was disastrous. The new school, who found their prophet in Colonel de Grandmaison, found in General Joffre, appointed Chief of the General Staff in 1912, a lever for their designs. Under the cloak of his authority, the advocates of the *offensive à outrance* gained control of the French military machine, and, throwing aside the old doctrine, formulated the now famous, or notorious, Plan XVII. It was based on a negation of historical experience, indeed of common sense, and on a double miscalculation—of force and place, the latter more serious than the former. Accepting the possibility that the Germans might employ their reserve formations at the outset, the strength of the German army in the west was estimated at a possible maximum of sixty-eight infantry divisions. The Germans actually deployed the equivalent of eighty-three and a half, counting Landwehr and Ersatz troops. But French opinion was, and continued to be, doubtful of this contingency, so much so that during the crucial days when the rival armies were concentrating and moving forward the French Intelligence counted only the active divisions in its estimates of the enemy strength—a miscalculation by half! If the plan had been framed on a mis-

calculation less extreme, this recognition does not condone but rather increases its fundamental falsity, for history affords no vestige of justification for a plan by which a frontal offensive was to be launched with mere equality of force against an enemy who would have the support of his fortified frontier zone, while the attackers forswore any advantage from their own.

The second miscalculation—of place—was that although the possibility of a German move through Belgium was recognized, the wideness of its sweep was utterly misjudged. The Germans were expected complaisantly to take the difficult route through the Ardennes in order that the French might conveniently smite their communications! Based on the idea of an immediate and general offensive, the plan ordained a thrust by the First and Second Armies towards the Saar into Lorraine. On their left were the Third Army opposite Metz and the Fifth Army facing the Ardennes, which were either to take up the offensive between Metz and Thionville, or, if the Germans came through Luxembourg and Belgium, to strike northeast at their flank. The Fourth Army was held in strategic reserve near the centre and two groups of reserve divisions were disposed in rear of either flank—relegation to such a passive rôle expressing French opinion on the capacity of reserve formations.

Britain's contingent share in this plan was settled less by calculation than by the "Europeanization" of her military organization during the previous decade. This Continental influence drew her insensibly into a tacit acceptance of the rôle of acting as an appendix to the French left wing, and away from her historic exploitation of the mobility given by seapower. At the council of war after the outbreak, Lord Roberts, summoned from retirement, suggested the dispatch of the expeditionary force to Belgium—where it would have stiffened the Belgian resistance and threatened the flank of the wheeling German mass. But the plan did not provide for variations, and in any case the British General Staff, through General Wilson, had virtually pledged themselves to act in direct coöperation with the French. When the General Staffs of the two countries conducted their informal negotiations between 1905 and 1914,

they were paving the way for a reversal of England's centuries-old policy, for a war effort such as no Englishman had ever conceived.

Lord Kitchener, who had just been made War Minister in the emergency, had a remarkably accurate intuition of the German plan and tried to avert the danger by advocating that the expeditionary force should concentrate near Amiens, where it would be less exposed. But the vehement support given by the Commander, Sir John French, and his staff to the French plan induced Kitchener to give way. Later he lamented his consent as a mistaken weakness. Kitchener, however, gave French instructions which, designed to reduce the risks, were in the issue to complicate and even to increase them. For while French's assigned purpose was "to support, and cooperate with, the French army," it was qualified by the somewhat contradictory statement "that the gravest consideration will devolve upon you as to participation . . . where your force may be unduly exposed. . . ." Further, "you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any Allied General."

On the Russian front, the plans of campaign were more fluid, less elaborately worked out and formulated, although they were to be as kaleidoscopic in their changes of fortune as in the western theatre. The calculable condition was geographical; the main incalculable, Russia's rate of concentration. Russian Poland was a vast tongue of country projecting from Russia proper, and flanked on three sides by German or Austrian territory. On its northern flank lay East Prussia with the Baltic Sea beyond. On its southern flank lay the Austrian province of Galicia with the Carpathian Mountains to the south, guarding the approach to the plain of Hungary. On the west lay Silesia. As the Germanic border provinces were provided with a network of strategic railways, while Poland, as well as Russia itself, had only a sparse system of communications, the Germanic Alliance enjoyed a great advantage, in power of concentration, for countering a Russian advance. But if its armies took the offensive, the further they progressed into Poland or Russia proper the more would they lose this advantage. Hence their most profitable

strategy was to lure the Russians into a position favorable for a counter-stroke rather than to inaugurate an offensive themselves. The one drawback was that such a Punic strategy gave the Russians time to concentrate and set in motion their cumbersome and rusty machine.

From this arose an initial cleavage between German and Austrian opinion. Both agreed that the problem was to hold the Russians in check during the six weeks which must elapse before the Germans should have crushed France, and so could switch their forces eastwards to join the Austrians in a decisive blow against the Russians. The difference of opinion turned on the method. The Germans, intent on a decision against France, wished to leave a minimum force in the East, and only a political dislike of exposing national territory to invasion prevented them from evacuating East Prussia and standing on the Vistula line. But the Austrians, under the influence of Conrad von Hotzendorf, Chief of their General Staff, were anxious to throw the Russian machine out of gear by an immediate offensive, and, as this promised to keep the Russians fully occupied while the campaign in France was being decided, Moltke fell in with this strategy. Conrad's plan was that of an offensive northeastwards into Poland by two armies, protected by two more on their right, further east. Complementary to it, as originally designed, the Germans in East Prussia were to strike southeast, the two forces converging to cut off the Russian advanced forces in the Polish "tongue." But Conrad failed to induce Moltke to provide sufficient German troops for this offensive thrust.

On the opposing side, also, the desires of one Ally virtually affected the strategy of the other. The Russian Command, both for military and for racial motives, wished to concentrate first against Austria, while the latter was unsupported, and leave Germany alone until later, when the full strength of the Russian army would be mobilized. But the French, anxious to relieve the German pressure against themselves, urged the Russians to deliver a simultaneous attack against Germany, and persuaded the Russians to consent to an extra offensive for which they were ready neither in numbers nor in organization. On the south-

western front two pairs of two armies each were to converge on the Austrian forces in Galicia; on the northwestern front two armies were to converge on the German forces in East Prussia. Russia, whose proverbial slowness and crude organization dictated a cautious strategy, was about to break with tradition and launch out on a gamble that only an army of high mobility and organization could have hoped to bring off.

## 60. THE GREY MEMORANDUM<sup>1</sup>

[In the fall of 1915 Colonel House suggested that President Wilson take the initiative in calling a Peace Conference to consider "reasonable" peace terms. Should either side refuse to attend, or refuse his terms, the United States would enter the war against that side. Later House was sent abroad to discuss his plan with the belligerents. Nothing came of the plan, due in a large measure to the desire of the Allies to realize their secret war aims unembarrassed by the participation of the United States.]



### CONFIDENTIAL

COLONEL HOUSE told me that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a Conference should be summoned to put an end to the war. Should the Allies accept this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably enter the war against Germany.

Colonel House expressed the opinion that, if such a Conference met, it would secure peace on terms not unfavourable to the Allies; and, if it failed to secure peace, the United States would [probably] leave the Conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies, if Germany was unreasonable. Colonel House

<sup>1</sup> Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1926), Vol. II, pp. 201-202. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.



expressed an opinion decidedly favourable to the restoration of Belgium, the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine to France, and the acquisition by Russia of an outlet to the sea, though he thought that the loss of territory incurred by Germany in one place would have to be compensated to her by concessions to her in other places outside Europe. If the Allies delayed accepting the offer of President Wilson, and if, later on, the course of the war was so unfavourable to them that the intervention of the United States would not be effective, the United States would probably disinterest themselves in Europe and look to their own protection in their own way.

I said that I felt the statement, coming from the President of the United States, to be a matter of such importance that I must inform the Prime Minister and my colleagues, but that I could say nothing until it had received their consideration. The British Government could, under no circumstances, accept or make any proposal except in consultation and agreement with the Allies. I thought that the Cabinet would probably feel that the present situation would not justify them in approaching their Allies on this subject at the present moment; but, as Colonel House had had an intimate conversation with M. Briand and M. Jules Cambon in Paris, I should think it right to tell M. Briand privately, through the French Ambassador in London, what Colonel House had said to us; and I should, of course, whenever there was an opportunity, be ready to talk the matter over with M. Briand, if he desired it.

(Intd.) E. G.

Foreign Office  
22 February 1916

61. THE ZIMMERMANN NOTE <sup>1</sup>

[The Zimmermann Note was intercepted by the British secret service, turned over to Ambassador Page, and released for publication in the United States on February 26, 1917. It created great excitement and did much to hasten the declaration of war on April 6.]



Berlin, January 19, 1917

ON the first of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.


ZIMMERMANN.

<sup>1</sup> *Congressional Record*, LIV, 4596.



(From *First World War*, edited by L. Stallings, published by Simon and Schuster, New York. Reprinted by permission of Otto Kurth.)

#### WAR CARTOONS



(From *First World War*, edited by L. Stallings, published by Simon and Schuster, New York. Reprinted by permission of Otto Kurth.)

WAR POSTERS

62. SENATOR NORRIS OPPOSES THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

[On April 2, 1917, President Wilson came before a joint session of the Senate and the House to ask for a declaration of war against Germany. Four days later, by large majorities, Congress approved the request, and the United States went to war. Senator Norris was one of a small group which opposed this action and justified his stand in a brilliant speech from which the following extract is taken.]



MR. PRESIDENT, while I am most emphatically and sincerely opposed to taking any step that will force our country into the useless and senseless war now being waged in Europe, yet if this resolution passes I shall not permit my feeling of opposition to its passage to interfere in any way with my duty either as a Senator or as a citizen in bringing success and victory to American arms. I am bitterly opposed to my country entering the war, but if, notwithstanding my opposition, we do enter it, all of my energy and all of my power will be behind our flag in carrying it on to victory.

The resolution now before the Senate is a declaration of war. Before taking this momentous step, and while standing on the brink of this terrible vortex, we ought to pause and calmly and judiciously consider the terrible consequences of the step we are about to take. We ought to consider likewise the route we have recently traveled and ascertain whether we have reached our present position in a way that is compatible with the neutral position which we claimed to occupy at beginning and through the various stages of this unholy and unrighteous war.

No close student of recent history will deny that both Great Britain and Germany have, on numerous occasions since the beginning of the war, flagrantly violated in the most serious manner the rights of neutral vessels and neutral nations under

<sup>1</sup> *Congressional Record*, IV, 212-213.

existing international law as recognized up to the beginning of this war by the civilized world.

The reason given by the President in asking Congress to declare war against Germany is that the German Government has declared certain war zones, within which, by the use of submarines, she sinks, without notice, American ships and destroys American lives.

Let us trace briefly the origin and history of these so-called war zones. The first war zone was declared by Great Britain. She gave us and the world notice of it on the 4th day of November, 1914. The zone became effective November 5, 1914, the next day after the notice was given. This zone so declared by Great Britain covered the whole of the North Sea. The order establishing it sought to close the north of Scotland route around the British Isles to Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, and the Baltic Sea. The decree of establishment drew an arbitrary line from the Hebrides Islands along the Scottish coast to Iceland, and warned neutral shipping that it would cross those lines at its peril, and ordered that ships might go to Holland and other neutral nations by taking the English Channel route through the Strait of Dover.

The first German war zone was declared on the 4th day of February, 1915, just three months after the British war zone was declared. Germany gave 15 days' notice of the establishment of her zone, which became effective on the 18th day of February, 1915. The German war zone covered the English Channel and the high sea waters around the British Isles. It sought to close the English Channel route around the British Isles to Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Baltic Sea. The German war zone decreed that neutral vessels would be exposed to danger in the English Channel route, but that the route around the north of Scotland and in the eastern part of the North Sea, in a strip thirty miles wide along the Dutch coast would be free from danger.

It will thus be seen that the British Government declared the north of Scotland route into the Baltic Sea as dangerous and the English Channel route into the Baltic Sea as safe.

The German Government in its order did exactly the reverse. It declared the north of Scotland route into the Baltic Sea as safe and the English Channel route into the Baltic Sea as dangerous.

The order of the British Government declaring the North Sea as a war zone used the following language:

The British Admiralty gives notice that the waters of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and other vessels will be exposed to the gravest danger from mines it has been necessary to lay.

The German Government, by its order declaring its war zone around the south of England, declared that the order would be made effective by the use of submarines.

Thus we have the two declarations of the two Governments, each declaring a military zone and warning neutral shipping from going into the prohibited area. England sought to make her order effective by the use of submerged mines. Germany sought to make her order effective by the use of submarines. Both of these orders were illegal and contrary to all international law as well as the principles of humanity. Under international law no belligerent Government has the right to place submerged mines in the high seas. Neither has it any right to take human life without notice by the use of submarines. If there is any difference on the ground of humanity between these two instrumentalities, it is certainly in favor of the submarines. The submarine can exercise some degree of discretion and judgment. The submerged mine always destroys without notice, friend and foe alike, guilty and innocent the same. In carrying out these two policies, both Great Britain and Germany have sunk American ships and destroyed American lives without provocation and without notice. There have been more ships sunk and more American lives lost from the action of submarines than from English mines in the North Sea; for the simple reason that we finally acquiesced in the British war zone and kept our ships out of it, while in the German war zone we have refused to recognize its legality and have not kept either our ships or our citizens

out of its area. If American ships had gone into the British war zone in defiance of Great Britain's order, as they have gone into the German war zone in defiance of the German Government's order, there would have been many more American lives lost and many more American ships sunk by the instrumentality of the mines than the instrumentality of the submarines.

We have in the main complied with the demands made by Great Britain. Our ships have followed the instructions of the British Government in going not only to England but to the neutral nations of the world, and in thus complying with the British order American ships going to Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have been taken by British officials into British ports, and their cargoes inspected and examined. All the mails we have carried even to neutral countries have been opened and censored, and oftentimes the entire cargo confiscated by the Government. Nothing has been permitted to pass to even the most neutral nations except after examination and with the permission of the officials of the British Government.

I have outlined the beginning of the controversy. I have given in substance the orders of both of these great Governments that constituted the beginning of our controversy with each. There have been other orders made by both Governments subsequent to the ones I have given that interfered with our rights as a neutral Nation, but these two that I have outlined constitute the origin of practically the entire difficulty, and subsequent orders have only been modifications and reproductions of those I have already mentioned. It is unnecessary to cite authority to show that both of these orders declaring military zones were illegal and contrary to international law. It is sufficient to say that our Government has officially declared both of them to be illegal and has officially protested against both of them.

The only difference is that in the case of Germany we have persisted in our protest, while in the case of England we have submitted. What was our duty as a Government and what were our rights when we were confronted with these extraordinary orders declaring these military zones? First, we could have defied both of them and could have gone to war against both of



these nations for this violation of international law and interference with our neutral rights. Second, we had the technical right to defy one and to acquiesce in the other. Third, we could, while denouncing them both as illegal, have acquiesced in them both and thus remained neutral with both sides, although not agreeing with either as to the righteousness of their respective orders. We could have said to American shipowners that, while these orders are both contrary to international law and are both unjust, we do not believe that the provocation is sufficient to cause us to go to war for the defense of our rights as a neutral nation and, therefore, American ships and American citizens will go into these zones at their own peril and risk. Fourth, we might have declared an embargo against the shipping from American ports of any merchandise to either one of these Governments that persisted in maintaining its military zone. We might have refused to permit the sailing of any ship from any American port to either of these military zones. In my judgment, if we had pursued this course, the zones would have been of short duration. England would have been compelled to take her mines out of the North Sea in order to get any supplies from our country. When her mines were taken out of the North Sea then the German ports upon the North Sea would have been accessible to American shipping and Germany would have been compelled to cease her submarine warfare in order to get any supplies from our Nation into German North Sea ports.

There are a great many American citizens who feel that we owe it as a duty to humanity to take part in this war. Many instances of cruelty and inhumanity can be found on both sides. Men are often biased in their judgment on account of their sympathy and their interests. To my mind, what we ought to have maintained from the beginning was the strictest neutrality. If we had done this I do not believe we would have been on the verge of war at the present time. We had a right as a nation, if we desired, to cease at any time to be neutral. We had a technical right to respect the English war zone and to disregard the German war zone, but we could not do that and be neutral. I have no quarrel to find with the man who does not desire our

country to remain neutral. While many such people are moved by selfish motives and hopes of gain, I have no doubt that in a great many instances, through what I believe to be a misunderstanding of the real condition, there are many honest, patriotic citizens who think we ought to engage in this war and who are behind the President in his demand that we should declare war against Germany. I think such people err in judgment and to a great extent have been misled as to the real history and the true facts by the almost unanimous demand of the great combination of wealth that has a direct financial interest in our participation in the war. We have loaned many hundreds of millions of dollars to the allies in this controversy. While such action was legal and countenanced by international law, there is no doubt in my mind but the enormous amount of money loaned to the allies in this country has been instrumental in bringing about a public sentiment in favor of our country taking a course that would make every bond worth a hundred cents on the dollar and making the payment of every debt certain and sure. Through this instrumentality and also through the instrumentality of others who have not only made millions out of the war in the manufacture of munitions, etc., and who would expect to make millions more if our country can be drawn into the catastrophe, a large number of the great newspapers and news agencies of the country have been controlled and enlisted in the greatest propaganda that the world has ever known, to manufacture sentiment in favor of war. It is now demanded that the American citizens shall be used as insurance policies to guarantee the safe delivery of munitions of war to belligerent nations. The enormous profits of munition manufacturers, stockbrokers, and bond dealers must be still further increased by our entrance into the war. This has brought us to the present moment, when Congress urged by the President and backed by the artificial sentiment, is about to declare war and engulf our country in the greatest holocaust that the world has ever known. . . .

## **XII. PEACEMAKING**



### 63. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE <sup>1</sup>

[The Peace Conference was held in Paris, partly as a compliment to France because of her contribution to the allied victory, and partly to afford France revenge for the humiliation of 1870. Most of the nations of the world were represented, and each delegation was accompanied by a small army of secretaries, experts, publicity specialists, and camp-followers. There were, in addition, many uninvited guests, representatives of important newspapers and special interests likely to be affected by the decisions of the Conference. The result was chaos, and the wonder is that any rational settlement was evolved in this atmosphere of pandemonium.]



IT is not easy, when using the silent machinery of printed words, to reproduce the double stress of turmoil and time-pressure which in Paris constituted the obstruction to calm thinking or planned procedure. One writes the sentence: 'It was a period of unremitting strain.' The sedative note of such a sentence, as applied to the scurrying cacophony of the Peace Conference, forces one to smile. Only through the medium of a sound film could any accurate impression, that sense of riot in a parrot house, be conveyed.

Were I to sketch such a scenario of my own impressions, the result would be something as follows. As a recurrent undertone throughout would run the rumble of Time's winged chariot: incessantly reiterant would come the motif of this time-pressure—newspapers screaming in headlines against the Dawdlers of

<sup>1</sup> Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1933), pp. 152-156. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

Paris, the clamour for demobilisation, 'Get the Boys back,' the starving millions of Central Europe, the slouching queues of prisoners still behind their barbed wire, the flames of communism flaring, now from Munich, and now from Buda Pesth. Through this recurrent grumble and rumble of the time-motif would pierce the sharper discordances of other sounds: the machine-gun rattle of a million typewriters, the incessant shrilling of telephones, the clatter of motor bicycles, the drone of aeroplanes, the cold voices of interpreters, 'le délégué des Etats-Unis constate qu'il ne peut se ranger . . .' the blare of trumpets, the thunder of guns saluting at the Invalides, the rustling of files, a woman in a black woollen shawl singing 'Madelon' in front of a café, the crackle of Rolls Royces upon the gravel of sumptuous courtyards, and throughout the sound of footsteps hurrying now upon the parquet of some gallery, now upon the stone stairway of some Ministry, and now muffled on the heavy Aubusson of some overheated saloon.

These sound-motifs would be accompanied by a rapid projection of disjointed pictures. The tired and contemptuous eyelids of Clemenceau, the black button-boots of Woodrow Wilson, the rotund and jovial gestures of Mr. Lloyd George's hands, the infinite languor of Mr. Balfour slowly uncrossing his knees, a succession of secretaries and experts bending forward with maps, Foch striding stockily with Weygand hurrying behind. The silver chains of the huissiers at the Quai d'Orsay. Such portraits would be interspersed with files, agenda papers, resolutions, *procès verbaux* and communiqués. These would succeed each other with extreme rapidity, and from time to time would have to be synchronised and superimposed. 'The Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy and of Japan, of the one part . . . It is resolved that subject to the approval of the Houses of Congress the President of the United States of America accepts on behalf of the United States . . . Si cette frontière était prise en considération, il serait nécessaire de faire la correction indiquée en bleu. Autrement le chemin de fer vers Kaschau serait coupé . . . These coupons will be accepted in settlement of the table d'hôte

meals of the hotel; the whole ticket is to be given up at dinner. . . . M. Venizelos told me last night that he had concluded his agreement with Italy in the following terms: (1) Italy will support Greek claims in Northern Epirus. . . . From the point where the western boundary of the area leaves the Drave in a northerly direction as far as the point about one kilometre to the east of Rosegg (Saint Michael). The course of the Drave down-stream. Thence in a north-easterly direction and as far as the western extremity of the Worthersee, south of Velden. A line to be fixed on the ground. The median line of that lake Thence eastwards to its confluence with the river Glan. The course of the Glanfurt downstream. . . . (1) Audition de M. Dmosky. (2) Rapport de la Commission Interalliée de Teschen. (3) Le repatriement des troupes du Général Haller. (4) Rapport de M. Hoover. (5) Prisonniers de guerre. (6) Réparation de la marine marchande allemande. . . . From the coming into force of the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall renew, in so far as concerns them, and under the reserves indicated in the second paragraph of the present Article, the conventions and arrangements signed at Berne on October 14, 1890, September 20, 1893, July 16, 1895, June 16, 1898, and September 19, 1906, regarding the transportation of goods by rail. If within five years of the coming into force of the present Treaty . . . Le traité concernant l'entrée de la Bavière dans la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord, conclu à Versailles le 23 novembre 1870, contient, dans les articles 7 et 8 du protocole final, des dispositions toujours en vigueur, reconnaissant . . . A meeting of the British Empire Delegation will be held on Tuesday the 14th instant at the Villa Majestic at 11:30 a.m. . . . Dr. Nansen came to see me this morning. He represents the urgent necessity of inducing the Supreme Council . . . An entertainment will be held on Saturday next at 9:30 p.m. in the Ball Room of the Hotel Majestic in aid of the Dockland Settlement. Miss Ruth Draper has kindly consented to give us two of her well-known character sketches. Tickets may be obtained from the hall-porter—Le Baron Sonnino estimait qu'il y avait lieu d'établir une distinction entre les représentants des Soviets

et ceux des autres Gouvernements. Les Alliés combattaient les bolcheviks et les considéraient comme des ennemis. Il n'en était pas de même en ce qui concernait les Finlandais, les Lettons. . . . Telegram from Vienna. Count Karolyi has resigned and according to telephone message received by Mr. Coolidge this morning from his representative at Buda Pesth communist government has been formed under leadership of Bela Kun. Fate of Allied Missions uncertain. . . . Wir wissen das die Gewalt der deutschen Waffen gebrochen ist. Wir kennen die Macht des Hasses, die uns hier entgegentritt, und wir haben die leidenschaftliche Förderung gehört, dass die Sieger uns zugleich als Ueberwundene zahlen lassen und als Schuldige bestrafen sollen. . . .'

A rapid succession of such captions, accompanied by the whole scale of sound which I have indicated, would furnish a clearer picture of the atmosphere of the Peace Conference than any chronological record in terms of the printed work. Could colour, scent and touch be added, the picture would be almost complete. The dominant note is black and white, heavy black suits, white cuffs and paper: it is relieved by blue and khaki: the only other colours would be the scarlet damask of the Quai d'Orsay curtains, green baize, pink blotting pads, and the innumerable gilt of little chairs. For smells you would have petrol, typewriting ribbons, French polish, central heating, and a touch of violet hair-wash. The tactile motifs would be tracing paper, silk, the leather handle of a weighted pouch of papers, the foot-feel of very thick carpets alternating with parquet flooring, the stretch of muscle caused by leaning constantly over very large maps, the brittle feel of a cane chair-seat which has been occupied for hours.

And behind it all the ache of exhaustion and despair.



64. THE LEAGUE AS A PEACEMAKER <sup>1</sup>

[Despite the marked difference of opinion as to the effectiveness of the League of Nations as an agency making for international peace, it is generally recognized that many of the problems of the post-war era could not have been solved without some permanent international organization. The extract which follows summarizes the activities of the League in this important connection.]



PARALLEL to all these discussions and plans for keeping the world's peace there has progressed the development of the League's machinery for the same purpose through actual use. Theory and practice have affected each other, though too often kept apart. Ultimately, all the schemes of statesmen and experts have to be tested by what has actually happened. The success or failure of the League in its various problems will determine the character and extent of the machinery which it can employ.

Since 1920 there have been twenty-nine disputes handled by the Council of the League, not counting one or two minor affairs. One has been referred to the Assembly and it has discussed one or two others. At least nine of them have led to the clash of armed forces, others have been of such a nature as to impair seriously the relations of two or more states. Besides these cases the Council has continually been dealing with Minority questions, one of the most fruitful causes of war. . . . Continually, also, the Foreign Ministers of Europe have been discussing problems which threatened to lead to a rupture, though some of these have not been officially before it.

The total of work done is impressive. It is indeed difficult

<sup>1</sup> C. K. Webster and Sydney Herbert, *The League of Nations in Theory and Practice* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1933), pp. 159-163. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

to see how the post-war world, still shaken by the storms of an unprecedented struggle, which had left numerous unsolved problems and almost unexampled bitterness and hatred behind it, could have done without machinery of this kind. There has been great success in many directions. A new technique for the keeping of the world's peace has been evolved. . . . Official war, though not recourse to arms, has been avoided since the immediate post-war years. Measures have been taken, sometimes drastic ones, to isolate disputes, provide methods of settlement, organize and concentrate public opinion, and penalize and make impossible the recourse to force.

But this result must not be exaggerated. Peace has been preserved in Europe partly because the victors have had overwhelming force and the generation that fought is tired and worn out by war. There is no guarantee that peace can be maintained as a new generation grows up with its own ambitions, grievances, and unsatisfied energy. Moreover, though the League has been generally successful in disputes in which minor Powers are concerned, it has not been so successful in those in which the prestige of Great Powers has been involved. It is clearly less able to handle disputes that involve Russia, Far-Asia, and America than in those of continental Europe or the Middle East. In some cases, if peace has been preserved it has only been by allowing the stronger party to have much, though not all, of its own way, regardless of justice. In fact the experiment is still proceeding, and no one can say whether the final result will be success or failure.

The reference of disputes to the League has been in almost all cases easily and almost automatically accomplished. There has thus been a great advance on pre-war practice when it was immensely difficult to get dangerous disputes referred to conference, mediation, or arbitration. The prestige of some Power often seemed to depend on a refusal to allow interference in the dispute and third parties had to be excessively careful before they used their influence or authority to intervene. An invitation to a Power which had already committed itself to some drastic action was considered almost an unfriendly act.

The same attitude has been often apparent during the last twelve years. Powers—especially Great Powers—have been reluctant to state their case before the world tribunal. Poland in the Vilna dispute, Italy in that concerning Corfu, Japan in the Manchurian question, obviously disliked outside interference in a situation in which they were the stronger party. But all had to yield with more or less good grace to the fact that they had committed themselves at least to a discussion of the dispute. Though they might claim that it was unsuitable for such discussion and refuse to submit to the advice or pressure thus publicly exerted upon them, yet they could not avoid it altogether, and it undoubtedly affected their actions, and, still more, the attitude of other states towards them. In most other cases the parties concerned either welcomed the intervention of the League, which sometimes enabled them to draw back from an impossible situation, or did not dare to object to its authority.

There are, as we have seen, various ways by which a dispute or a threat of war can be brought before the Council of the League. But on twenty occasions appeal has been made to Article XI, generally by itself, but occasionally in conjunction with other Articles. Experience has shown that this Article is most easily used and is less likely to give umbrage to either of the contending parties. Whereas Article XV contains a threat that a decision may be made against a party with serious legal consequences, if it is opposed, Article XI is an invitation to join with other states in finding a way out of an impasse. At the same time, the duty that is imposed on the Council "to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations" has been in reserve if the parties have shown themselves stubborn, and in some cases wide powers have been based on it.

Article XV, on the other hand, has only been used twice in serious cases. In the Corfu case, where it could not be applied, and eventually in the Japanese-Chinese dispute, partly in order to obtain a reference to the Assembly. But the fact that Article XV remained in reserve has been an important consideration, while the procedure laid down in it has influenced that used in the discussions under Article XI.

On two occasions Article X has been quoted (Bulgaria-Greece, 1925, and Abyssinia, 1926). Some cases have come before the Council as a result of a treaty (the Mosul case). In at least one case the Council of the League has simply taken the matter up as a part of its general duties without specifying its terms of reference (Bolivia-Paraguay).

Most often one of the parties to the dispute, nearly always the weaker party, has appealed to the Council. On two occasions (Aaland Isles and Serbia-Albania) a third Power has intervened, in both cases Great Britain. This was, however, in the early days when the procedure needed an energetic step to put it into action and is now hardly necessary. In other cases another international body such as the Conference of Ambassadors (Austria-Hungary frontiers and Memel) has referred the matter and once the "Supreme Council," so-called, of the immediate post-war days (Upper Silesia).

At any rate, it is clear that the machinery of the League can be easily called into action. Wherever there has been real urgency the Council, if not in session, has been specially summoned. Previously, the President of the Council has often sent warnings or notices. In one or two cases emissaries of the Council have thrown themselves between the contending factions in the nick of time.

Once the Council has met and the contending parties are seated round the table a great variety of method has been used to find a solution. When hostilities threatened, the great thing was to stop the violence and prevent it from developing into a regular war. The classical case in this respect is the Graeco-Bulgarian dispute of October 1925. The Greeks had then already crossed a recognized frontier line and both sides were reinforcing their troops. At the appeal of Bulgaria, the weaker party, the Council through its President, M. Briand, sent exhortations to peace, reminders of the obligation of the Covenant, and a hint of the consequences of persistency in the evil course. No effort was made to judge the rights of the dispute. Each side, complainant and complainant, was treated alike. When the Council met, these appeals were addressed directly to the repre-

sentatives of each party. The military attachés of the Great Powers near the scene of action were ordered to the spot as the agents, not of these alone, but of the Council itself. Pressure was brought to bear on the contending Governments from every side, the representatives of the Great Powers at Athens and Sofia reinforcing the advice given by the Council. In this way the two states were persuaded to give orders to stop their troops just as a sanguinary battle was preparing by hereditary foes much heated by the recent incidents. Lines were laid down behind which the troops of each side should retire. Thus peace was preserved.

## 65. THE WORLD COURT <sup>1</sup>

[The World Court which came into being in September, 1921, was the realization of an ideal expressed as early as the fourteenth century. The later nineteenth century was marked by a rapid development of international arbitration, but no method of selecting judges for a permanent court was discovered until the establishment of the League of Nations.]



WHEN the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established in 1899, there was much dissatisfaction that the Hague Conference had not been able to go further. The institution created was not in any real sense a permanent tribunal; it was not strictly a court, and it provided means for arbitration instead of an agency for adjudication.

In 1907 the American delegates to the second Peace Conference at The Hague were instructed by President Roosevelt and Secretary Root to work for the development of the Permanent Court of Arbitration "into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else, who


<sup>1</sup> Manley O. Hudson, *The World Court* (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1931), pp. 3-8. Reprinted by courtesy of the World Peace Foundation.

are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility." Earnest efforts to this end were made by the American delegation, with the support of the British and German delegations throughout; but they met with very incomplete success. Though the second Conference succeeded in agreeing on the general plan of a new Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice, no agreement could be reached on the method of choosing the judges. The competition between the equality of states on the one hand and the political dominance of the great states on the other hand, created an impossible deadlock; and the conference adjourned without surmounting it. Yet the American delegation felt encouraged to report that "the foundations of a Permanent Court have been broadly and firmly laid. . . . A little time, a little patience, and the great work is accomplished."

The plan drawn up at the second Hague Conference was never put into force. Secretary of State Bacon made an effort in 1909 to have a proposed International Prize Court invested with the functions of the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice, and his efforts were continued by Secretary of State Knox; but without success.

#### THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

The world thus came to 1914 with no general machinery for handling international disputes except the Permanent Court of Arbitration. At the end of the Great War, it was taken for granted that a new court would be established. The Italian delegation at the Peace Conference put forward a proposal to this end, following very closely the earlier Hague conventions on the pacific settlement of international disputes. But other problems of the peace were so pressing that no attempt was made to agree upon a definite plan at that time, and the Peace Conference contented itself with drawing up Art. 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which directed the Council



Kultur Has Passed Here

(From *Raemaekers' Cartoon History of the War*, Vol. I, The Century Co., New York, 1919.)



The Gas Fiend

(From *Raemaekers' Cartoon History of the War*, Vol. I, The Century Co., New York, 1919.)

RAEMAEKERS' CARTOONS



#### THE APPLE SERMON ON THE MOUNT

This cartoon published while the World Depression was at its height effectively illustrates the close relationship between the World War, the armament race, and economic depression. (By H. M. Talburt. From *New York World-Telegram*.)



#### A PLACE IN THE SUN

This cartoon, inspired by the Italian assault on Ethiopia, epitomizes the futility of imperialism. (From *The Philadelphia Inquirer*.)



of the League of Nations to formulate and submit for adoption "plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice."

The Council of the League lost no time in carrying out the mandate given to it by Art. 14. At its second session in February, 1920, the Council invited a group of distinguished jurists to frame a plan for the new Court. . . . On the suggestion of Mr. Root, it decided to adopt as the basis of its discussion the plan for a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice which had been drawn up at the second Peace Conference at the Hague; it was at Mr. Root's suggestion, also, that the difficulties with reference to electing the judges were surmounted by resorting to the compromise which had already been reached between the large and small states in setting up the Council and Assembly of the League.

The project of the Commission of Jurists was submitted to the Council of the League of Nations at San Sebastian on August 5, 1920. It was debated for several months in the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, and after a number of amendments had been agreed upon it was adopted by the Assembly on December 13, 1920.

A protocol of signature was opened on December 16, 1920, and the project for the Court approved by the Council and Assembly was annexed to it as a Statute. This protocol constitutes an independent treaty which has now been signed by 55 states, of which 45 have ratified. The Statute came into force in September, 1921, when the Protocol had been ratified by 28 states.

The first election of judges was held on September 14-16, 1921, and the Court thereupon came into being. A first (preliminary) session was held at The Hague from January 30 to March 24, 1922; officers were elected, the organization was completed and rules of procedure were promulgated. On May 12, 1922, in accordance with the provision in Art. 35 of the Statute itself, a resolution was adopted by the Council, under which all states have access to the Court on equal terms, regardless of membership in the League of Nations. . . .

In addition to the preliminary session of the Court in 1922, 22 sessions have been held in the ten years 1922-31. In this period the Court has handed down 16 judgments, 20 advisory opinions and numerous orders. It has thus contributed to the settlement of a number of international disputes. No state has shown itself unwilling to abide by a judgment of the Court. Moreover, the jurisprudence of the Court constitutes a significant contribution to the development of international law. The Statute has worked much more smoothly than the history of the effort to establish a court would have led one to expect. Owing to the cooperation of various states through the League of Nations, administrative problems have given little difficulty. The expenses of the Court, about \$500,000 a year, have been promptly paid by the various states.

#### ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE COURT

A general election of members of the Court is held at the end of each nine-year period. The first general election in 1921 occupied three days; the second general election in 1930 was completed in one day. Four special elections to fill vacancies have been held—in 1923, 1928, 1929 and in 1930. Candidates are nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and, for states not represented in that body, by national groups created *ad hoc*. In 1921 the representatives of the United States in the Permanent Court of Arbitration declined to make any nominations; but they reversed their position in 1923 and they have made nominations in every election since that of 1921. The voting is conducted in the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations. The 55 states which are Members of the League of Nations may vote in the Assembly; proposals are now pending which would enable states which are not Members of the League of Nations but which are parties to the Protocol of Signature of 1920 to participate in the voting. Under the protocol for American adhesion of September 14, 1929, the United States would be permitted to vote in the election, both in the Assembly and in the Council.

The machinery for the election has worked so successfully that it now seems strange that this question should so long have baffled previous efforts to establish a Court.

#### THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

The Court exercises two kinds of jurisdiction: (a) in contentious cases; (b) on requests for advisory opinions. In contentious cases the Court's jurisdiction depends upon the consent of the parties. This consent may be given by a special agreement submitting the particular case to the Court, or it may be given by a previous agreement conferring on the Court a compulsory jurisdiction over cases of certain kinds. Many recent treaties and conventions contain such general agreements; in the annual reports of the Court 322 treaties are listed as providing for its jurisdiction. The most important source of compulsory jurisdiction, however, is the so-called Optional Clause, which is now binding on 37 states.

Advisory opinions may be requested by the Assembly or the Council of the League of Nations. Art. 1 of the Statute of the Court incorporates by reference a provision that the Court may give advisory opinions, which is to be found in Art. 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. To date the Council has made 25 requests for advisory opinions: one request was withdrawn; in one instance the Court refused to give the opinion because it related to a dispute to which a nonconsenting state was a party; and advisory opinions have been given in 20 instances. Each of these opinions has contributed to the solution of some perplexing international question.

66. THE LOCARNO TREATIES <sup>1</sup>

[At the Locarno Conference of October, 1925, statesmen caught a fleeting vision of a peaceful Europe. Under the conciliatory influence of Briand and Stresemann the powers signed a series of treaties designed to replace hatred and ill-will with peace and mutual understanding. Briand expressed the prevailing sentiment when he eloquently declared, "differences between us still exist, but henceforth it will be for the judge to declare the law. . . . Away with rifles, machine guns, cannon! Clear the way for conciliation, arbitration, peace!"]



TREATY OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE BETWEEN GERMANY,  
BELGIUM, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY

(Translation)

The President of the German Reich, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of Italy;

Anxious to satisfy the desire for security and protection which animates the peoples upon whom fell the scourge of the war of 1914-18;

Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium, and conscious of the necessity of ensuring peace in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts;

Animated also with the sincere desire of giving to all the signatory Powers concerned supplementary guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties in force between them;

Have determined to conclude a treaty with these objects, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: . . .

<sup>1</sup> *Parliamentary Papers*, 1926 (Cmd 2764) XXX, 743, p. 7.

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

## ARTICLE 1

The high contracting parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner provided in the following articles, the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulations of articles 42 and 43 of the said treaty concerning the demilitarised zone.

## ARTICLE 2

Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of—

1. The exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say, resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the previous paragraph or to a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary.

2. Action in pursuance of article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

3. Action as the result of a decision taken by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed against a State which was the first to attack.

## ARTICLE 3

In view of the undertakings entered into in article 2 of the present treaty, Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid

down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy:

Any question with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judicial decision, and the parties undertake to comply with such decision.

All other questions shall be submitted to a conciliation commission. If the proposals of this commission are not accepted by the two parties, the question shall be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which will deal with it in accordance with article 15 of the Covenant of the League.

The detailed arrangements for effecting such peaceful settlement are the subject of special agreements signed this day.

#### ARTICLE 4

1. If one of the high contracting parties alleges that a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

2. As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.

3. In case of a flagrant violation of article 2 of the present treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43, of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of

Nations, which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the high contracting parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the parties which have engaged in hostilities.

#### ARTICLE 5

The provisions of article 3 of the present treaty are placed under the guarantee of the high contracting parties as provided by the following stipulations:

If one of the Powers referred to in article 3 refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision and commits a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, the provisions of article 4 shall apply.

Where one of the Powers referred to in article 3 without committing a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision, the other party shall bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken; the high contracting parties shall comply with these proposals.

#### ARTICLE 6

The provisions of the present treaty do not affect the rights and obligations of the high contracting parties under the Treaty of Versailles or under arrangements supplementary thereto, including the agreements signed in London on the 30th August, 1924.

#### ARTICLE 7

The present treaty, which is designed to ensure the maintenance of peace, and is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

## ARTICLE 8

The present treaty shall be registered at the League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It shall remain in force until the Council, acting on a request of one or other of the high contracting parties notified to the other signatory Powers three months in advance, and voting at least by a two-thirds' majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the high contracting parties; the treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of one year from such decision.

## ARTICLE 9

The present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance thereof.

## ARTICLE 10

The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva in the archives of the League of Nations as soon as possible.

It shall enter into force as soon as all the ratifications have been deposited and Germany has become a member of the League of Nations.

The present treaty, done in a single copy, will be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and the Secretary-General will be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the high contracting parties

In faith whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty.

Done at Locarno, the 16th October, 1925.

LUTHER  
STRESEMANN  
EMILE VANDERVELDE  
A. BRIAND  
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN  
BENITO MUSSOLINI



67. THE PACT OF PARIS <sup>1</sup>

[Acting on the suggestion of Professor J. T. Shotwell, Briand proposed to Secretary of State Kellogg a Franco-American agreement outlawing war. The latter urged that other states be invited to participate, with the result that on August 27, 1928, representatives of fifteen states signed the treaty which appears below.]



The President of the United States of America, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the President of the German Reich, His Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the President of the Republic of Poland;

Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind;

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty;

Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a com-

<sup>1</sup> James T. Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1929), Appendix vi, pp. 301-303.

mon renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy;

Have decided to conclude a treaty and for that purpose have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries: . . .

#### ARTICLE 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

#### ARTICLE 2

The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall be never sought except by pacific means.

#### ARTICLE 3

The present treaty shall be ratified by the high contracting parties named in the preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at . . . . .

This treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a power shall be deposited at . . . . . and the treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the power thus adhering and the other powers parties hereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of . . . . . to furnish each Government named in the preamble and every Government subsequently adhering to this treaty with a certified copy of the treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of . . . . . telegraphically to notify such Govern-

ments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty in the French and English languages, both texts having equal force, and hereunto affix their seals.

Done at ..... the ..... . day of ..... ..  
in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty  
..... .



### **XIII. THE NATIONS SINCE THE WAR**



## 68. IS ENGLAND DONE? <sup>1</sup>

[England has suffered from a prolonged economic crisis which began soon after the close of the World War and, although it has been eased recently, many observers are still of the opinion that the condition is chronic and that England is doomed to lose her position as a great power. The extract which follows does not attempt a final answer to this problem, but does set forth the fundamental facts of the situation with admirable clarity.]



THE history of Great Britain would be better understood if there were no maps; the seas which separate the islands from the continent give a misleading impression of isolation and self-sufficiency. Great Britain is more closely connected with the outside world than almost any other nation; economically she is the most dependent of the major Powers. She does not grow half enough food to feed her forty-five million inhabitants, she does not produce more than a fifth of the raw materials of her industries. The United Kingdom must buy food and materials from abroad, and there is no question of her relying solely upon the Empire—little more than half her imports come from imperial sources; she has to rely not only on the Empire, but on foreign nations in Europe, Asia, Africa and America for the necessities of life.

To pay for food and raw materials, Great Britain sells manufactured goods and minerals: cotton goods, above all; then iron and steel, machinery, coal, woollen goods and chemicals. One person in five of the occupied population is working for the export trades, yet there are never enough exports to pay

<sup>1</sup> From "The Post-War World," by J. Hampden Jackson, pp. 82-84. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown & Company

for the imports. The balance must be made up by performing services for foreigners—by shipping, by banking, moneylending and insurance work and by the investment of British capital overseas. The importance of these “invisible exports” can best be illustrated by figures: the Board of Trade estimated that in the year 1929 Great Britain’s income from shipping was £130 million, from short interest and commissions £65 million, and from interest on overseas investment £250 million.

This dependence on foreign markets makes Great Britain sensitive to every economic shadow that passes over the face of the earth. Smoke from a new foundry in China darkens the prospect for English ironworkers; the sinking of a new shaft in a Polish coal field makes heavy the heart of English mineowners and shippers; bankruptcy in Argentina or in Austria, in Russia or in Peru, means loss of dividends for English investors and loss of orders for English industrialists; and empty pockets in Germany mean empty larders in England—for what Germans cannot buy, some English manufacturers cannot sell, and so must cut down expenses and dismiss workers. Great Britain is dependent on the outside world: her hope for the future is that the outside world should continue to be dependent upon her.

*Post-War Depression.* When the Armistice was signed, no Englishman doubted that his country would resume her pre-war position as the wealthiest of nations, the factory and the banker of the world. A wave of optimism swept over the country: buyers releasing the tension of four long years poured out their savings in indiscriminate spending; takings swelled and trade boomed. The optimism lasted for over a year, and then it began to be realized that all was not well after all. Men could not find work; in January, 1921, there were over a million unemployed. Something must have gone radically wrong. In cold fact, each of Great Britain’s four great sources of revenue was drying up. Her exports were falling. Foreign countries had less need of British manufactured goods; they had begun even before the war to set up industries for themselves, and the war had hastened the development; Japanese and Indians had built their own cotton mills; Australians were weaving the wool of their



own sheep; there was less demand for British coal—Germany had just delivered two million tons to France by way of Reparation payment; and France, not needing so much, had sold coal cheap to Holland, the Scandinavian countries and Italy, who were accustomed to buy from Great Britain. Shipping suffered with the coal industry; reduced coal exports meant reduced freights for outgoing British steamers. It is true that by confiscating the German mercantile marine the British had secured the luxury passenger traffic across the Atlantic (the German ships appeared under new names as the *Berengaria*, *Homeric*, *Majestic*) but this meant loss of contracts for British shipyards; in 1921 two thirds of the men engaged in the shipbuilding industry were out of work. Britain had lost, too, many of her overseas investments; in Russia, for instance, the Bolsheviks had repudiated all debts incurred under the Tsarist régime, and by 1921 Great Britain had given up hope of expelling the Bolsheviks by force. Finally, a great deal of the financial business of the City of London had been lost during the war to New York, which was fast becoming the banking centre of the world.

It was a sad situation but nobody thought it very serious. Given time, the world would shake down to peace conditions and Great Britain would return to her pre-war supremacy. Lloyd George gradually withdrew the Government control over industry that had been imposed during the war, and then cajoled his Coalition into passing a few mild but startling reforms. He suggested some tariffs in the 1919 budget and in 1921 passed a Safeguarding of Industries Act to protect "industries indispensable in the event of another war" and to make it difficult for countries with depreciated currencies to sell goods in England. He made a commercial agreement with Russia whereby England swallowed her pride, in the hope of making a little money out of trade with the Soviets; in this supper with the Devil, England kept a long spoon, stipulating that the Soviets should refrain from propaganda against British capitalism. And he did something for the unemployed. Back in 1911 Lloyd George had adapted from Bismarck an insurance scheme, by which the employees, the employers and the State each made a contribution

to a fund out of which premiums were paid to men who failed to find work. The fund was adequate for normal conditions but with the million unemployed of January, with the nearly two millions of July, 1921, it could not deal; such figures seemed in those days fantastically abnormal. Lloyd George increased the State's contribution to the fund and so provided a pittance for insured workers for fifteen weeks of unemployment. This "dole," as it was unhappily called, was enough to keep the workers from starvation and from thoughts of revolution; but it did nothing to cure the basic diseases of England's economic condition.

By 1922 the Conservatives had had enough of Lloyd George. A brilliant opportunist of his calibre was the very man to lead the country through a war, but he was not, in their opinion and in the opinion of Liberals in Asquith's following, steady enough for a peace-time leader. They withdrew their support and a Conservative Ministry was formed, backed by a strong majority at the elections of 1922.

## 69. THE SPIRIT OF THE PRESENT RÉGIME IN FRANCE <sup>1</sup>

[The selection which appears below is taken from an address delivered at the Williamstown Institute of Politics and should serve to make clear certain basic traits of French political life.]



THE Third Republic is characterized by three persistent tendencies, and three reactions arising in opposition to them.

Popular government, the first of these tendencies, must be considered irrevocable; and the second running parallel to it is a tendency to despotism, a virus inherited from the past which

<sup>1</sup> Andre Siegfried, *France: A Study in Nationality* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1930), pp. 102-108. Reprinted by courtesy of Yale University Press.

still exists in both our administration and our government. "Power is always regal," says Alain, and it must be admitted that such is the experience of the French in the past. The third tendency, the Bonapartist spirit, is a longing for autocratic power in a *régime* that has systematically tried to root it out. This latent anti-parliamentarism seems paradoxical in a country which just wants parliamentarism to be everything.

The three reactions arising out of these tendencies are not less vigorous. The people wish to be everything, or at least assure their own rule, therefore their elected, the deputy, must be the most important piece in the game; hence the supremacy of the deputy, the creature of universal suffrage. Since in the nature of things, governments invariably abuse their power, they must be rigidly kept in check. The deputy chosen to be a Cabinet Minister and placed in that capacity at the head of an administration is really instructed by the people to control it quite as much as direct it. Parliament is still mindful of the two Napoleons, and also of General Boulanger who more recently insisted on addressing the people over its head, and therefore its sure instinct tells the parliament that it is prudent to be jealous of anybody endeavoring to come in touch with the masses outside of it. The French Parliament, even in its most advanced elements, detests and condemns any form of direct government by the people.

It is not surprising that such preoccupations have formed an entirely new conception of the parliamentary *régime* in comparison with the original English model. The men originally elected to watch and inspect the working of the system have become the true inspirers of their Government in the democracy, and democracy in its turn has come to insist that no resistance whatever should be opposed to its delegates so that the balance of power remains in fact nothing more than a theory. It is hard to understand how an English observer as penetrating as Mr. Bodley could have ever believed that the French people were not seriously devoted to democracy.

The deputy is in reality the central figure of the *régime*, for his power lies in the fact that he alone in the Republic is directly

responsible to the people, and holds a direct delegation of the sovereign masses. Now with the constituency system, which is the truly French way of voting, the member of Parliament really owes nothing to his party, for as it did not create him it cannot depose him. Nor need he worry about the Government, for although the latter has the right constitutionally, it would never dream of dissolving the Chamber; it would constitute a scandal, almost a *coup d'état*! He then will hardly ever refrain from defeating the Cabinet, a gesture which in England would automatically carry you before the electors (with a cost of £1,000 sterling) but which in France does not cost the deputy a cent and is even likely to open the agreeable prospect of a portfolio. Could any two situations be more diametrically opposed? This explains why a deputy who is sure of his constituency feels independent of everyone except his electors. The opponents of universal suffrage consider this a lamentable situation, but the constituency does not view things from such an angle at all. From this point of view we should not be astonished to read Alain writing of the deputy with love and admiration and describing him as the "idealist of the provinces, a redoubtable personality, not to be turned aside by promises or threats, for he is entrenched in his constituency, fortified and invincible as a feudal nobleman in his castle."

Thus the political system rests on a local foundation, in fact on a polyarchy of constituencies, where the deputy is absolutely at his best if he happens to be personally a local man, in which case he becomes the plenipotentiary of the districts to Paris. We have already noted the suspicious attitude of the republican provinces toward the capital. The man they have elected must not become a Parisian, but should on the contrary always remain a provincial endowed with a mission. If he does become a Parisian—as usually happens if he is successful—he runs the risk of getting out of touch with his constituents. If he is corrupted by the salons, by business, or by power, he will cease to share the political faith or convictions of his electors. Such skepticism is incompatible with the deep-rooted and somewhat heavy-footed provincial convictions. Alain will tell you that he prefers for his

deputy an honest man who has not been too successful, a man who just arrives from his village all ready to teach the Parisians. Everywhere we find this democratic phobia of being betrayed, the snobbishness being the first step to treachery . . . How well I understand the labor leader's hesitation to appear in a dinner jacket! The average French deputy goes to his constituency every Friday night and only returns to Paris on Tuesday or Wednesday. The post brings him fifty letters a day and he answers them all. He generally lodges in a modest room somewhere in the capital or the suburbs, and his electors prefer that he live this "simple life."

His mandate to the Chamber is thus less as a lawmaker than as an agent-ambassador, who must always be within reach of the electors, to right the wrongs inflicted by an arbitrary administration—unless he is, on the contrary, asking arbitrary favors. The electors like to feel that their delegate is all-powerful, and nothing provokes them more than a story of failure. "Aren't you the boss?" would be the natural protest. "You who are all-powerful," is a phrase which constantly recurs in the correspondence of our parliamentarians. We recognize in this the naive attitude of the poor people who have been ground down for centuries by an administration insolent and intolerant of the lower classes. Today they like to think that the personal intervention of their great protector, the deputy, can settle everything. This touching survival of the appeal to the King seated under the oak is explained by Alain's remark: "The door of the deputy should always be open."

It is indeed, as we have said already, a striking delegation of sovereignty, of which the deputies individually and collectively are inordinately proud, although they did not fully appreciate it so long as the *régime* was still under discussion. After the elections of 1906, when the impression made by the Dreyfus case, Boulangism, and the last attack of Royalism in 1877, had faded into the past, the deputies, irrespective of the political parties to which they belonged, began to realize that only one power survived in the democracy, and that power was their own. It was about that time that they began to use the familiar

"thee" and "thou" to each other. Commenting on this, Robert de Jouvenel writes in the *République des Camarades*: "Actually there is left less difference between two deputies, although one may be a revolutionary and the other not, than between two revolutionaries, one of whom is a deputy and the other is not."

This *esprit de corps*, which seems to be increasing, arises partly from a feeling of the deputies that they must stand together on the defensive. We are apt to picture the member of the Chamber as a cringing creature, using back streets in order to hide from the contemptuous public. This may, perhaps, be true in Paris on certain days of military demonstration, but usually employees on the trains cannot be too civil and porters never make him wait. He has all the prestige of a man traveling on a pass, and in a crowd he would not dream of standing in queue—a point on which he is extremely touchy. At certain official dinners the Field Marshals have to be placed at the lower end of the table because a dozen deputies must go in first. This touchiness of etiquette is sometimes ridiculous, but on reflection it is not surprising when one considers the intoxicating effect of sovereign power. A deputy will not say in so many words like Louis XIV, "*L'état, c'est moi*," but many of them certainly think so. At any rate, although the Chamber looks upon the Presidency of the Republic, the Senate, and the Government as useful and highly respectable institutions, nevertheless in their opinion it is the man elected by the people who must always have the final word. This also is the opinion of the electors, though not so much of those you will meet in the Paris salons, as the millions of nobodies who make up the French nation.

This is a singular *régime*, arising almost entirely from distrust and protest. It is by questions and control that the member makes his power felt, and it is by becoming as Minister the head of an administration that he tries to force his will upon the impenetrable ranks of the civil servants. But, as La Rochefoucauld remarks, "One may give advice, but one cannot influence conduct." The civil servant wins out in the end, for as he alone knows the technique and the routine, the Minister's influence is

greatly reduced in actual practice. A permanent rule of suspicion is developed from this. According to Alain, "The control exerted by democracy is nothing less than the power continually on the alert to dispose alike of kings and specialists the moment they do not work for the good of the greatest number."

But according to Robert de Jouvenel, "The democracy based on control has fallen complacently asleep, since the Minister now works hand in hand, even against Parliament, with the men whom he has been appointed by Parliament to control." This is also the opinion of that most competent judge, M. Charles Seignobos: "The Ministers, once they form part of the tradition, are constrained to work in harmony with their subordinates, the civil servant, to carry on the traditional and automatic routine." Nevertheless, he considers that sooner or later by means of the budget, and especially by questions in Parliament, the Chamber brings them back under its control.

This control, despite all, has its virtues. I was attached for some time to one of our chief administrative departments. Usually we did our share of work conscientiously in a quiet atmosphere of daily routine, but there were days when one hardly recognized the place—the director had nerves, the letter files seemed to pile up hectically on the tables, and the typists all had their teeth on edge. There was a question to be asked in the House by a deputy . . . and everyone jumped except the porters! This intervention of the deputy serves thus as a spur to keep the horse panting, even when it is not in use. It also acts as a master key, able to open and track down everything.

70. THE FASCIST STATE <sup>1</sup>

[The World War definitely sharpened the conflict between the middle class and the workers and in a number of states led to the suppression of radicalism among both workers and peasants. In other states, notably Italy and Germany, an attempt has been made to obliterate the class struggle and establish a form of dictatorial capitalism under the system known as fascism. The effort to build up an organization based on this concept has made marked progress in Italy.]



## THE STRUCTURE AND POLICY OF THE FASCIST STATE

**I**TALY, like Russia, is now a one-party state; and the National Fascist Party is, like the Russian Communist party, a close corporation, hierarchically organized. Members are admitted only after tests as to their Fascist character and loyalty, and they must take an oath "to follow without question the orders of the *Duce*." Breach of party discipline is a cause for expulsion from the party, which means exclusion from political life. Party administration is in the hands of a National Directorate selected and presided over by the *Duce*. Provincial party officials are appointed and controlled by the central organization. About 400,000 of the party members are now organized into the Fascist militia, evolved out of the earlier *squadre*, some 50,000 of the latter are on permanent duty and, since 1928, have been co-ordinated with the regular armed forces of the nation.

Legislation of the Fascist régime has established a strict, centralized, governmental control of the economic life of the nation. Fascist party pronouncements, in 1922, declared in favor of national corporations of local workers' syndicates, to be integrated into the national political structure. Subsequently a for-


<sup>1</sup> Francis W. Coker, *Recent Political Thought* (D Appleton-Century Company, Incorporated, New York, 1934), pp. 468-471. Reprinted by courtesy of D. Appleton-Century Company, Incorporated.





GHOSTS AT VERSAILLES

The German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles on January 18, 1871, and on June 28, 1919, the representatives of the German Republic signed the Treaty of Versailles. This cartoon depicts the ghosts of Bismarck, Moltke, and William I witnessing the great humiliation of Germany. (*Mr. Punch's History of the Great War*, Cassell and Company, Ltd., London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne, 1919.)



UTOPIA

A famous cartoon by a contemporary artist which effectively illustrates the major post-war trends. (By O. E. Cesare. From *New York Times*, April 8, 1934.)



Photograph by Brown Brothers

Hitler at a Nazi Demonstration



From World Wide Photos

Mussolini Addressing Populace



From Sovfoto

Stalin and Members of the Soviet Government

mal legal structure was worked out for them as well as for associations of employers and professional men. The laws (as they stand in 1933) provide for thirteen great associations: six federations each of employers and employees (Industry, Commerce, Agriculture, Sea and Air Transport, Land Transport and Inland Navigation, and Banking) and a single federation of "independent artists, artisans, and professional men." The laws are vague as to the appointment of officials of the federations, but they appear to be selected by the Fascist party leaders. Wage agreements in each industry are fixed, in first instance, by negotiation between the proper employer and labor organizations; failing agreement, a court of labor, composed of a judge and two official labor experts, decides the matter. Strikes and lockouts are forbidden. No employer or laborer is compelled to join these associations under Fascist auspices; but no others are "recognized," and employers and employees must pay contributions to the official federations, whether or not they join them. The government also authorizes the federations to make collective contracts binding on both members and non-members, in the industries to which the contracts apply.

Complete political centralization and absolutism have been achieved through laws and decrees, from 1923 to 1928. In November, 1926, all opposition parties were dissolved, and prison sentences were provided for those who tried to revive the parties or who carried on propaganda for their doctrines. Other laws or decrees have nullified all responsibility of the ministry to Parliament. The king remains formally the constitutional executive, but, by law of 1925, the premier—selected by the king without consulting parliamentary opinion and responsible only to the king—is made "Head of the Government," with authority to issue decrees having the full force of law. The other ministers are subordinates, not colleagues, of the premier.

The final steps in the destruction of the institutions of constitutional democracy were accomplished by the laws of February, March, and December, 1928. These laws abolish the old Chamber of Deputies and establish in its stead a new "corporative parliament." This body is composed of 400 members, who

represent not local constituencies but official groups created by the government: namely, the thirteen federations already named and twenty-odd non-incorporated organizations, such as the National Association of State Employees, the Disabled Soldiers' Association, the Universities, and the National Association of Primary Schools. The Grand Council of Fascism (made fully a part of the government) fixes the quotas of representation, with reference to the relative importance of the functions for which the several organizations stand in the life of the nation. Each organization submits a list of candidates—generally twice the number to be selected—to the Council, which either selects the required number from the list or substitutes other nominations of its own. The list as finally approved by the Council is then submitted to the electorate for acceptance or rejection. The electorate is confined to Italian citizens, twenty-one years of age (or eighteen years for married citizens having children), of the following groups: those who pay syndicate dues or a certain amount in taxes; those who receive a regular payment from the state or from a province or commune; clergy of the Roman Catholic Church or of other churches recognized by the state. The law declares that the new parliamentary chamber is to "cooperate with the government"—that is, with the "Head of the Government" and the Grand Council of Fascism, which is also the "Grand Council of the National State" and "the supreme body which controls all the activities of the régime." The chamber has no power of initiative; it acts only on proposals submitted by the "Head" and may only discuss (this includes a nominal right to criticize) the proposals; it may not reject them. Control of government and of the Fascist party is made permanent by the provision for succession to the headship of government, which is also the headship of the party. The law provides that when the present incumbent dies or resigns, his successor is to be appointed by the king from a list of names submitted by the Grand Council. Thus power centers finally in a single person, who is both "leader of fascism" (*duce del fascismo*) and "head of the government" (*capo del governo*). He makes the appointments to superior positions in the party, selects the members of

the Grand Council of Fascism (which nominates the candidates for the Chamber of Deputies), and ratifies or vetoes the governmental decisions of the Council.

Through all fluctuations in Fascist policy, certain objectives have constantly stood out, in profession and practice: the restoration of the power of the Italian nation externally and the establishment of vigor and efficiency in the domestic administration of economic and civic affairs. The most distinguished leaders of the former Nationalist party are now preeminent among the counselors of Mussolini; and their assumption is that the prestige and influence of the state require an assertive foreign policy and a rigidly hierarchic organization of domestic government.

The Fascists, in pursuing these aims, recognize no individual liberties as sacred and rely chiefly upon the methods of moral intimidation, physical compulsion, and official censorship and propaganda. Both in their illegal activities before their seizure of formal power and in their subsequent governmental policy, they have dealt summarily and malevolently with their opponents. In the first few years of their régime the Fascist government tolerated the kidnappings, beatings, and slayings inflicted by the private bands, sometimes in retaliation for outrages committed against Fascists, sometimes without any such provocation. Probably no country, in recent years, with the possible exception of tsarist and Soviet Russia, and Germany under Hitler, has explicitly adopted methods so repressive as those embodied in the Fascist laws and decrees of 1925 and 1926. These make it a crime, punishable by imprisonment, to criticize the government, to conduct propaganda for the doctrines of associations that have been dissolved by the government, and to spread false or "exaggerated" news abroad concerning internal conditions of the country; they empower the government to deprive anti-Fascist Italians abroad of their citizenship and property. For the trial of these crimes the laws establish a special tribunal—chosen by the *Duce* from officers of the army, navy, air force, or militia—employing the procedure of a court martial. There is also a rigid governmental control of all published opinions. The law requires every newspaper or other

periodical to be operated under the control of a director approved by the government and limits the contributors to persons registered by the government-controlled syndicates of journalists. The government has vigorously prosecuted and suppressed socialist and liberal periodicals and has "fascitized" the more mildly critical journals (such as the famous *Corriere della Sera*), forcing the replacement of independent managers and editors by persons who will applaud, without serious qualifications, the Fascist rule.

## 71. THE PERSONALITY OF THE NATIONAL STATE <sup>1</sup>

[Adolf Hitler is a dominant figure in the world of to-day. Taking shrewd advantage of German resentment toward the Versailles Treaty, and profiting by the economic distress which has been chronic in Germany since the World War, he seized power in January, 1933. The following selection from his book, *My Battle*, represents his conception of the National State.]



IT WOULD be folly to expect to measure a man's worth by the race he belongs to and at the same time to declare war on the Marxist axiom, 'One man is the same as any other,' unless we were prepared to pursue it to its final consequences.

Anyone who believes to-day that a national, Nationalist-Socialist State should, by purely mechanical means and better construction of its economic life, make itself different from other States—that is, by a better compromise between riches and poverty or by broadening the control of the economic process or by fairer recompense, by doing away with too great differences in wages—will find himself in an absolute *impasse*: he has not the slightest conception of what we mean by a world-view.

<sup>1</sup> Adolf Hitler, *My Battle* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1933), pp. 183-188. Abridged and translated by E. T. S. Dugdale. Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

The methods described above offer no hope of permanency; still less do they promise a great future. A nation which puts trust in reforms so superficial will obtain no guarantee whatever of victory in the general struggle of nations. A movement which founds its mission on such compromises as these will in truth introduce no great reforms, real because far-reaching, because its action will never touch anything but the surface of things.

In order to understand this more clearly, it may be well to glance at the real origins and causes of the development of human civilization.

The first step which visibly drew mankind away from the animal world was that which led towards invention. Man's first skilled measures in the struggle with the rest of the animals were in their origin undoubtedly his management of creatures which had special capabilities. Even then personality was clearly what produced decisions and achievements which were later on accepted by the whole of humanity as a matter of course. A man's knowledge of his own powers, which I consider even now is the foundation of all strategy, was due originally to a determined brain, and not until perhaps thousands of years had passed was it universally accepted as a perfectly natural thing.

Man crowned this first discovery with a second: he learned, among other things, how to live while engaged in his struggle for life. And so began the inventive activity peculiar to man, the results of which we see all around us. And it is the result of the creative power and capability of the individual person. It was profoundly instrumental in making the man who has the power of continually rising higher still. But what were once simple artifices, helping hunters in the forest, in their struggle for existence, are now the brilliant scientific discoveries of our present time, and these help mankind in the struggle for existence today and are forging the weapons for struggles in the future.

. . . The labour of evolving pure theory, which is incapable of measurement, but which is the necessary preliminary for all further material discovery, is again seen to be the exclusive product of the individual. The multitude does not invent, ma-

majorities neither organize nor think; it is always only the one man, the Individual.

A human community is only seen to be well organized if it furthers in every possible way the work of these creative forces and employs them for the good of the community. Organization must be an embodiment of the endeavour to place the brains over the multitude and to subjugate the multitude to the brains.

Thus organization may not prevent the brains from emerging from the multitude, but it must, on the contrary, by its own conscious action, make it in the highest degree possible and facilitate it.

The hard fight for life above all things causes the brains to emerge.

State administration and the strength of the nations incorporated in the defensive forces are dominated by the idea of personality and the authority attaching to it and by responsibility towards the highly placed individual.

The political life of today alone has persistently turned its back on this principle of nature. While all human civilization is but the outcome of the creative force of personality, in the community as a whole and especially among its leaders, the principle of the dignity of the majority makes a pretence of being the deciding authority, and it is beginning gradually to poison all life below it—and in fact to break it up. The destructive workings of Judaism in the bodies of other nations can at bottom only be ascribed to the perpetual effort to undermine the importance of personality throughout the nations who are their hosts, and to substitute the will of the multitude.

. . . We now see that Marxism is the enunciated form of the Jewish attempt to abolish the importance of personality in all departments of human life and to set the mass of numbers in its place. In politics the parliamentary form of government is its expression, and that is what is working such mischief, from the smallest parish council up to the power controlling the entire Reich.

. . . Marxism has never been able to found a culture or create an economic system by itself; moreover, it has never



really been in a position to carry on an existing system in accordance with its own principles. But after a very short time it was forced to retrace its steps and grant concessions to the theory of the principle of personality; even in its own organization it is unable to deny that principle. The national theory of the world must therefore be completely differentiated from the Marxist theory; it must pin its faith on race, and on the importance of personality also, and make them the pillars supporting the whole of its edifice. These are the basic factors of its view of the world.

The national State must work untiringly to set all government, especially the highest—that is, the political leadership—free from the principle of control by majorities—that is, the multitude—so as to secure the undisputed authority of the Individual in its stead.

. . . The best form of State and constitution is that which with natural sureness of hand raises the best brains of the community to a position of leadership and predominant influence.

. . . There must be no majority making decisions, but merely a body of responsible persons, and the word 'council' will revert to its ancient meaning. Every man shall have councillors at his side, but the *decision* shall be made by the one Man.

The national State does not suffer that men whose education and occupation have not given them special knowledge shall be invited to advise on or judge of subjects of a specialized nature, such as economics. The State will therefore subdivide its representative body into political committees and committees representing professions and trades. In order to obtain advantageous co-operation between the two, there will be over them a particular Senate.

But neither Senate nor Chamber will have power to make decisions; they are appointed to work and not to make decisions. Individual members may advise, but never decide. That is the exclusive prerogative of the responsible President for the time being.

. . . As regards the possibility of carrying out our knowledge in practice, I may remind my readers that the parliamentary

principle of decision by majorities has not always governed the human race; on the contrary, it only appears during quite short periods of history, and those have been always periods of decadence in nations and States.

In any case let no one imagine that purely theoretical measures from above will produce such a change, since logically it cannot stop at the constitution of a State. All legislation and, indeed, the citizen's whole life will have to be saturated with it. Such a revolution will and can only come about by means of a movement, itself built up in the spirit of that idea and therefore itself the begetter of the coming State.

Thus the National-Socialist movement must today identify itself with that idea and carry it out in practice within its own organization, so that it may not only be able to guide the State in the right path, but may have the perfected body of the State ready for its occupation.

## 72. THE NEW TURKEY <sup>1</sup>

[While the history of Turkey during the past century is on the whole unpleasant, it should be remembered that the picture presented to American students has been incomplete and frequently misleading. Since the World War, however, profound changes have taken place in Turkey with the result that in many respects the new Turkish Republic has become westernized. Madame Halidé Edib is well qualified to interpret the new Turkey, having played an important part in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the Nationalist Revolution under Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in addition to rendering important service in connection with education, journalism, and politics.]



THE continuation of reforms in Turkey under the dictatorial *régime* from 1925 to 1929, and especially their nature, are more interesting and significant than the ter-

<sup>1</sup> Halidé Edib, *Turkey Faces West* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1930), pp 223-236. (Condensed.) Reprinted by permission of, and by arrangement with, Yale University Press.

rorist methods by which they were supposed to be made possible.

This process of reform has been going on for nearly a century, but within the last twenty years it has moved with tremendous rapidity. The version in the western press, usually the outcome of the most superficial and hurried observation after a pleasant and short Mediterranean trip, is that Turkey was changed overnight from an eastern into a western country. This is worse than superficial; it is false. Whether the recent reforms could have been carried out by other than terrorist methods is a question to be seriously considered. And there is no doubt that they were bound to be carried through—but whether in three years or in thirteen or thirty years, no one can tell. Naturally one includes among the reforms which were sure to be realized only the fundamental ones that will endure. The nature of the leading reforms effected by the dictatorial *régime* confirms the assumption that they are the continuation of earlier tendencies to westernization and are not departures from the fundamental line of progress that the Turks have taken.

The first and most spectacular of these reforms was the "Hat Law," passed in 1925. It was also the most futile and superficial in comparison to the others which followed. But it was the only one which accomplished an external change overnight. In a week it made the Turks don European hats (the only part of the city dwellers' outfit which had not been westernized) and made them look like westerners, although the manner in which it was accomplished was utterly un-western. The westernization of Turks is not and should not be a question of mere external imitation and gesture. It is a much deeper and more significant process. To tell the Turk to don a certain head-dress and "get civilized" or be hanged or imprisoned, is absurd, to say the least. The opposition of individuals among the men in the street, really much more westernized than those who carried the measure through, had a note of wounded self-respect rather than of objection to wearing hats. Among all the recent measures, this was the most seriously opposed in the country itself. Any opposition to the "Hat Law" was labeled as reaction-

ary. The interesting fact connected with the substitution of the hat for the Turkish fez is that it attracted the greatest attention in the western world. Other more fundamental changes taking place in Turkey were either entirely unnoticed, or criticized, or neglected as unimportant items of foreign news in the western papers. But the moment the Turks put hats on their heads the general cry in the West was, "At last the Turks are civilized; they wear hats." Hence those who enacted the "Hat Law" might say: "We have killed a few, and imprisoned a large number, but it was good psychology; has anything in the past brought the Turks so much into the limelight? Has anything brought them nearer to the European in the European mind?" . . .

The chief result of the "Hat Law" was that it enriched European hat factories at the expense of the already impoverished Turks. Broadly one can say that it could not have been passed without a *régime* of terror. The Islamic reactionaries, the liberals, the people who understood the spirit of the West, were all opposed to it for different reasons. What would have happened was this: The very small number of Turks who wore hats in the summer in Constantinople would have increased gradually and in a generation hat wearers would have been in a majority in the cities. But the Turkish peasant would have stuck to his old headdress.

The adoption of the Swiss code in place of the Islamic family law in 1926 was a reform of a much more serious nature. It could have been put through without much coercion, although there would have been some bitter criticism. . . .

The educational rights that Turkish women have gained are no longer questioned even by the smallest minority, and the sphere of women's work has been constantly widening. It is perhaps a blessing that they have not obtained the vote. Thus they have been protected from the danger of being identified with party politics, and their activities outside the political world could not be stopped for political reasons.

In the Turkish home, women continue to be the ruling spirit, more so, perhaps, because the majority contribute to the upkeep

by their labor. At the present time, offices, factories, and shops are filled with women workers in the cities; and in addition to their breadwinning jobs, and sometimes in connection with them, women have interested themselves in child welfare and hygiene, and in organizing small associations to teach poor women embroidery, sewing, weaving, and so on. The favorite profession of Turkish women today, after teaching, is medicine. All this is the city aspect of the situation. In the rural districts, women still continue to live their old life with its drudgery, and will continue to live under these conditions until a more up-to-date agricultural system is adopted and the rudiments of education can be given in those districts. It would not be an underestimate to say that something like 90 per cent of the Turkish women are very hard workers; the question is not how to provide more work for them but how to train them better for their work and to give them more leisure. The small percentage of the idle rich (much smaller in Turkey than elsewhere) do on a miniature scale what the idle rich of other countries do. Unfortunately Turkey is judged by the life and attitude of these idlers, who are conspicuous to the eyes of the traveler, rather than by the hard-working majority. . . .

In 1928 the clause in the Constitution which declared Islam the state religion was abolished. In the foreign press this step was criticized very severely, on the ground that it amounted to the abolition of religion in Turkey. This criticism was not only superficial but inaccurate. If religion, in the best sense, is in any danger of losing its hold on the Turkish people, it is not due to absence of governmental interference but to governmental interference itself. The men who sponsored this measure may or may not have been atheists, but the measure itself does not do away with religion. No secular state can logically have a basic law which establishes a state religion. The abolition of the clause from the Constitution was therefore in true and necessary accord with the nature of the new Turkish state at its last stage of secularization. "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." The Turks have at last rendered up the things that were

Caesar's or the state's; but Caesar or the state still keeps things which belong to God. Unless the Presidency of Religious Affairs is made free, unless it ceases to be controlled by the office of the Prime Minister, it will always be a governmental instrument. In this respect the Moslem community is less privileged and less free than the Christian Patriarchates. These are free institutions which decide upon all questions of dogma and religion according to the convictions of their particular group. The Islamic community is chained to the policy of the Government. This situation is a serious impediment to the spiritual growth of Islam in Turkey, and there is always a danger in it of the use of religion for political ends

Now that the state has freed itself entirely from religious control, it should in turn leave Islam alone. Not only should it declare, "Every major Turkish citizen is free to adopt the religion he (or she) wishes to adopt," but it should also allow the Moslem community to teach its religion to its youth. Now that the schools give no religious instruction, and the religious institutions are abolished, the Islamic community, if it is going to last as a religious community, must create its own means of religious teaching, its own moral and spiritual sanctions. Further, in the ritual and in the fundamentals of worship, there are likely to be changes among the Moslems in Turkey. Those changes should be allowed to take place without governmental interference. The occasional proposals by the university professors of new forms of worship in Islam—such as substituting organ music for vocal music, entering the mosques without taking off the shoes, placing benches so that the faithful may pray seated, and doing away with a number of complicated body movements in prayer—have met with profound displeasure. All these changes might take place by the wishes of the people, but governmental interference in this most sacred part of men's rights would constitute a dangerous precedent. It would fetter the religious life of the Turks and bring politics into religion. The fundamental meaning of the long and very interesting phases of secularization is that Turkish psychology separates this world from the next. To take religion out of the political

state but at the same time to keep the state in religious affairs, is one of the contradictory aspects of the last phase which must be corrected . . .

The change of the Turkish alphabet from the Arabic to the Latin characters in 1928 is as important as the adoption of the Swiss family law, in its future significance. The desire to change the Turkish alphabet showed itself in a much earlier movement, as has been indicated. The serious impediments were: First, that it would impair Islamic unity, as all Moslems used the Arabic alphabet; second, that the Koran is written in the Arabic alphabet, and it might be considered as a sacrilege to write it in other letters; third, that it would impair cultural unity among the Turks inside and outside Turkey, for all Moslem Turks, who speak the same language, use the Arabic letters.

By 1928 the circumstances affecting this question had changed. First, Islamic unity was practically gone during and after the Great War, as far as the Turks were concerned.

Second, the Turks had ultimately altered their conception of Islam by a secularization which appeared unorthodox if not heretical to the other Moslems. The writing of the Koran in Latin letters seemed a very light matter in comparison to the feat of abolishing the Islamic law, especially its family clauses, and abolishing the Caliphate. The trend toward the nationalization of Islam among the Turks resembled the trend toward the nationalization of Christianity at the time of the Reformation. The Turks have translated the Koran into their own tongue; they have begun to say the Friday prayers in Turkish; and naturally, they will also write the Koran in their own letters, whatever those letters may be. Third, a conference in Baku, with a large number of delegates from Turks all over Russia, adopted the Latin letters in 1925. The Azerbaijan Turks have been writing Turkish in Latin letters for four years, and other Turks in Russia are gradually adopting them. The use of Latin letters would therefore no longer impair the cultural unity of the Turks. It would work just the other way.

There was finally a strong practical argument in favor of the adoption of the Latin letters. The quantitative ideal in edu-

cation under the Young Turkish *régime* was becoming more important than the qualitative value of education in Turkey, partly due to the general illiteracy of the country. Mass education was one of the undying movements which the constitutional changes in 1908 had brought about. It was natural to seek the easiest way of teaching the alphabet.

From 1921 to 1922, during the year when military activities between the Greeks and the Turks were suspended, the young element in the Turkish army had started an admirable movement to educate the men. Demonstration of the difficulty of teaching adults the Arabic alphabet won adherents for the Latin alphabet with its comparative simplicity.

Hence in 1928, with all these factors in favor of the Latin letters, with the extra strength of westernization centered in a dictatorial government, there was a chance of carrying out the reform of the alphabet. It had the support of all progressive people in Turkey, whether adherents or opponents of the dictatorship. Popular opposition to any measure of which the army approved, after the reign of terror from 1925 to 1927, of course would have been useless.

The way this measure was carried out deserves serious consideration. The time allowed for the change was absurdly short. The preliminary study of the ways and means of applying it—perhaps the most serious measure involving cultural problems ever adopted in Turkey—was neither properly conceived nor conducted by any important experts. A far more serious investigation of the question, not only by Turkish specialists but also by eminent western authorities, was needed. The martial way it was rushed into effect, the martial orders given for the time limit by a mentality which was purely that of a staff officer, indicated a lack of understanding of the most far-reaching change ever carried through in modern Turkish history.

For the time being it reduced the reading public to the minimum. Many papers were obliged to suspend publication, and those that continued to exist hardly paid expenses. Now the graver danger of being cut away from the Turkish culture of the past is looming on the horizon. The new generation rising within



the next twenty years will be as strangers in the country and to its past. The continuity of Turkish culture has been abruptly broken. The younger people will read and write, but will not be at home with any culture half a century old. Without a past, without a memory of the accumulated beauty in the national consciousness, there will be a certain crudeness, a lowering of aesthetic standards. If the change had been brought about in fifteen years instead of five months, with enough experts to work it out, with enough funds to edit the essential works of Turkish culture in Latin letters, these drawbacks would have been infinitely reduced. Yet with all its drawbacks, if one thinks of the Turkish nation two hundred years hence, the measure is nothing but a serious step toward that ultimate psychological unification with the West which seems to be the Turkish destiny.

In the Turkish schools today, Arabic, Persian, and Turkish classics have given way in the curriculum to science and history. Religious teaching and the reading of the Koran occupied some hours up to 1925; then they were altogether abolished. Into the teaching of history nationalism of a sort has penetrated, but the emphasis has been transferred from the Ottoman past to the pre-Ottoman Turkish period. The purely cultural and liberal has yielded in late years to the utilitarian spirit, the idea that learning is for its use rather than for its intrinsic value gaining ground all the time and ousting the platonic ideals of the earlier westernizers. Otherwise there has been little change in the fundamentals of the educational system which the Turkish Republic took over in 1922. The number of primary schools has increased, but not enough yet to provide education for the majority of the children. Perhaps the best recent step is the opening of primary schools in central towns where the children of the peasantry can be educated. There has been a decided increase in the teaching of modern languages and a still greater emphasis on sport and physical training. Of course the adoption of the Latin alphabet and the phonetic system has made necessary the training of a vast number of primary teachers who will know how to use them, and within a few years one can reason-

ably expect better results in primary teaching. The drastic repression of thought in 1925 is still having its effects, and the complete facts about the workings of the present educational system cannot be told until those who are closely connected with it, or are studying conditions in the country at large, can express their opinions more or less freely.

### 73. THE SOVIET INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM <sup>1</sup>

[The *Piatletka*, or Five Year Plan, was an attempt to determine the course of Russian economic and cultural life for a period of five years, beginning in 1928. The blue prints were drawn by the Gosplan, or State Planning Commission, and contemplated an increase of 136 per cent in industrial output, and a 55 per cent increase in agricultural production. The following extract is a summary of the progress made on the "industrial front."]



IN 1917 the Soviet government assumed control of a predominantly agricultural country, which had suffered a severe economic breakdown during the World War and whose industry, agriculture and transport were in a state of disorganization bordering on chaos. Economic conditions appeared extremely unfavorable to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat which, according to Marx, must be preceded by intensive industrialization.

The Soviet leaders undertook to transform Russia from a backward agrarian country into a modern industrial state. This transformation was intended to accomplish three principal aims: first, liberate Russia from dependence on advanced industrial states for capital and manufactured goods; second, establish a basis for the collaboration of industrial workers and peasants in

<sup>1</sup> Vera Micheles Dean, *Soviet Russia, 1917-1936* (Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1936), pp. 15-21. (Condensed.) Reprinted by courtesy of the Foreign Policy Association.

a socialized economy; and third, eventually enable Russia to attain and, if possible, surpass the economic level of capitalist countries like the United States and Germany.

Such comprehensive transformation, according to Lenin, could be successfully achieved only under a system of planned economy which would permit the government to regulate the use of natural resources and means of production, and plan both production and distribution over a period of years. This system, which received preliminary trial in the field of electrification, was finally embodied in the first Five-Year Plan, inaugurated on October 1, 1928. The plan, originally designed to cover five years ending September 30, 1933, was officially declared completed in four and a quarter years on December 31, 1932:

The first Five-Year Plan, regarded as a prelude to a series of plans, the second of which is now in operation, was framed by the State Planning Commission in collaboration with a whole network of regional and local planning bodies. The plan contained detailed programs for the development of every branch of national economy as well as all fields of social activity, such as education and housing. No sphere of human interest was too humble or remote to be affected by the process of planning: plans for extraction of coal and manufacture of textiles were matched by plans for increase in literacy and expansion of radio. . . .

Discussions of Soviet planning sometimes create the impression that it constitutes a harmonious process under which each plan sweeps majestically and irresistibly toward its appointed goal, without hitch or delay. Such a picture does not correspond to reality. The main purposes and general lines of planning are clear. In the course of application, however, many a project which seemed desirable and feasible in blueprint has had to be adjusted to human capacities and available raw materials, perhaps fundamentally altered, or even discarded when it proved unworkable. It is not in a spotless and well-appointed economic laboratory, but in a welter of plans, counter-plans, orders and counter-orders that giant new factories capable of producing machinery emerge, new ways of life are forged, new ideas ham-

mered into a backward people. That this process is uneven and wasteful, that it imposes heavy sacrifices which perhaps only Russians with their remarkable physical endurance and tradition of submission to authority can bear without undue recrimination, that much of it could have been accomplished more efficiently given a longer period of time—all this is doubtless true. It must always be recalled, however, that the Soviet leaders have constantly felt they had no time to lose, that Russia must be set industrially on its feet before it is attacked by hostile capitalist states, and that if socialism can triumph today it must under no circumstances be postponed until tomorrow.

The Five-Year Plan should not be viewed merely as an economic program for the establishment of a socialist state. It goes far deeper than economic reconstruction. It prescribes a new way of life, and directs the transformation not only of the country's economic structure, but of the habits, traditions, mentality—the entire pattern of conduct of the people. It may even be doubted whether, without such thoroughgoing transformation, the entire forces of the country could have been effectively massed over an indefinite period of time for the fulfilment of a program from which the average individual could derive but few immediate material benefits.

Reconstruction of Russia's economic system along socialist lines has nowhere been so thoroughgoing as in industry, which constitutes the most important part of the "socialized sector" of Soviet economy. Except for some handicrafts, which are fast dwindling in importance, private industry does not exist in the Soviet Union. The state controls all natural resources and means of production. Soviet industries are operated under the direction of government departments which are responsible to the Council for Labor and Defense. Individual plants and undertakings are grouped into trusts which, in turn, are organized into over thirty so-called combinations, such as coal, oil, rubber, agricultural machinery, industrial machinery, and others. The combinations appoint the directors of the trust, control the supply of raw materials assigned to these trusts, regulate the distribution of government credits among them, and assist the State

Planning Commission in the preparation of annual plans for their respective industries.

Under the first Five-Year Plan the efforts and resources of the Soviet state were concentrated on the development of heavy industries—factories devoted to the production of machinery. Soviet leaders believed that once the country was equipped with adequate facilities for the manufacture of means of production, it would become independent of capitalist states and could turn its attention to light industry—the production of consumers' goods. Heavy industry consequently made the greatest relative gains during the period 1928-1932, while light industry lagged behind.

This disparity between heavy and light industry explains the apparent paradox that while the Soviet Union reports constant industrial progress, the population continues to experience a relative shortage of such necessities as shoes, clothing, furniture and manufactured foodstuffs. Pressed for time in its race to attain and, if possible, surpass the technical level of capitalist states, the Soviet government purposely postponed fulfillment of the Russians' rapidly increasing desire for a higher standard of living. The second Five-Year Plan, however, envisages a slower pace of construction in heavy industry and devotes more attention to production of consumers' goods.

A number of important industrial undertakings were completed under the first Five-Year Plan, notably the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, which taps an important cotton-growing region; the Stalingrad, Kharkhov and Cheliabinsk tractor factories; the Rostov agricultural machinery plant; the automobile plant at Nizhni-Novgorod; the Baku-Batum oil pipe-line; the Dnieprostroi hydro-electric plant in the Ukraine which will serve a network of industries, some of which are still to be constructed; and the Magnitogorsk steel plant in the Urals, which will furnish the Soviet Union with an important base both for industrial production and for defense against attack in the Far East. Whenever possible, factories and extractive industries are grouped by geographic regions into powerful industrial combines—for example, the Ural-Kuznetzk combine and the net-

work of industries which will centre around the Dnieprostroi. Foreign experts have criticized the tendency of the Soviet government to scatter its resources of labor and raw materials by simultaneously starting work on plants in several regions instead of concentrating on the completion and efficient operation of a few key undertakings. Soviet leaders believe, however, that the country's industrial backwardness and the vastness of its territory make it imperative to decentralize industry, and develop various regions differing widely in climate and natural resources. They hope eventually to create all over the country well-knit and self-sufficient industrial units, linked with neighboring agricultural organizations into socialist communities in which workers and peasants will labor side by side for the welfare of society as a whole. . . .

State operation of industry in the Soviet Union has revealed distinct advantages as well as notable flaws. Single control of industry has permitted standardization of goods and methods of production, and concentration of production in the more efficient plants. It has eliminated the costs inherent in a competitive system, such as advertising, the gains of the middleman, and other overhead items. It has shown that state control of industry need not inevitably develop into a stifling form of paternalism, and has increasingly emphasized the importance of individual initiative and responsibility in industrial management. On the other side of the ledger, state control has not yet insured a high degree of efficiency, has not materially improved the quality of goods or reduced the cost of production, and has not succeeded in raising the standard of living to the desired level. It has fostered the growth of bureaucracy in industrial administration, thus leading to mismanagement and serious delays. Economic plans, moreover, have frequently been subordinated to political considerations.

From the point of view of the Soviet government, however, the success of industrial planning and of state control over industry is to be measured not by qualitative or even quantitative standards, but by the progress made toward the establishment of socialism. The first aim of Soviet leaders is not to found a

social system under which all men can immediately satisfy their material needs, but to abolish economic conditions favorable to the re-appearance of capitalism and create conditions of production and distribution which will assure the triumph of socialism and the gradual disappearance of a class society.

#### 74. THE COMMUNIST EXPERIMENT<sup>1</sup>

[Mr. Chamberlain represented the *Christian Science Monitor* in Russia from 1922 to 1934. He left Russia in the latter year to take up a new journalistic assignment. The following passage from his recently published book represents his personal reaction toward the Soviet experiment which he observed for twelve years.]



WHEN I first came to Moscow in 1922, my attitude toward the Soviet régime was more than friendly; it was enthusiastic. I sometimes look back with a shade of amusement to the rhetorical articles in praise of the Bolshevik Revolution which I published in radical newspapers and magazines at that time, animated, as I can see in retrospect, by little knowledge and much faith. And, if I am sometimes tempted to laugh at the outbursts of Mrs. Modlin-Creighton and other enthusiastic tourists, I must remember that in 1919 and 1920 my own attitude was very similar. How ready I was in those years to believe the most fantastic yarns of the well-disposed returned visitor to the Red Mecca of Moscow! And how I was inclined to denounce the mildest and most reasoned critic as a base traitor and defamer! Proceeding from the belief, which I still hold, that the World War was the supreme crime and folly of the century, I jumped to the conclusion, which I have long abandoned, that revolution on the Bolshevik model is the panacea for war and for all social injustice.

<sup>1</sup> From William Henry Chamberlain, *Russia's Iron Age* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1934), pp. 372-378. An Atlantic Monthly Publication. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown and Company.

Not that I have completed the absolute psychological somersault which I have witnessed in some acquaintances who came to Russia avowed Communists and left the country expressing hopes for the complete overthrow of the Soviet régime. For some achievements of the Revolution I have the sincerest respect, especially for its spread of education among the masses, for its policy of absolute nondiscrimination among the races and nationalities of the country, for its exaltation of labor, for its promotion of health and recreation. I always come away from a workers' rest home or from a workers' club, situated perhaps in a former slum district, with a conviction that a vast amount of useful social and educational work has been and is being done under the auspices of the ruling Communist Party.

Industrialization was a reasonable goal for a country with the population and natural resources of the Soviet Union; and the Soviet leaders have certainly displayed tireless drive and energy in creating a network of steel and chemical plants, tractor and machine-building factories, and electrical power stations. The industrial progress of the country during the last few years is striking, even though one should bear in mind the fact, overlooked by some admirers of the Soviets, that pre-war Russia was developing its railroads and its industries very rapidly. I see no reason to doubt that the Soviet leaders and the majority of the Communist Party members believe sincerely in their cause and think they are working for the well-being of their country. I have repeatedly been impressed by the obvious devotion of the more idealistic of the Young Communists and of the veteran *podpolshchiki*, or former underground revolutionaries.

And yet, when one sums up all that can fairly be said about the constructive sides of the Soviet régime, there remains a formidable burden of facts on the other side. There is the permanent and odious system of terrorism and espionage. There is the decimation of the intelligentsia through secret arrests and banishments and most unconvincing "sabotage" trials. There is the subjection of the peasantry to wholesale deportations and to a "military feudal exploitation" that reached its terrible and inevitable climax in the great famine of 1932-1933—all



for the sake of imposing on the peasants an alien and unfamiliar system which certainly has yet to prove its productive advantages.

How can one reconcile such apparent contradictions: establishment of children's nurseries and sending of some children, with their kulak parents, to Arctic wastes; setting up of technical research institutes and application of inquisitorial methods to scientists of world eminence—to mention two of the more obvious? It is my personal belief that the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet régime which grew out of it can only be understood as an example of historical tragedy of the deepest and truest type, a tragedy of cruelty, of the crushing out of innumerable individual lives, not from sheer wanton selfishness, but from perverted, fanatical idealism—always the surest source of absolute ruthlessness. And behind this tragedy lie several conceptions which are implicit in Communist philosophy; and the longer I have seen these in practice, the more I have come to regard them as sentimental fallacies.

The first, the oldest and the most demonstrable, is the conviction that the end justifies the means. I think the overwhelming weight of historical evidence is to the effect that the means determine the end, and that an idealistic goal, pursued by brutal methods, has a tendency to disappear from view. Such major atrocities as the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, the state-organized famine, and the persecution of the intelligentsia have harmful results that go far beyond their immediate victims. They brutalize the society that is taught or forced to look on them with indifference or even with applause. I have often felt that even more terrible than the commission of these atrocities was the fact that no voice could be publicly raised against them in the Soviet Union. A distinguished historical novelist of the last century, Aleksei Tolstoy, in his introduction to his novel of the times of Ivan the Terrible, *Prince Serébrany*, writes:—

“I throw down my pen in indignation, not so much at the thought that Ivan the Terrible could exist, as at the thought that a society could exist which would look on him without indignation.”

I think there could be some very pointed modern applications of this statement.

A second sentimental fallacy of Communism is its virtual ignoring of the grave problems involved when the few men who must inevitably guide the whole political and economic life of the country, under the system of the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, are granted enormous power with no kind of effective check or control. Lenin was so obsessed with the idea that "capitalism," the private ownership of the means of production, was the root of all human ills that he never seems to have foreseen the abuses, equally serious, if of a different kind, which might emerge when all power, political and economic, would be in the hands of a dictatorial state.

I have talked with few if any peasants in the Soviet Union who do not consider the Soviet state a harder taskmaster than the Tsarist landlord. Russia's whole experience, especially during the Iron Age, certainly indicates most vividly that the possibility of exploitation is not eliminated when factories and mines, banks and railroads, are transferred from private to public ownership. A dictatorial state may exploit—more than that, *has* exploited—workers and peasants alike, not for the sake of private enrichment, but as a result of blundering mismanagement, of grandiose ambitions for quick industrial and military expansion. Incidentally, I think it is decidedly improbable that the Soviet state, after arrogating to itself the most absolute power over the lives of its citizens, will some day obediently fulfill Lenin's formula and "wither away." Lenin could doubtless imagine an abstract conception, "the state," withering away. It is very difficult, after seeing the atmosphere of special privilege with which high Party, Soviet, and Gay-Pay-Oo officials are surrounded, to imagine this new ruling class, or caste, voluntarily merging itself with the mass of Soviet citizens and "withering away" in any future, however distant.

The materialistic conception of history is a Communist dogma with which I am in vigorous disagreement. This effort to explain all human activity in terms of the play of economic forces seems narrow, inadequate, and unconvincing. It becomes

positively ridiculous when there is an effort to explain a jolly overture by Glinka as "Russian trade capitalism expanding" or a melancholy song by Tchaikovsky as "Russian landed aristocracy in decay." More serious than these amateurish experiments in artistic misinterpretation is the tendency to regard the individual merely as a member of this or that class. This impersonal approach is an easy road to pitiless hardness.

Then the practice of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in the Soviet Union has in it a large element of inverted snobbishness. Reasonable people would generally agree that labor with hand or brain is a title to respect. But I am quite unable to comprehend why work in a factory is intrinsically more ennobling than work in an office, or on a farm, or in a research laboratory. By its avowed and systematic discrimination against "non-proletarians"—that is, against non-factory laborers—in educational opportunity and in promotion in the state service, the Soviet Union is handicapping itself just as much as any state which resorted to some of the more familiar forms of class or race discrimination.

One among many points of faith common to apologists of Communism and of Fascism is an overweening contempt for civil liberties, which are represented as unnecessary and inconvenient barnacles on the ship of progress. The longer I have lived in the Soviet Union, where civil liberties—freedom of speech, press, assembly, and election—are most conspicuously lacking, the more I have become convinced that they are of vital and tremendous importance, and that their existence or absence is as good a test as any of the quality of a nation's civilization. The Communist (or the Fascist; their trend of thought in this question is strikingly similar) talks of civil liberties as of the outworn fetish of a handful of disgruntled intellectuals who are unable to rise to the necessary vision of the high and noble character and purpose of the Communist (or Fascist) state. But my own observation in Russia has led me to believe that a great deal more is at stake than the freedom of thought of the educated classes, although it seems rather obvious that culture becomes impoverished when the historian must alter his record of the

past, the author must give a prescribed coloring to his characters, and free research in any field can be cut off by the will of an all-powerful state.

It was during my trip through the famine regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus that I became utterly and definitely convinced that democracy, with all its faults, weaknesses, and imperfections, is enormously superior to dictatorship as a method of government, simply from the standpoint of the common man. Is there any recorded case in history where famine—not poverty or hardship or destitution, but stark famine, with a toll of millions of lives—has occurred in a democratically governed country? Is it conceivable that the famine of 1932-1933 could have taken place if civil liberties had prevailed in the Soviet Union, if newspapers had been free to report the facts, if speakers could have appealed for relief, if the government in power had been obliged to submit its policy of letting vast numbers of the peasants starve to death to the verdict of a free election? The countless graves of the humble and obscure famine victims, the peasants of Ukraine and the North Caucasus, of the Volga and Central Asia, are to me the final grim, unanswerable refutation of the specious Communist contention that freedom of speech and press and political agitation is only humbug by which the bourgeoisie tries to delude the masses.

If I have one wish for the future of a country where I spent many of the best years of my life and for whose people I feel only the warmest friendship, even though I disagree so strongly with many of its present-day political, economic, and philosophical beliefs, it is that somehow a little leaven of doubt and skepticism might filter into the pure yeast of Communist dogma. It is not a matter of discarding methods that prove ineffective; any ruling group with elementary capacity for governing will do this. It is a question of coming to believe that there might be one per cent of a chance that the fundamental dogmas of Marxism and Leninism are wrong, or at least that they represent not infallible truth, but a working hypothesis, to be verified by trial and error.

I believe that the progress of civilization in Russia will go

hand in hand with the progress of skepticism. When the Communists are no longer so self-righteously certain that they are leading the country toward a future millennium, they will perhaps not be so ready to impose on it some of the characteristics of a present-day purgatory.